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Henry Dundas.

REPORT

ON THE

ARRANGEMENTS which have been adopted,
in former Periods, when FRANCE threat-
ened Invasions of BRITAIN or IRELAND,
to frustrate the Designs of the Enemy,
by attacks on his Foreign Possessions, or
European Ports, by annoying his Coasts,
and by destroying his Equipments.



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State Paper Office

Jan^y 6. 1798.

Sir.

THE subject to which you have directed my researches, at the State Paper Office, is, to ascertain from authentic documents ; —

WHAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN ADOPTED, IN FORMER PERIODS, WHEN FRANCE THREATENED INVASIONS OF BRITAIN OR IRELAND TO FRUSTRATE THE DESIGNS OF THE ENEMY, BY ATTACKS ON HIS FOREIGN POSSESSIONS, OR EUROPEAN PORTS, BY ANNOYING HIS COASTS, AND BY DESTROYING HIS EQUIPMENTS ?

That I might meet your commands with the fullest information, I have perused the naval histories of good authority, and compared them with such documents, as the records of my office afforded ; and I now beg leave to report, as follows ; —

—That the successive administrations of Britain, since the reign of Queen Elizabeth, have proceeded upon *two* distinct, but frequently connected *plans* ; —

B

—That

—That the first of these plans has been ; to embark a body of troops, in transports, and to send a large naval force to protect them, both on their passage, and when landing, and for co-operation, at the same time, in the attack on shore ; —

In this case, from the tenor of the instructions, it appears ; that the object has been, at one time, to obtain possession of a foreign settlement, at another, of an European sea-port, by the former to extend our colonial empire, by the latter, to impress the enemy with an idea of our intentions, permanently to occupy an European station in his country, in order to draw off a part of his forces from the continental wars in which we had become parties *, or to destroy the armaments which he had assembled in his principal sea-ports, Brest or Rochelle (for instance) for the invasion of the south of England or Ireland ; St. Maloes, Havre, Dunkirk, &c. for the invasion of the North of England, or of Scotland ; —

—That the second of these plans has been, to grant a roving commission to one or more lesser squadrons, on board of which were embarked

* *Note.* It is to be recollected, that during all the wars in which we have been engaged, since the reign of Queen Elizabeth, in the Netherlands, either Austrian or Dutch (though the former have been frequently over-run by the French, and the latter, Zealand and Holland excepted, occupied by their armies) that the uniform object has been to restore these countries to their respective sovereigns, and that such restitution has been deemed necessary, for preserving the balance of power among the European nations.

barked a proportion of land troops, for the purpose of cruizing along the enemy's coasts; and, according to the information which the commander might receive, to make sudden attacks on any practicable port, by bombarding the towns, taking or burning the shipping; or landing, to destroy warehouses, carry away stores, and levy contributions;—

—Both of these classes of armaments have, in naval language, been termed *conjunct expeditions*. *Conjunct*, from having been frequently composed of British and Dutch ships and troops; and *conjunct*, from the navy and army having been united in the intended service.

These measures have been usually resorted to in the crisis of a war; and though both plans have frequently failed in their particular objects, they have, on most occasions, answered the general purpose of annoying and distressing the enemy, preventing his conquests of the territories of our allies, and his invasion of Britain or Ireland.

It is unnecessary, in this research, respecting conjunct expeditions, to review the History of England, before the last years of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, after she had recognized the independence of the Dutch; because that event gave rise to a new aspect of the relations of the nations in Europe, or to that system of a balance of power, the maintenance of which has been the source of all the wars and treaties of peace, for two centuries. Against this system, the schemes of *monarchial-France*, for universal subjugation, have
B 2
been

been in vain directed ; while those of *republican-France*, have overfet the independence of the continental powers.

With these preliminary observations, explanatory of the manner in which the subsequent report is to proceed, I shall reduce the subject under two distinct CLASSES OF EXPEDITIONS, and in treating of each of them, refer you to an *Appendix*, in which you will find copies of the official documents, by which I have been guided.

I. THE FIRST CLASS OF CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS, *proceeded upon the plan, of making conquests of the enemy's colonial dependencies, or of obtaining possession of some of his ports in Europe, under secret instructions, where the conquest could not be maintained, to destroy his armaments, and the ports in which they had been preparing, to oblige him to draw off part of his troops from the armies with which he was invading Germany and Flanders, or from the places in which he was assembling a force, for the invasion of Britain or Ireland.*

As the expeditions of this description have assumed different characters, according to the circumstances in which Britain has been placed, in the successive wars, in which our sovereigns have been parties, I shall arrange them under the reigns, in which they have chiefly been undertaken.

ELIZA-

ELIZABETH.
L I S B O N and V I G O.

1589.

After the *Spanish Armada* had been wrecked or defeated, the Queen resolved to find the enemy employment, at home, by sending a strong conjunct armament to Portugal. The first attack was made on Corunna, or the Groyn, where, after burning the magazine of naval stores, the troops were re-embarked for the Tagus, and landed at Peniche, a sea-port town, at some distance from Lisbon, under the command of Sir John Norris and the Earl of Essex. From the circumstances of this town being at too great a distance from the capital, and from Sir Francis Drake having found it impracticable to bring up his ships to it, the first object of the expedition failed, and the army were re-embarked; but, in the voyage home, the squadron made for Vigo, which it bombarded and burned*.

BRI-

* Hume's History of England, Vol. v. P. 350.

Molyneux Expeditions, that have been carried on jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a commentary on a littoral War, P. 37.

Burchett's History of Transactions at Sea, P. 355.

Note. As the state papers (those of Sir Joseph Williamson and Lord Salisbury,) of ancient date, though very valuable, have not been arranged under the subjects comprehended in the volumes or bundles, the documents regarding this expedition, have not been found.

BRITANNY and NORMANDY.

1591.

The Queen, still threatened by a new Armada, combined, in this expedition, two distinct objects; one was an attack upon the King of Spain, on the coasts of that kingdom, on this and on the other side of the Straits of Gibraltar; another was, affording support to the adherents of Henry IV. in Brittany and Normandy, at that juncture, at the head of the French protestants. To this last she directed her most powerful armaments; because the coasts of these provinces were situated opposite to England, with ports from which, if in the hands of the Spaniards, an invasion could be rendered more practicable.

For the purpose of expelling Spain from these dangerous strong-holds, in April of this year, she granted a commission to Sir John Norris to conduct 3000 men into Brittany, and in his instructions he was directed to steer first for Jersey, then to Granville, or Concale Bay, as from information he might find the adherents of Henry best prepared to receive him. On his landing the troops, he was to settle with the commanders, entrusted by Henry, what towns it might be expedient to put into the hands of the English, for the accommodation of the army and fleet; and he was to take care, that his choice of such towns should be decided, by their situation being such as could keep up a communication with the English coast; If he found that the adherents of Henry were not
suffi-

sufficiently numerous to co-operate decisively, with the troops under his command, he was to act on the defensive only, till such time as he should receive reinforcements either from the King's adherents, or from England.

It appears from Norris's report, that it became necessary to send a second armament to Normandy, for co-operation with that sent to Brittany. The conduct of this armament, consisting of 4000* men, was entrusted to the Earl of Essex.

Both expeditions, it would appear, were parts of the general system of defence, which the Queen had adopted in the year 1589. She had then sent Lord Willoughby, at the very time the Armada failed, to create a diversion in the enemy's country, and this at the crisis, when she had put her own subjects in *array*, to resist the Spaniards, in case they had effected a landing.

In the commission, and in the instructions given to Essex, are to be found observations, which, allowing for the present changes on the continent of Europe, may be useful in any conjunct expedition.

In the first place, the Queen vested Essex with absolute power, not only to exercise martial law, but to judge by himself, or by his deputies, in

* The mode in which this number was computed, strongly marks the cautious policy of the Queen, as well as the manners of the age. The force was to consist of foot and horse, 100 horsemen were to be accounted as 250 foot, balancing the expence of the one against the other.

all criminal cases, explaining these, not only to be military crimes, but such offences as would be recognizable by a criminal court in England.

In the next place she directed, that whatever pay or allowances Essex might think it expedient to grant to the officers and men serving under him, should be fully and regularly discharged; but to prevent excesses in the common soldiers, she ordered, that only a part of their pay should be weekly given them, and the arrears fully paid up at the end of each month, care being taken, in the mean time, that the necessary provisions and accommodations should be furnished, and an exact account of the sums so expended, should be sent to her, from time to time.

In the third place, as she had taken advantage of the prevailing prejudices of her subjects, in favour of the French protestants, to whom they had appeared eager to afford assistance, she required, that both the commander, and all serving under him, may regularly observe the rites of the English church, that the Queen's motives may truly appear; and farther, she directed (in order to prevent all suspicion of the sincerity of her intentions) that he, the commander, and all under him, shall pay a due regard to the honour of their transactions, in every particular, as any deviation from this principle (such as she had observed on former occasions) might disgrace the fame of the nation, "and the wisdom of the Queen's choice of her servants." Farther, as she had reason to apprehend, that *sedition individuals* had entered into
the

the bands which he commanded, for the purpose of becoming *spies* to the enemy, she ordered, that particular attention might be paid to the religious forms of the church, knowing that this test would lead to discoveries of the characters of individuals, and of the honor of their transactions.

In the fourth place, in the *commission* she gave the commander power to grant the honour of knighthood, and other military honors, to such as should distinguish themselves by acts of bravery, and useful service; but in the *instructions* she warned him, not to bestow these honors, from friendship and favour, as had, on former occasions, been the case, but on men who had actually distinguished themselves *in fight*, and who, from birth and fortune, were in situations to support the rank; leaving it, in other cases, by his recommendations, to herself, to bestow favours on such men, and such rewards, as would be more suitable to their own views and characters.

In the last place, she desires *Essex* may limit the service to two months, in his report to the French king, to whom he was to explain the great favour of granting her best officers and troops, at a time when her kingdoms were threatened with an invasion; and then he was to insist, on the troops being regularly paid, or that Dieppe and Rouan should be given, as cautionary towns, the revenues of which he was to levy, till the expence of the expedition should be liquidated.*

* Appendix, No. I. p. i.-xxii.

B R E S T.

1594.

The Queen, not discouraged by the failure of the preceding expedition to Lisbon, prepared an armament against Brest, then in possession of the opponents of Henry.

It has appeared from the preceding expedition, that she had resolved to drive the Spaniards from the provinces and ports of France, situated on the coasts opposite to England.

This fleet was entrusted to Sir Martin Frobisher, and the army to Sir John Norris. The troops were landed at some distance from the town, while Sir Martin blocked up the port. As the army were making their approaches, Sir Martin landed the seamen, and co-operating with the troops, made himself master of the place, a service in which this brave officer lost his life*.

C A D I Z.

1595.

Spain, imitating the politics of Elizabeth, sent four gallies, with a small detachment of troops, to burn some of the towns on the English coast. The troops were landed at Mount's Bay in Cornwall, and burned three small towns.

* Molyneux, P. 38.

Note. The Instructions not yet found.

Elizabeth,

Elizabeth, pursuing her original plan of finding her enemy employment at home, ordered a larger armament to be prepared than she had hitherto sent out. The destination was Cadiz. The Queen's orders were, to take possession of the place, and make prizes of, or destroy the shipping found at it.

The fleet consisted of about 150 sail, of which 120 were men of war; but seventeen only of this number were the Queen's ships, the remainder being vessels hired for the voyage. Twenty-four Dutch men of war re-inforced this fleet. The command was entrusted to the Lord High Admiral, Howard, Earl of Effingham. The army consisting of about 7000 men, was put under the orders of the Queen's favourite, the Earl of Essex.

The expedition set sail on the first of June, and arrived at Cadiz on the 20th, before the enemy had entertained any apprehension of such an attack.

In the port were fifty-nine Spanish ships, many of them laden with treasure, and nineteen or twenty gallies.

Essex, though subordinate to Effingham, stimulated by the ardor of youth, and trusting to his influence with the Queen, attempted to dictate to the Admiral, who following his instructions, and trusting to his own experience, resolved to begin with an attack on the ships in the harbour.

The enemy, however, run them up the bay, and burned a considerable part of them.

The troops were now landed quietly, and three regiments sent to make themselves masters of the bridge, which joins the Island to the main. The Admiral, after this service was effected, landed the remainder of the forces, while Sir Walter Raleigh was sent to seize on the ships in Port Real.

The Duke de Medina Sidonia, seeing the danger, ordered them to be set on fire, to prevent their falling into the hands of the English; The city was next attacked and captured. Essex insisted on retaining it, but the experience of the admiral prevented this rash measure. After therefore occupying Cadiz, about a fortnight, the troops re-embarked; and, in their way home, looked into the ports on the Grogne, St. Andero and St. Sebastians; but meeting with no ships of which to make prizes, arrived in England on the 8th August*.

FAYAL.

1597.

Determined in her purposes, Elizabeth ordered a new expedition, the object of which was the taking of Fayal.—This equipment, assisted by ten Dutch men of war, was commanded by the Earl of Essex.—From history it would appear, that they were directed to burn such

* Hume, Vol. V. P. 381.

Molyneux, P. 40.

Burchett, P. 356, 360.

Note. The instructions not yet found.

vessels as they might find in the harbours of the Groyne, and at Ferrol, and to cruize in the latitude of the Azores, for the purpose of intercepting the plate fleet ; and they were next to bear down, on the place of their original destination.

During the voyage, the ship commanded by Sir Walter Raleigh having sprung a mast, Essex ordered him to follow him to Fayal. On Raleigh's arrival, the alarm was given, and measures taken for securing the place against the invaders. After waiting four days, for the arrival of Essex, Raleigh, with great bravery, landed his own people, and made himself master of the Island ; a service which, if it procured him high reputation, brought on him the jealousy and hatred of his imperious commander.

Essex, that he might not return till he had performed some service himself, attacked and plundered Graçiosa, and Villa Franca*.

From these expeditions it would appear, that Elizabeth, in the crisis of a war, which threatened the conquest of her kingdoms by Spain, then undoubtedly the first naval and military power in Europe, and possessed, at the same time, of Flanders, not only preserved her own dominions, but curbed the encroachments, which Spain was making, by its attack on Henry IV. on the continent, and thus established that *new balance of power* in

* Hume, Vol. P. 5. 383.

Molyneux, P. 41.

Burchett, P. 364.

Note. The instructions not found.

Europe,

Europe, to which her coalition with the Dutch had given the first beginnings.

C H A R L E S I.

C A D I Z.

1625.

It does not appear that any conjunct expedition was undertaken, during the pacific reign of James I. though one of the first acts of his successor Charles, was to order an expedition against the Spanish dominions in general, under the command of Sir Edward Cecil and Lord Effex. The instructions bear, that they were to destroy the Spanish shipping and ports along the coasts of that kingdom.

The power vested in the commanders of this expedition, unlike those of the wise Elizabeth, were *equal*, and perhaps, to this circumstance, may be ascribed its failure. From the correspondence, and from cotemporary authors, it would appear, that the fleet made direct for Cadiz; and that the object of the commanders was, to destroy that town and the Spanish fleet.

The troops were landed with tolerable success; but from a total want of discipline in the army, after doing considerable mischief to the shipping and place, they were obliged to re-embark and return to England*.

* Molyneux, P. 44.
Hume, Vol. VI. P. 212.
Burchett, P. 370.
Appendix, No. II. p. xxi.

R O C H E L L E.

1627.

The command of this enterprize was entrusted to the Duke of Buckingham, and consisted of 100 sail British, having on board 7000 troops, with a right in the commander, to call upon the States General, for their contingent of one-fourth of any force, which might be sent upon such service.

From the instructions it appears ;—

—That after the war with Spain had been carried on for two years, Charles had entered into strict alliance with the French King, whose forces then occupied Rochelle ;—

—That by means of the Duke of Soubize, who had an interest in that part of France, Charles had entered into an agreement, to send this force to support the garrison of this place, against the meditated attack of the Spanish army ;—

—That Buckingham was directed to land the troops, on the condition only, that the French were sincere in their intentions to support the Protestant interests ; but that if he found it otherwise, he was to make for Bourdeaux, and from thence either to bring away, or to destroy, such English trading ships, as might be detained in that river. This service performed, he was to cruize along the coasts of Spain, make prizes of, or destroy their shipping, and land the troops to burn the towns, &c. ;—

—That

—That then he was to cruize for the purpose of intercepting the Brazil ships; and lastly, to detach a force, under proper officers, for the purpose of distressing the Spanish trade and settlements in the West Indies.

The fleet, under these orders, arrived off Rochelle, and the troops might have easily been landed, the men of war being ready to support the army, but instead of executing the service on which he had been sent, or throwing succours into the town of Rochelle, Buckingham attacked Oleroon, then made for the island of Rhé, from which he was obliged to retreat, and lastly, was compelled to re-imbark the army. Similar attempts were made to relieve Rochelle in the following year; but the incapacity of Buckingham frustrated that measure*.

CROMWELL.

JAMAICA.

1654.

The political embarrassments in England having taken place soon after this period, followed by the civil wars, which subverted the monarchy, we have to look for *conjunct expeditions*, under the administration of Cromwell.

* Hume, Vol. VI. P. 236. Molyneux, P. 44 and 45. Burchett, p. 371. Appendix, No. III. p. xxvi.

This

This bold usurper struck out a new line, in this kind of armament, in 1654, by combining the objects of both classes together, covering that where he had permanent conquests in view, under that, in which he had only the destruction of the enemy's armaments, shipping, ports, &c. The principal plan was the conquest of some of the Spanish settlements in the West Indies; the secondary one was, the destruction of their navy, and trading vessels on the coast of Spain. Neither blow, he knew, could be struck, but by concealing his intentions; and therefore, under the pretext of exacting a just retribution from the Duke of Tuscany, and compelling the piratical states of Tripoli and Tunis, &c. to make peace with England, he sent one large fleet into the Mediterranean, under the command of Admiral Blake, and another, at the same time, to the West Indies, under Admiral Penn.

Neither of these admirals were ready for sailing, till the year 1655, and neither knew the destination of the other, for both received secret instructions, which they were to open, at sea, in a certain latitude.

On board of Penn's fleet were embarked 5000 troops, under the command of Colonel Venables, who, upon looking into his orders, found, that he was for sail to the West Indies, to touch at Barbadoes, St. Christophers, &c. for such reinforcements, as these island could furnish, and then to make an attack on Hispaniola. In case of being repulsed, he was to sail for Jamaica, and endeavor to make a conquest of that Island.

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The event corresponded with the instructions ; the attack on Hispaniola was unsuccessful, and the conquest of Jamacia was effected.

Blake's expedition, connected with this acquisition, as it comes under the second *class* of these armaments, shall be detailed in the subsequent part of this report*.

WILLIAM AND MARY.

FRENCH COAST.

1691.

During the two first of the three dutch wars, when England was connected with France, several plans appear to have been formed for invading Zealand, and bodies of land troops were put on board the fleet, but this measure tended only to bring on the memorable sea battles of that period.

The conquests of the French armies in Flanders, and their being in possession of five of the seven provinces, were peculiarly favorable to the scheme, for Zealand and Holland only remained to the states.

On the accession of King William to the throne of Britain, the English became united with their rival the Dutch.

* Hume, Vol. vii. P. 255.

Molyneux, P. 49.

Burchett, P. 385 et seq.

Note. The instructions not yet found.

The conjunct expeditions of France, at this juncture, were connected with their scheme of supporting the pretensions of the Stuart family, while those undertaken by King William, appear to have had in view, the diverting the French force from Flanders, by obliging them to send off large detachments to defend their own sea-ports.

While France was threatening the invasion of England or Ireland, to support the pretensions of James, King William resolved to send a counter expedition, for the purposes of obliging Lewis XIV. not only to recall the troops sent to Ireland, but large detachments from his armies in the Netherlands.

Towards the close, therefore, of the year 1691, an expedition was prepared, consisting of the grand fleet, commanded by Admiral Russell, and under him Sir John Ashby.—The military force consisted of a small body of dragoons, with a few regiments of infantry. The object was general, that of making an impression on any part of the coast of France, which, from information, might be deemed practicable, the execution being left to the result of a general council of war, composed of the land and sea officers.

Russell detached Ashby, with a strong squadron, to intercept the French fleet of store ships and victuallers, coming from St. Maloes to Brest, in the expectation of receiving, through them, information that might enable the council of war to come to a resolution what places should be attacked, and in the mean time, the fleet

cruized off la Hogue, for the purpose of awaiting such notice, as Ashby might be able to send the admiral.

After a fruitless cruize, Russell returned to England, from finding that an attack upon Brest, which appears to have been his leading object, was impracticable*.

B R E S T.

1693-4.

During the year 1693, it would appear, that the general plan of attacking the French coasts continued, but that no particular destination was assigned the armaments. If Brest, however, could be attacked, that measure was to be tried. This general instruction was given to the Marquis of Carmarthen, with orders to detach a squadron, as a convoy to the trade to the Mediterranean, and to protect it in these seas †.

This scheme was varied, in a short time, upon information, that the squadron from Toulon was about to sail for Brest; and an order issued to Sir George Rooke to intercept it ‡.

* Molyneux, P. 76.

Smollett, Vol. 1. P. 181.

Note. The instructions to Admiral Russell have not as yet been found.

† Order to Marquis of Carmarthen, 13th May 1693.

‡ Instructions to Sir G. Rooke, 28th June, 1693.

A fleet

A fleet, at the same time, under Sir John Wheeler, was detached to the Mediterranean, with the avowed object of protecting the trade, and compelling the piratical states to the observance of the treaties; he was to give them presents, according to their conduct, and to enforce the neutrality professed by the Grand Signor.*

The grand fleet remained under the command of Admirals Ruffell, Berkeley, and Shovel, and consisted of fifty-two English, and forty-one Dutch, and a proportion of frigates, fire ships, bomb-ketches, &c. The land forces were under the command of the Marquis of Carmarthen, and General Talmash. The fleet made Carmaret Bay, and the Bay of Bertaume. A part of the troops were landed, under the command of the Marquis of Carmarthen, who found the coast so completely fortified, under the directions of Vauban, that an attack was deemed impracticable. A council of war was called, in which General Talmash insisted, the honor of the British arms was concerned, and obtained leave to land with a part of the troops. Such, however, was the opposition he experienced, that the greater part of the men were lost, and their gallant commander was wounded in the enterprize, and died soon after his return to Plymouth; the remainder re-embarked, and returned to Portsmouth.†

* Instructions to Sir John Wheeler, 20th November 1693.

† Molyneux, P. 80. Lord Berkeley's letter to Mr. Secretary Trenchard, dated Carmaret Bay, June 9th, 1694. Appendix, No. IV. V. & VI. p. xxiv—xli.

During

During this war, several expeditions were attempted (from 1694 to 1697) to the coasts of France, particularly those under Lord Berkeley, with the object of destroying the enemy's shipping, and burning their towns. The result of these measures shall be detailed in their proper place, under the second class. In aid of both these operations, several lesser equipments, partly composed of army and navy, were employed on the coasts of America, and in the West Indies, one against Dominica, and another against Quebec; but from the weakness of the colonial force, of which they were composed, they served rather the purposes of alarm than of conquest, except in the single instance of the conquest of Arcadia or Nova Scotia*.

The peace of Ryswick in 1697, which was of short duration, prepared Europe for the memorable war which commenced in 1702-3.

QUEEN ANNE.

CADIZ—VIGO—GUADALOUPE.

1702—3.

It would appear, that before the death of King William, and the actual declaration of war, the English government had taken the necessary

* Molyneux, P. 96. to 104.

precautions, to prevent the junction of the Brest and Toulon fleets ; and that, as at this time, it was doubtful, whether the French did not intend to seize on the Spanish flota, under the pretext of protecting it from the English, but in reality to get possession of the treasure, as the means of defraying the charges of the war which they meditated against England ; it was deemed politic to give instructions to Sir George Rooke (12th August 1701) to watch the motions of Monsieur Chateau Renaud, and by all possible means, to oppose his getting possession of the Spanish flota, or his junction with the Spanish fleet. Admiral Benbow, with a considerable squadron, was, at the same time, ordered to cruize in the tract of the flota, and to intercept them, not as prizes, but with assurances, that the property should be restored to its legal owners, if no hostile intentions appeared on the part of the crown of Spain. From a subsequent instruction (10th September 1701) it appears, in consequence of information from Madrid, that the flota was not expected till the following year. Benbow was directed to join his division with the grand fleet, and the whole were then to return to England, for further orders.

The war with Spain was now declared ; a conjunct expedition, therefore, was fitted out, for the purpose of making an attack upon Cadiz. The command of the fleet was given to Sir George Rooke ; and that of the army, to the Duke of Ormond.

The fleet consisted of thirty English and twenty Dutch ships of the line, with a proportion
of

of frigates, bomb-ketches, &c. and transports, carrying 9,663 English troops, and 4-138 Dutch. A squadron under Admirals Fairbourn and Graydon, was detached, with orders to block up the Groyne, and to cruize to the north west of Cape Finisterre, till joined by the grand fleet. The junction being effected, the whole arrived before Cadiz on the 12th August 1702.

The forces were landed on the 16th, at the Bay of Bulls. After taking possession of Fort *Rota*, the army marched to the Fort *St. Marie* which with Fort *St. Catharine* were quickly reduced. The resistance, however, made by the Fort *Monta Garda*, and the advance of the Spanish troops, from different quarters, obliged the allies to re-embark, so that the expedition, which had been planned upon information that the inhabitants of Cadiz and its vicinity favoured the pretensions of Charles III. of the House of Austria, terminated, in so far as regarded Cadiz, in disappointment.

Rooke, however, having information, that the Spanish galleons had taken shelter in the port of Vigo, determined to attack that place. On his arrival, he found it defended, not only by several strong batteries, but by six French men of war, moored in situations to cover the harbour.

After holding a council of war, it was determined, that the Duke of Ormond should land on the south side of the river, with 2,500 men, while Lord Shannon with 500, supported by the men of war, should endeavour to carry, by assault, the stone Fort, on the outside of the harbour. On the attack

attack being made, Monsieur Choizel attempted to cut his way through the troops, but being defeated, the place was carried; though in the neighbourhood, an army of 10,000 men, under the command of the Prince de Brabançon, might, by rapid marches, have protected it.

The fleet, during the attack, broke through the boom, and entered the harbour, and, after experiencing a stout resistance from the batteries, took the French men of war and the galleons; and thus, by one decisive blow, destroyed the French naval force in that quarter.

When this service was effected, Rooke detached Commodore Walker, in the Bedford, with five third rates, and a proportion of transports, having four regiments on board, to the West Indies, where he was joined by General Cordington, then preparing for an expedition against Guadaloupe. On their junction, the troops and sailors landed at different points of the Island, and after carrying the principal fort by storm, destroying the fortifications, and removing the valuable effects on board their ships, reembarked*.

BARCELONA and GIBRALTAR,

1703-4.

The most important as well as the most successful expedition, which was undertaken during
E
this

* Molyneux, P. 109, 118.

Smollett, Vol. II. P. 156.

Burchett, P. 585, et seq.

Appendix, No. VII. page xlii.—lii.

this war, was that which was fitted out in 1703-4, with the object of supporting the interests of Charles III^d. of Austria to the crown of Spain, in opposition to the settlement which had been made on Philip of Anjou, supported by the Bourbon interest. The conduct of this expedition was entrusted to Sir George Rooke; and it appears a resolution had been taken, effectually to support Charles, so early as the month of January 1703-4; for orders were then issued, dated on the 26th of that month, to get ready sixteen English and twelve Dutch men of war, and a proportion of transports, for the troops from England and from Ireland.

The intention, however, appears to have been concealed; for Rooke was directed to act, according to circumstances, in regard to the Powers in the Mediterranean, by seeking redress of certain grievances from the Duke of Tuscany and the piratical states; but to recede from his demands, if he could persuade the latter to enter into the grand alliance*.

From a subsequent order, dated 31st January, it appears, that Sir George Rooke was instructed not to sail, till such time as he should have on board, at least 6000 troops, and that he was to carry along with him, Charles III^d. then in England, and who had represented to the English Ministers, that his adherents in Catalonia were numerous, and would be ready to co-operate with
Rooke,

* Copy. Sir George Rooke's orders, 26th January, 1703-4.

Rooke, in re-establishing his power. In case however the whole of the Dutch auxiliaries did not arrive, Rooke was to sail with the force above proposed, leaving orders for the Dutch squadron to follow him to Lisbon*.

From a subsequent order, dated 14th March, it appears, that information had been received of the intentions of the French to attack Nizza [Nice] and Villa Franca; and that Rooke was directed to sail, with the fleet, for the relief of these two places, with secret instructions to co-operate with the troops of Portugal, against Spain, and to harraßs the coasts of that kingdom. He was also to co-operate with the troops of the Duke of Savoy in any attack on the coast of France that might be deemed practicable†.

The substance of this order was repeated in a subsequent one, dated the 24th of the same month, in which he is to call a council of war of the Dutch and English officers, to take resolutions for the speediest method of distressing the enemy, in the Mediterranean; and above all, he was to take such a station, as might prevent the junction of the Toulon and Brest fleets‡.

From the general instructions, dated in the same month, it appears;—

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—That

* Orders from Sir George Rooke, 31st January, 1703-4.

† Instructions to Sir George Rooke, 14th March 1703-4.

‡ Instructions to Sir George Rooke, 24th March, 1703-4.

—That Sir George Rooke was ordered to sail direct for Cadiz, and as he coasted along Spain, to alarm the towns, but to make a distinction between the adherents of Charles, and those of the Duke of Anjou;—

—That in the event of his finding, after a council of war, that it would be expedient to proceed as far as Leghorn, he was there to consult with the English Envoy, as to the demand of reparations, for injuries sustained by British subjects from those of the Grand Duke of Tuscany: that he was next to proceed to the Adriatic, and there endeavour to destroy whatever French ships he might meet in that sea, or in the ports of Venice; and to make a demand on that republic, for the release of such British subjects as had been detained, with damages for their ships taken or destroyed, in the port of Bargno; insisting also that all English subjects be released, if on board any of the Venetian ships; and to leave a small force in the Adriatic, for the protection of the English in that sea;—

—That he was to endeavor to induce the states on the coasts of Barbary, to declare war on France, and to give them the hope of the present of guns, they had demanded, as soon as they should have captured any of the ships of that nation;—

—That he was to consider all Italians taken on board the ships of the enemy, as prisoners of war; and in fine, that he was to prevent, by every possible

possible means, the Toulon fleet, from getting out of the Straits*.

Sir George Rooke, with these instructions, sailed about the end of March, and arrived at Lisbon in May, and after cruizing for a month in the Mediterranean, proposed to the Prince of Hesse, who commanded for Charles III. to attempt Barcelona. Two thousand men were accordingly landed; but no co-operation being given by the Catalonians, agreeably to their promises, the troops were re-imbarked.

Rooke directed his next cruize to the Isles of Hieres, and pursued the French fleet into Toulon. From thence he proceeded to Lisbon, and afterwards to the Straits, where he was joined by a fleet from England, under Sir Cloudeſly Shovel. A council of war was held, in which it was resolved, to make an attack on Gibraltar. The troops were accordingly landed on the isthmus, under the command of the Prince of Hesse Darnstadt, with instructions to cut off the communications between the fort and the continent. On the 24th July, the fleet bombarded the town, and drove the enemy from the batteries on the south mole head. Rooke then ordered his captains to man the pinnaces, and storm the fortifications, which the seamen, with

* Appendix, No. VIII. page 1.

Note. From an additional instruction to Rooke, it would appear, even at this period, that the scheme of attacking Toulon had been projected, but as this event did not take place till the subsequent year, the instruction respecting it shall be reserved, as explanatory of that expedition.

with infinite bravery, effected. On the 24th the place capitulated.

The Prince of Hesse, with such drafts as could be spared from the fleet, was appointed governor. In the fort were found, above 100 brass pieces mounted, and sufficient ammunition for the defence of the place.

Rooke, after this expedition, sailed for the Bay of Malaga, where he fought and gained the decisive battle against the French fleet, that rendered the allies masters of the Mediterranean, during the remainder of the war.

In September he returned in triumph to England, leaving Sir John Leake with a fleet in the Mediterranean, for the protection of trade, and the important station of Gibraltar.

The French were no sooner informed, that Leake and the fleet had arrived at Lisbon, than Monsieur de Pontis sailed from Toulon with a conjunct expedition, to recover Gibraltar. When Leake received information of this event, he immediately sailed from Lisbon, and was fortunate enough to throw 400 marines, and some engineers, into Gibraltar, and then returned to Lisbon for further re-inforcements. The enemy continued the siege, and had prepared a great number of gun boats, to be supported by frigates, in cannonading the fort, intending to take it by storm.

Leake arrived on the 14th of October, the very night on which the enemy's attack was to be made

made, and succeeded in sinking most of the men of war and gun boats intended to co-operate with the army on shore. In the ships which he captured, he found a large quantity of bombs and other warlike stores, with which, and with such drafts as could be spared from the fleet, the place was put in a state of defence.

On the 7th of December, 2000 land troops arrived from England, as a reinforcement to the garrison. Leake now sailed for Lisbon to refit. The French however still determined to persevere in the siege, and appointed the Mareschal de Tessé to command the army, and Monsieur de Pontis, to co-operate with his fleet.

The Prince of Hesse, and his garrison, were much pressed by the besieging army, when Admiral Dilkes arrived with a fleet from England, and threw in reinforcements, which made the garrison now amount to near 3000 men. Dilkes then made for Lisbon, where joining with the fleet of Sir John Leake, both arrived in the Bay of Gibraltar, where they found five French men of war, all of which they either captured or destroyed.

Monsieur de Pontis escaped with the remainder of the French fleet to Toulon, and the Mareschal de Tessé, finding the siege would be fruitless, turned it into a blockade.

By these efforts, the celebrated fortress of Gibraltar came into the possession of the English, the defence of which has, since that period, been

been the theatre of so many fruitless sieges on the part of the enemy*.

BARCELONA, ALICANT, &c.

1706.

This conjunct expedition was nearly allied to the preceding one, in its object and consequences. It was entrusted to the Earl of Peterborough and Sir Cloudefley Shovel, for the purpose of farther supporting the claims of Charles III. on the crown of Spain.

Queen Anne, founding upon the treaty made by King William with Charles, sent Mr. Stanhope as her ambassador to that prince; and it appears from the instructions given to this minister, that the objects were, to unite, as many of the states, bordering on the Mediterranean, as would co-operate with the grand alliance, and to obtain also such terms for her trading subjects, either in Europe or in the Indies, as might encrease the resources of the kingdom, judging, from the support she had given to Charles, that this was a favorable opportunity to obtain such advantages†.

Lord

* Appendix, No. IX. page lvi.

Molyneux, P. 121 to 126

Smollett, Vol. II. P. 247.

Burchett, P. 640. et seq.

* Instructions to Mr. Stanhope, dated 5th day of January 1705.

Lord Peterborough, besides having the chief command, both by sea and land, of the expedition, was also vested with power, if the service would admit it, to assist Mr. Stanhope in negotiating, as occasions might require, leaving the command under Sir Cloudesly Shovel*.

And it appears, at the same time, that the Queen had resolved to make Gibraltar a free port, and had forbidden the levying of any duties on vessels, arriving or sailing from it †.

Under these political arrangements, the fleet, consisting of twenty-nine ships of the line, besides frigates and bomb ships, under the orders of Lord Peterborough and Sir Cloudesly Shovel, with a proportion of transports for the troops, arrived at Lisbon in June.

At a council of war it was determined, after a junction had been effected with the fleet, under Sir John Leake, to make an attack on Barcelona. The fleet intended for this particular service, consisted of forty-eight ships of the line, English and Dutch, and a station was taken between Cape Spartell and Cadiz, to prevent the junction of the Toulon and Brest fleets, while Sir Cloudesly Shovel was directed to take on board Charles, and attack Barcelona.

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On

* Instructions to Lord Peterborough, 4th May 1705.

† Order by Prince George of Denmark, as Lord High Admiral, 6th May 1706.

On the arrival of the fleet, it was agreed at a council of war, to land 2500 English and 600 Dutch troops, for the purpose of taking Fort Montjuick, as the best approach for facilitating the attack on the town. This fort being carried, though with the loss of the Prince of Hesse, Lord Peterborough pushed on the siege, by land, while the town was bombarded by sea by Sir Stafford Fairbourne, and capitulated on the 28th of September.

In October, Sir Cloudesly Shovel proceeded to England, with the main body of the Fleet, leaving Sir John Leake with a strong squadron, to protect the Mediterranean.

Charles was left at Barcelona, with a small garrison, while Lord Peterborough went to command the army of his adherents, in the kingdom of Valencia.

The absence of the English fleet induced the French to form a large armament at Toulon, to be commanded by the count de Thoulouse, and to send an army of 30,000 men, under Marechal du Tessé, to attack the place by land.

This force arrived near Barcelona in April 1706, and Charles, deeply affected by his danger, wrote to Sir John Leake, then in Gibraltar Bay, where he had been joined by a squadron from England, under Commodore Price, entreating him to come to his relief.

Leake immediately sailed, and was joined by another squadron, under Sir Geo. Byng, and off Terragora

Terragora, by Lord Peterborough, with 1400 land troops.

The Count de Thoulouse, on receiving information of the superior force of the combined fleets, retreated to Toulon, while the Mareschal de Tessé broke up his camp with precipitation, and thus left Charles and his allies in possession of Barcelona and the adjacent country.

The fleet next proceeded against Alicant and Carthagenæ; the former of which stood a short siege, in which Admiral Byng and Sir John Jennings assisted; the latter submitted without resistance*.

Sir John Leake next proceeded against Ivica and Majorca, which, after a slight resistance, also submitted†.

T O U L O N.

1706-7.

The expedition against Toulon was conducted, on the part of the English, by Sir Cloudesly Shovel; and on the part of the allies, by the Duke

* Articles of capitulation between General Mahoni, preserved in state papers No. 3, entitled *Spain*. *Mr. Stanhope* and *Earl Peterborough*. 1706.

Molyneux, p. 128 to 131.

Smollett, Vol. II. p. 304.

Note.—After a careful research, the instructions to Lord Peterborough and Sir Cloudesly Shovel, cannot be found.

† Molyneux, p. 133.

Burchett, p. 689, et seq.

of Savoy. This measure appears to have been in view, so far back, as the time when Sir George Rooke got his orders to co-operate with the adherents of Charles III. in the attack upon Barcelona.

From the instructions given to that celebrated commander, he had the Queen's private orders to keep Toulon constantly in view; but, by no means, to communicate this part of her instructions to the ambassador of Portugal, till such time, as a council of war should be called to concert measures for carrying the attack into execution.

We accordingly do not find, during the period in which the operations detailed in the preceding article occurred, the least notice of this scheme; and yet Sir Cloudesly Shovel followed exactly the instructions which, two years before, had been given to Sir George Rooke.

The instructions directed,—That measures should be concerted with the Duke of Savoy for marching an army to attack Toulon; but, in the first place, that the Admiral was to relieve Nizza (Nice) and Villa Franca.

—That he was to propose the attack of Toulon to the Duke of Savoy, at a council of war;—

—That he was not to employ more time in alarming the coast of Spain than was required for the Duke of Savoy's forces to advance; and—

—That he was to consider the attack on Toulon as the great object the Queen had in view.

In

In the additional instructions, dated in May, he was directed not to attempt the landing to destroy the salt works at Panquars, till such time as he had relieved Nice and attempted Toulon; and when these services should be performed, he was to proceed to Palermo, and assist in the reduction of Sicily. He was then to make for Naples, and, in like manner, endeavour to bring that part of Italy under the dominion of the House of Austria; and, in general, to assist the adherents of Charles with warlike stores, § &c. &c.

Under these instructions Sir Cloudefly Shovel acted in 1706-7. Toulon, from information, was but weakly fortified by land. Sir Cloudefly was, at this time, joined by Sir George Byng, so that the fleet amounted to forty-three men of war and fifty-seven transports.

A council of war was held on board the Admiral's ship, the *Association*, at which the Duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene assisted; and it was resolved, that, with the aid of the English Admiral, an attempt should be made to pass the Var. Sir John Norris commanded the English boats, which run up that river under the batteries, and drove the French from them. He was supported by Sir Cloudefly Shovel with a body of seamen, and the place submitted.

The army of the Duke of Savoy, consisting of 35,000 men, had now advanced, and the English lay off the bay off Hieres.

§ Appendix, No. VII. and IX. page lii—lix.

Louis XIV. alarmed at this unexpected invasion, marched troops from all quarters, under the command of Mareschal Tessé.

The siege was began on the 15th of July, and a hundred pieces of cannon, with a proper body of seamen, were landed to work them.

The dilatory advances of the Duke of Savoy saved both the place and his fleet to the enemy, for it gave time to the French to strengthen the fortifications, and for their army to advance. The reinforcements thrown into the town enabled the garrison to make a sally, and to destroy the works of the besiegers, so that at a council of war it was determined, the Duke of Savoy should retreat, leaving it only in the power of Sir Cloudesly Shovel to bombard the works, and to destroy one of the magazines and several of the men of war.

This enterprize, however, though it failed, had the effect to dispose the French court to more reasonable terms of peace.

It was on his return from this enterprize, that the storm overtook the fleet of Sir Cloudesly Shovel, which lost to this country that distinguished officer.*

* Molyneux, p. 139 to 144. Smollett, vol. 11, p. 343. Burchett, p. 728, et seq.

SARDINIA, MINORCA, &c.

1708.

These expeditions were continued in 1708 and Sir John Leake appointed to succeed Sir Cloudesly Shovel, as Commander in chief.

The French, to prevent reinforcements going to the Mediterranean, resolved to send an expedition, with a considerable body of troops, to favor the pretensions of James in Scotland.

It is sufficient, in this report, to say that this enterprize was prevented by the activity of the squadron under Sir George Byng.

Sir John Leake arrived in the Mediterranean in the month of April, and at Barcelona in May. The first enterprize was an attack on Sardinia.—Eighteen hundred men were landed near Cagliari, and the fleet was prepared to bombard that town, when it yielded. By this acquisition, the interests of the House of Austria were strengthened, and ample provisions found for the united fleets of Holland and England, serving in the Mediterranean.

During the operations of this extensive war, in the Mediterranean, the want of a port, at which the fleet could rendezvous, or be refitted, had been severely felt. This circumstance suggested to Sir John Leake, and General Stanhope, who now commanded the troops, the plan of making an attack

tack on Minorca, and if possible, getting possession of Port Mahon.

For this purpose, the admiral took an additional complement of marines, from such of the men of war as were returning to England, to convoy the empty transports; and having received reinforcements from Majorca, accompanied by General Stanhope, the troops were landed in September, and commenced the siege of Port Mahon.

This important fortress capitulated in October, and in the month of November, Citadella, and the whole island; an acquisition which gave to the allies a strong-hold in the Mediterranean, and enabled the British, for many years, to check the naval armaments of France, coming from Toulon to join those at Brest.*

C E T T E.

1710.

The last expedition of this description, during this war, took place in 1710. The object of it was to land a body of troops in Languedoc, for co-operation with the Camissars (a religious sect) then in arms against the French government.—The English Minister entrusted the conduct of this

* Molyneux, p. 147 to 151. Smollett, vol. 2, p. 378.—London Gazette, 4481. Burchett, p. 749 et seq. Note—The State papers, respecting this expedition, have not as yet been found.

business to Sir John Norris, and General Stanhope, both of whom eagerly embraced the scheme, as promising a powerful diversion in favor of the Spanish interests, and, of course, of the grand alliance. General Stanhope persuaded Charles to embark a small body of troops on board the fleet, to co-operate with the General's regiment, and about 300 men, drafted from the garrison of Port Mahon.

The troops were landed at Port Cette, a cape on the coast of Languedoc, situated on the lake Thau. Cette was taken possession of with very little resistance, and a body of about 700 men, under General Seiffans,† pushed forward, to occupy the town of Adge, the peninsula leading to Cette, while the men of war protected the approach to the fort. This post, however, was but feebly defended against the Duke de Roquilaure, who approached with the militia, and a small body of dragoons, and was soon supported by the Duke de Noailles, who, by hasty marches, was advancing with a considerable army; the town therefore was abandoned.

The expedition, notwithstanding, answered one of its objects, that of obliging the French, to detach a considerable corps from the army, employed in Roussillon, on the frontier of Spain.‡

† This officer was a native of Languedoc.
Appendix, No. X. p. lx—lxx.

‡ Molyneaux, p. 157. Smollott, vol. 3, p. 36. Burchett, p. 768.

Such were the expeditions, during the memorable war of Queen Anne, and they produced the following effects;—They seconded, in a very strong degree, the operations of the Duke of Marlborough, on the side of Flanders, by obliging the French to make large drafts from their armies on that frontier, to defend their own coasts; they, in connection with the expeditions to be detailed under the second class, either captured, burned or destroyed the equipments, prepared for the invasion of Britain and Ireland, whether for depredation, conquests, or support to the schemes of the Jacobite malcontents with the existing government.—And, they so alarmed the French court, and exhausted its resources, as to compel its ministers into the terms of peace with the kingdoms and states, who had been parties in the grand alliance, and to bring about the various treaties, which ultimately were confirmed by the peace of Utrecht, and gave to Europe tranquillity for almost thirty years.

GEORGE I.

V I G O.

1719.

During the war with Spain, 1719, when that Court was meditating an invasion of Britain, in favor of the Pretender, it was judged expedient to

to check it, in this design, by an attack on *Vigo*. The troops embarked for this service, consisting of 6000 men, were put under the command of Lord Cobham, and the fleet under that of Admiral Mighels; and the whole were ready at St. Helens, on the 1st of September.*

After cruizing for three days on the coasts of Spain, in expectation of being joined by Captain Johnson, with the bomb-vessels, it was determined to make a landing; which service was effected on the 19th, by debarking the grenadiers, about three miles from the town, and on the following day, the whole army.

A strong position was then taken, on the left of the place, near the village of Boas. § Approaches were immediately made to the town, which was defended but a very short time, when the garrison retired into the citadel, after having spiked a considerable number of the cannon, the commandant leaving the magistrates to make what terms they could with the besiegers.

The siege of the citadel immediately commenced, and was carried on with such briskness, that the garrison surrendered on the 10th of Octo-

* Lord Cobham's Letter, dated on board the Ipswich, 1st September, 1719, in which he acknowledges the receipt of his instructions; but this paper has not been found.

(Spain,) Lord Cobham, General Wade, Col. Stanhope, 1719 and 1720.

State papers, No. 17.

§ Lord Cobham's Letter, dated Vigo, 19th September.

ber, in which were found the cannon and military stores, which had been prepared for the invasion of England.*

General Wade was next detached with about 1000 men, on board transports, to seize on Pontavedra, situated at the upper end of the lake of Vigo, which surrendered, without making any resistance. In this place were found a large magazine of cannon, mortars, and small arms, for the same purpose, of invading England.||

Having thus effected the object of the expedition, and found it impracticable to make any further impressions on the country, Lord Cobham ordered the troops to be re-imbarked; and the whole, with the loss of about 300 men, by death, sickness, and desertion, returned to St. Helen's, on the 27th of November.§

* Lord Cobham's Letter, 10th October, and its enclosure (articles of capitulation signed by Don Juan Gonzales de Sotto.

|| General Wade's Letter, 19th October, 1719, to Mr. Secretary Craggs.

§ Lord Cobham's Letter of that date, and London Gazette, for October and November. Molyneux, p. 170.—Smollett, Vol. III. P. 260,

GEORGE

GEORGE II.

CARTHAGENA.

1741-2.

The Duke of Newcastle, then Prime Minister, considering that he could not more effectually distress Spain, than by making an attack on some of its West India settlements, ordered a large fleet to be got ready, consisting of twenty-seven ships of the line, besides frigates, fire-ships, bomb-ketches, hospital and store ships, and an army to be assembled, and encamped at Carresbrook. The command of the fleet, till it should reach the West Indies, was entrusted to Sir Chaloner Ogle; but to devolve, on its arrival, on Admiral Vernon, who had acquired popularity from his expedition against Darien in 1739, (to be detailed in the second class) and the command of the army was given to Lord Cathcart. The opinion of Capt. Boscawen, who had served, with much credit, in the West Indies, was, after long consultation, taken, in so far as regarded the place of rendezvous, and Dominica, one of the neutral islands, fixed on.

It was likewise recommended, by the same officer, that the expedition should sail in the month of July; because, if delayed to a later time, it would be exposed to storms in the passage, and the troops to the rainy season, after their arrival*.

* Lord Cathcart's letter to the Duke of Newcastle, dated Portsmouth, 18th, August, 1740.

It was however, the 7th of August, before the troops were embarked, and the 16th, before the whole were ready to sail. From this period to the 24th of October, the sailing was delayed by contrary winds. The troops amounted to 10,000, the whole complement, about 12,000, was to be filled up by a regiment, to be raised in America by General Spottiswood, consisting of four battalions*.

The fleet failed about the 24th of October, and, as had been predicted, from storms and separation, did not reach Prince Rupert's Bay, in the Island of Dominica, till the 21st of December†.

From the hot season in the West Indies, before the fleet was ready for action, and from the loss which it experienced by the death of Lord Cathcart, at Dominica, the measure proposed to his Lordship, of attacking the Island of Cuba, was laid aside. Had this plan been followed up by Admiral Vernon and General Wentworth, the enterprize would not have ended in disappointment, losses, and calamity. That the attack on Cuba, with such a commanding force, was practicable, was universally admitted; Vernon, however, had cannonaded Carthagena, after his suc-

* Lord Cathcart's letters to the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Harrington, Mr. Stone, and Mr. Couraud, from 16th August to 24th October.

† Letter from Capt. Knowles to the Duke of Newcastle, dated Jamaica, 10th September, 1741, enclosing a journal of the voyage; and Sir Chaloner Ogle's letter, dated Dominica, 29th, September, 1740, to the Duke of Newcastle.

cessful attack of Darien ; and in opposition to all advice, resolved to conduct the fleet and army to Carthagena. The armament did not reach its fatal destination, till the 5th of March, 1741. The operations commenced with an attack upon Bocca-Chica, by the men of war, because this fort covered the mouth of the harbour. Considerable resistance was made, and a part of the troops were landed on the 17th of March, and this station taken possession of on the 25th. The fleet now attempted to enter the harbour of Carthagena, but found it blocked up by five ships, which the enemy had sunk, and two which were moored across, to serve as floating batteries.

After bombarding Castella Grandi, which covered this defence of the port, the troops which had been re-imbarked, after taking Bocca-Chica, were relanded, and with them the whole army, on the 5th of April, at a small distance from the town of Carthagena. In a short time, from the diseases of the climate, the army were reduced in their numbers ; and (unfortunately for the service) the disputes between Admiral Vernon and Gen. Wentworth ran so high, that the demand for assistance from the Admiral was but partially complied with, and only such soldiers sent, as had been serving as marines on board the fleet.

The siege, however, proceeded with considerable vigor, for a few days ; but from the strength of the place, and from the deaths occasioned by an epidemic distemper which prevailed, a council of war was called, at which it was resolved to re-imbark the whole on the 17th. After
destroying

destroying the fortifications of Bocca-Chica, &c. the fleet sailed for Jamaica, where it arrived on the 22d May. From this expedition, therefore, being undertaken at an improper season, from the disputes of the Commanders in Chief of Land and Sea Forces, and from the diseases of the climate, which terminated in the yellow fever, the enterprize completely failed of the expected success. *

L'ORIENT:-

1746.

The war, which had hitherto been openly carried on against Spain only, was, in March 1744, declared against France. The successful expedition from New England, which captured Cape Breton, 1745, induced the English minister to plan a large armament, for the conquest of Canada. The command was given to Admiral Listocke and General St. Clair. The preparations, however, were so tedious, that the Duke of Newcastle was, at last, satisfied this scheme must be given up; but as the troops were embarked, and so large a fleet prepared, on accidental conversation of General St. Clair with His Grace, in which

* Journal of the Expedition at Carthagen, by Capt. Knowles, in his Letter to the Duke of Newcastle, dated Jamaica, 10th Sept. 1741.

Letters from Lord Cathcart, Col. Blakeney, &c. 1740—1741. (No. 54.)

Molyneux, p. 173 to 182.

Smollett, vol. iv. p. 192.

he had stated the practicability of an attack on the coast of France, induced the King to give directions, for immediately employing the fleet and army on this service, and the place fixed on was L'Orient,—in which the store-houses, containing the goods of the French East India Company, were situated, and where, it was supposed, a considerable number of shipping might be either captured or destroyed.

From the correspondence, it appears, that neither the Admiral nor the General were, in any degree, informed, respecting that part of the coast of France, or the forces which might be collected to oppose their landing, or check their progress. The delays arising from this circumstance, and from their sending to Jersey, to collect pilots; the pretended knowledge of the country by a Colonel M'Donald, which was unfortunately listened to by the Duke of Newcastle, though doubted, and indeed remonstrated against by the Admiral and General, produced still farther delays; at last, however, the expedition, consisting of sixteen ships of the line, eight frigates, some bomb-vessels, and thirty transports, having on board six battalions of infantry, with a detachment of artillery, sailed from Plymouth, on the 14th September, 1746, and on the 18th arrived off Port Louis. Captain Coates, with a flying squadron, had been sent forward to examine the coast. A squadron, also, with a reinforcement, consisting of the Welsh Fusileers, and two battalions of the Guards, was at Plymouth, ready to sail, as soon as information should arrive of the success of the first experiment. On the fleet reaching the coast

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of France, there appeared to be three different places for landing the troops ; the first, at the Bay of Quimperley, but occupied by a body of militia and cavalry ; the second, in a small bay, situated near the former, and protected by a rising ground ; the third, at an arm of the sea, running up the counrry, and which was unoccupied.

In a council of war it was resolved, to make a feint of landing at this last place, which would draw off the troops from the second ground, which was considered to be the most practicable, for speedily forming the men when landed. The boats therefore ran along shore, as if intending to land at the third ground. The French, of course, suddenly marched to this spot. When this movement was perceived, the boats suddenly made for the second landing place, and formed on the beach, in a sufficient number to beat off the militia, which came to oppose them. The army then moved in two divisions, towards l'Orient, the one commanded by General St. Clair, and the other by General O'Farrel.

This town was summoned ; and a deputation, consisting of one person from the Magistrates, one from the East-India Company, and one from the Governor, waited on the General, to settle the terms of capitulation.

The General refused to treat with the two former, and rejected the conditions asked by the latter, which, in substance, were, that the garrison should be allowed to march out with the honours

honours of war, and retire to the interior of the country.

Whether the General was acquainted with the incapacity of his engineer, and artillery officer, or that he had not sufficient ammunition for a regular siege, does not appear from the first part of the correspondence ; but both become evident from the last. The engineer had placed the battery at too great a distance, and yet had reported, that he could make a practicable breach from this spot, or burn the town. The artillery officer had not provided furnaces, for heating the balls, after the seamen had, with their usual spirit, drawn up large iron ordnance to the battery. At last it was found out, that the stores were deficient in ammunition. Under such circumstances, which it was the General's duty to know, he certainly ought to have accepted of any conditions, to put himself in possession of the place, and he might have defended it, till the arrival of the reinforcement from Plymouth ; or if even that had been found impracticable, he might have carried off the naval stores and goods, in the East-India Company's warehouses, and taken the shipping in the harbour, and, at worst, have partially destroyed the fortifications.

By his delays, however, the French found means to throw a reinforcement into the town. This circumstance, with the incapacity of the officers, who were to conduct the siege, and the want of the necessary ammunition, led to a council

cil of war, in which it was resolved to retreat, and reimbark the troops, and return to England*.

ROCHEFORT.

1757.

The French having, in 1756, overrun the north of Germany, by sending almost the whole force of their army to that quarter, and scarcely leaving any regular troops to protect their own coasts, Mr. Pitt, on becoming minister, resolved on an expedition to the French coast, for the purpose of obliging the enemy to draw off their troops from Germany, and striking at his naval strength, by destroying the shipping in his harbours, and the naval stores, which had been collected for their equipment. The officer selected to command the fleet was Sir Edward Hawke, having under him Admirals Knowles and Broderick, and sixteen sail of the line, six frigates, six bomb-ketches, with fireships, two hospital ships, and forty-four transports. Sir John Mordaunt was appointed Commander in Chief of the army, with ten regiments, making, with the proportion of artillery, attending them, 9000 men.

The instructions given to these commanders, dated 5th August, 1757, pointed out *Rochefort*, as the place of destination, and, in general, required

* Appendix, No. XI.—Page lxx to lxxx.

Molyneux, P. 188.

Smollet, Vol. IV. P. 354.

quired both commanders to co-operate for the common service; the one, by ordering the seamen on shore, when their services with the army might be required; and the other, by ordering the soldiers, when on board, to assist, if their services should be required in the duties of the ships.

Besides Rochefort, the first destination. the commanders were directed, in case of succeeding at that place, to proceed to l'Orient, and should the attack prove effectual, on that town. next to attempt Bourdeaux; but they were, on no account, to keep possession of these places, any longer, than was necessary for destroying the forts, and either burning or carrying off the enemy's ships or stores. Should the armament be successful in all of these attempts, it was not to return to England till a time specified: but to continue cruizing, and alarming the French coast, from Bourdeaux down to Havre.

This fleet sailed from Spithead on the 8th of September, and so completely had its destination been kept a secret, that till the 19th, when the Admiral made the signal to lay to, no suspicion was entertained of its object.

The first attempt was made on the Island of Aix, by the frigates and bombs, under the orders of Captain Howe, who bore down on the fort, and close to the walls, on which he opened a terrible fire, and soon obliged the enemy to strike. A few troops were put on shore, to take possession of an Island, which, from its situation, in the mouth of the river, leading to Rochefort, gave them the command of the place by sea.

As if this Island had been the only object of the expedition, several days were lost in holding councils of war, * to determine on the mode of attacking Rochefort. On the 28th, the troops were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to to debark ; but the sea ran so high, that the first division of the troops, having been a considerable time in the boats, were ordered to their respective transports.

This delay gave the French the alarm, and every effort was made to strengthen the town. Such was the consternation at Paris, that the French guards were ordered to march, and endeavour to stop the progress of the English. †

A part of the troops were, at last, landed, but it was soon found, in a council of war, that the scheme was impracticable ; they were therefore re-imbarked, and the fleet, without performing any other service, than destroying the ships in the river, returned to Spithead on the 6th of October, to the great disappointment of the good old King, and the whole nation.

The hopes formed, before the sailing of the fleet, of their success, cannot be more strongly marked, than in a letter of Mr. Secretary Pitt's, still preserved in the correspondence, though it was not delivered, till after the arrival of the troops in England, in which, after hearing of the failure, he

* Minutes of council of war, held on 25th and 28th September.

† Letter from Colonel Yorke, then ambassador at the Hague, to the Secretary of State.

he required of the commanders, to take possession of the Island of Rhé*.

The Measure however had the good effect, of stopping the march of the large reinforcements, ready to join the French army in Germany.

ST. MALOES &c.

1758.

Not discouraged by this disappointment, Mr. Pitt resolved to send an expedition, in the spring of 1758, against St. Maloes. Past experience had shewn, that one of the great difficulties attending conjunct operations had been, the want of flat bottomed boats, which could be run on shore to land, or re-imbark troops. To remedy this inconveniency a considerable number of flat bottomed boats were built, to carry two sails, and with benches in them, for the soldiers to sit on, leaving a space for 10 rowers on each side. Each boat was to contain 70 soldiers, besides 20 rowers. The fleet was commanded by Lord Anson and Sir Edward Hawke, and the army, consisting of 15 battalions, 400 artillery, and 500 light horse, making in all, 13,000 men, provided with 60 pieces of cannon, (50 of which were 24 pounders) and 56 mortars, put under the orders of the Duke of Marlborough, Lord George Sackville, and Lord Ancram,

* Appendix, XII and XIII.—Page lxxx—xciv.

Molyneux, P. 205.

Smollet, Vol. 6. P. 102.

Enticks History of the late War, Vol. 2. P. 305-338.

Ancram. The embarkation was finished by the 28th of March. The corps to be first debarked, were to take two days provisions, and one tent, for every 8 men. The particular command of the frigates, and in general the whole management of the debarkment, was entrusted to Commodore Howe.

This armament failed on the 1st of June. The squadron under Commodore Howe, with the transports, experienced a heavy gale off Alderney, on the 3d. After making the most proper dispositions, to reassemble his ships, the Commodore anchored in Canceille Bay, in the neighbourhood of St. Maloes. The batteries, on the shore, fired on him with very little effect. In his own ship, the *Essex*, after ranging along the shore, he landed the troops without opposition, and they immediately pushed on, in small parties, to seize the posts upon the high grounds.

The only practicable road, from the point of landing to St. Maloes, was a circuit of 12 miles, so that a mistake was made, in not landing at Parrame harbour, within a league of the town.

The army encamped on a rising ground, at a short distance from the place of its destination. In its first day's march, it was divided into two columns, and advanced towards St. Maloes. A detachment was sent to burn about 100 sail of shipping at St. Servan and Solidore, a fauxbourg of St. Maloes, which has an open harbour.

A fortified camp was next established, the front covered by a hollow way, flanked with
houses

houses, in which loop holes were made, the left secured by a deep escarpment; the centre and right defended by large trees, cut down, and the village of Cancale, so that the army could defend itself, in such a position, against any superiority of numbers.

The town of St. Maloes had been strongly fortified, towards the sea, but it had no outworks towards the land. It was not however deemed practicable to lay a regular siege to it, so that after alarming the country, and destroying the vessels above mentioned, the council of war judged it expedient to reembark the troops, which was done without loss.

The town of Granville was next reconnoitred by Commodore Howe's squadron, but from the state of the weather, the fleet was obliged to stand off, towards Guernsey and Jersey, and to make Portland; it next stood towards Cape La Hogue, and then steered for Havre de Grace. Still the weather continued tempestuous, and admitted only of a course, along shore, towards Harfleur. An attempt on Cherbourg was resolved on, but from the heavy gales and seas, which still continued, the fleet was forced to return to St. Helen's.

This expedition however answered fully its purposes, viz. of preventing the reinforcements from being sent to Germany, and obliging the enemy to lay aside his intentions of invading Britain.*

* Molyneaux, P. 212, 221. Smollett, Vol. 6, P. 306.—Entick, Vol. III. P. 77-94. *Note*—Though the Admiralty papers of this year are at the paper office, nothing regarding this expedition is to be found in them.

CHERBOURG.

1758.

This expedition was formed on a smaller scale than the preceding one. The command of the fleet was given to Commodore Howe, on board of whose ship His Royal Highness Prince Edward served, and that of the army to General Bligh. The troops consisted of about 6000, the fleet the same, as in the former expedition. The destination was Cherbourg. Commodore Howe weighed anchor on the 30th of July, but having met with contrary winds, he did not make Cherbourg till the 7th of August. On the 8th, the troops were landed, while the frigates ran along shore, scouring the coast. Though the enemy assembled about 9000 men in the neighbourhood, from their ignorance of the numbers landed, they retreated and left Cherbourg defenceless.

The troops advanced by the way of Nanqueville, and got possession of Fort Querqueville, which had been abandoned, and of the other posts leading to the town of Cherbourg, which they entered without resistance.

The engineer was directed to destroy the forts, while the destruction of the basin was left to the fleet and artillery.

A camp was formed for the army, in the neighbourhood. Had the enemy approached, from the excesses of our soldiery, in drunkenness, much danger might have been experienced, but though
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he had received a reinforcement of 4300, under the command of the Duke of Luxembourg, no attack on the British was attempted.

After then levying the King's taxes, and a ransom, for saving the town, the English re-imbarked, without molestation, having sent off before them the brass ordnance taken in the place, and reached Weymouth Road in safety*.

ST. CAS.

1758.

The success at Cherbourg led to what has been termed the *St. Cas* expedition, composed of the same troops and fleet, as the former one. This armament sailed on the 31st of August from Portland Road. It would appear that the first intention was to give an alarm to St. Maloes, as from the smallness of the force, compared with that which had recently found an attack impracticable, a serious attempt could not be intended.

This fleet first anchored in the Bay of St. Lunnaires, where the ground was bad, and the coast environed with rocks. The troops however were landed on the 6th Sept. 1758, and as there was no military force to oppose them, easily formed on the heights near St. Lunnair.

* Molyneux, 221, 226. Smollett, Vol. VI. P. 312.—Entick, Vol. III. P. 182, 192. *Note*—The documents for this expedition have not been found.

The enemy apprehending St. Maloes to be the object, had marched all his troops into the town. By this error St. Briac, the real object, situated about a league and a half from the place of debarkation, was attacked on the 7th, by five companies of Grenadiers, under Sir William Boothby, and submitted without resistance. Three 3-masted ships, eight of 2, and four sloops, were burnt in the harbour. To cover this service, a detachment of the army had been sent to reconnoitre St. Maloes.

After various schemes for the attack of this place, the measure was given up, as impracticable, and it was resolved to march the army across the country to *St. Cas*, while the fleet took its station in the bay, to be ready for the troops, when a reembarkment should be deemed expedient. The difficulty experienced by the army in this march, and the opposition, though feeble, which it met with, gave time to the Duke D'Aiguillon to assemble troops from St. Maloes, Granville, Caille and Brest, amounting to 14 battalions and 4 squadrons, with 12 pieces of cannon and several mortars, while Mons. D'Aubigny, with 3000 men, was advancing from Granville, and Mons. De la Chartre, with a strong corps from St. Maloes, to attempt enclosing the British forces. At last it was resolved to retreat to the shore of the bay of *St. Cas*; but before the whole of the army could be embarked, on the 11th of September, an attack from all quarters was made on the troops, waiting for the boats on the beach, so that our loss, in killed and wounded, amounted to about 700 men, notwithstanding

notwithstanding the meritorious exertions of Commodore Howe, to bring off the troops from the shore.*

GEORGE III.

BELLE ISLE.

1761.

General Hodgson commanded the troops, and the Commodore Keppel the fleet, in the expedition, fitted out for the conquest of Belle-Isle. The fleet came to anchor in Belle-Isle road, on the 7th of April. A feint was made to land at Port St. André, to call off the enemy's attention, while the real attack was made on Port Lac Maria.

At first the army experienced a check in landing; the service was at last effected, by the grenadiers of Beauclerk's regiment getting on the top of the rock, near point Lac Maria, and maintaining their ground, till supported. The siege of Palais was then commenced, and continued till the 7th of June, when it surrendered by capitulation.†

* Molyneux, P. 232 to 249. Smollett, Vol. VI. P. 316. Enticks, Vol. III. P. 192, 214.

† Entick's History of the War, Vol. V. P. 115. For Articles of Capitulation, see London Gazette. Belle-isle Castle, 7th June, 1761. Note—The instructions have not been found.

II. THE SECOND CLASS OF CONJUNCT EXPEDITION, proceeded upon the plan, of granting a roving commission, to one or more lesser armaments, for cruising along the enemy's coasts, and, according to the information received by the commanders, making attacks upon his ports, bombarding his towns, destroying his shipping and warehouses, and levying contributions, &c. to compel him to march his troops, from one place to another, uncertain where the next attack might be intended or made.

QUEEN ELIZABETH.

1587.

While the Spanish Armada was preparing, not only in the ports of that kingdom, but in those of Flanders, for the avowed purpose of invading England, and of subverting her throne, Queen Elizabeth made it known to her subjects, who might chuse to become adventurers, in an armament, for seizing the enemy's ships, &c. that such adventurers should receive her approbation, and have full right to the prizes they might seize, and to the plunder they might make.

One of the most forward of this description, who offered his services, was Thomas Cavendish of Devonshire, who, having by dissipation, ruined his private fortune, resolved to retrieve it by some bold enterprize against Spain. He accordingly fitted out three small vessels, one of 120, one of 60, and one of 40 tons. With this inconsiderable armament, he adventured into the South Sea, and committed great depredations on the Spanish

Spanish towns, wholly unprepared for such an attack, took nineteen vessels richly laden, and returned to the port of London, which he entered in triumph.

This blow was the more severely felt, not only from the loss sustained, but from the example of opening a new way, by which England could distress its avowed enemy*.

1588.

After the invincible armada had been, by storms and the attacks of the Queen's fleets, prevented from carrying their scheme of invasion into execution, with that decision and promptitude which marked all her measures, Elizabeth gave a discretionary and roving commission to Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake, to the following effect, viz;—

—That they were empowered, under the authority of martial law, to call for such service of carriages, horses, &c. from all her subjects, as might convey, with the greatest speed, the articles and necessaries, to the port, from which the squadron was to proceed, so that the equipment of 4000 men (to which she limited the expedition to be employed) might be speedily completed. That, as it was not the Queen's intention, to employ her own navy in this enterprize, but to hold out the prospect of plunder and fame
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* Hume's History, Vol. V. P. 328.

to her loving subjects, by invasion of the ports of her own and their enemy, the commander was empowered to select such ships and such men, as chose to embark in the enterprize, and to grant to them commissions, as officers in her service ;—

—That as a further encouragement, such adventurers were to receive their due proportion of the plunder, under the orders of the commanders, and that the right to such proportion should be confirmed by six of her Privy Counsellors, to be appointed for that special purpose, whose award should give sufficient right, to such proportion of the plunder, against any claim of this Queen, or of Her successors : that is, should establish the property to be absolute and vested in the holders of it.

The expedition accordingly proceeded to Cadiz ; but, as it had not on board a sufficient military force, to attack the place, it forced the six gallies, intended to guard the fort, to retire ; attacked, and either took or burned above 100 sail of vessels, loaded with stores and ammunition for the new Armada, intended to be sent for the invasion of England.

From Cadiz this fleet sailed for Cape St. Vincent, and after destroying the fishing and coasting vessels, in that part of the Spanish dominions, proceeded to the Azores, where it captured a valuable prize, and then returned in triumph, to England. Drake, thus added to the fame, which two years before he had acquired in the West Indies, by

by the capture and pillage of the cities of St. Jago, St. Domingo, Carthagená and St. Augustin*.

CROMWELL.

1654.

It does not appear, that any expedition of this description occurred, from the reign of Queen Elizabeth till the usurpation of Cromwell.

This bold, but intelligent usurper, determined, in 1654, to make war on the Spaniards, and, if possible, to get possession of some of their West India Settlements. For this purpose he fitted out two large fleets, one under the orders of Admiral Penn, the other under those of Admiral Blake.

His object was to make the attack of the fleet, under Blake, subordinate to that under Penn, and, in the mean time, to amuse the Court of Spain with pretensions of friendship, till he should receive information of his success in the West Indies.

When the fleets were ready, each Admiral received secret instructions, to be opened in a certain latitude at sea; but neither knew the destination, nor the service, upon which the other had been sent.

* Appendix, No. XIV. p. xciv.

Hume, Vol. 5. P. 327.

Molyneux, P. 36.

Burchett, P. 355.

Under the preceding class, we have detailed the success of Penn, in the conquest of Jamaica.

It was given out, that the object of Blake's armament was to intercept the Duke of Guise, and to protect the kingdom of Naples against the French; but as this delusion could not answer, after Blake's fleet had actually reached the Mediterranean, a new pretext was published, that he had been sent to require from the Duke of Tuscany, reparations for certain injuries, sustained by English merchants at Leghorn, and to compel the piratical states to terms of peace.

To give probability to these pretexts, Blake appeared before Leghorn, and compelled the Duke of Tuscany to pay a large sum, as a retribution; he next came before Tripoli, and obtained his terms; and then, by a bold attack on Tunis, forced its chief also into submissions. At the time when these services had been finished, the accounts of the capture of Jamaica arrived, and the war between England and Spain was declared.

Blake, who had received civilities from the Spaniards, that enabled him to be fully informed of the situation of Cadiz, appeared before that port, in April 1657; but having had information, that the plate fleet had put into Santa Cruz, in the island of Teneriff, determined to make an attack on that port. On his arrival, he found the place strongly fortified, and the governor determined to defend it against him. By one bold effort, however, he broke through the boom, that defended the harbour, and burned the whole
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of the galleons, and the Spanish ships in the port, and then returned to England in triumph.*

WILLIAM and MARY.

1692.

During the time, in which the armaments in the other class were acting, the King resolved to send a small squadron, consisting of some men of war, four bomb-ketches, and ten brigantines, under the command of Commodore Benbow, to attempt the destruction of the shipping and privateers in St. Maloes. After warping up the river, three several times, without being able to effect the service, this determined officer fitted up a vessel of 300 tons, as a fire ship, with the object of taking advantage of the first fair wind into the harbour, and burning the shipping and town.

The experiment would have completely succeeded, had not the ship grounded, before entering the harbour. The officer commanding, notwithstanding this accident, set her on fire, and such was the explosion, that both the town and shipping suffered considerably; and had there been land forces on board, to take advantage of the consternation of the inhabitants, the town and shipping might have been easily taken or destroyed†.

* Molyneux. P. 54.

Burchett, P. 384 to 396.

† Molyneux, P. 77.

Burchett, P. 527.

Smollett, Vol. I. P. 237.

1695.

The King, disappointed by the failure of the expedition against Brest, in 1694, resolved to send a lesser armament, under the command of Lord Berkeley, to make an attack on the towns, on the French coast, from St. Maloes, down to Dunkirk. On the 18th June 1695, the Lords of the Admiralty directed Lord Berkeley, to make an attempt upon St. Maloes, while the Dutch fleet, under Admiral Allemonde, were to attempt the bombardment of Dunkirk, leaving it to the opinion of a council of war, of English and Dutch officers, whether both attacks might not be made at the same time.*

Of so much importance were these attacks considered, that on the 27th of the same month, orders came to Lord Berkeley, to take the advantage of the wind, as it might be most favorable, either for St. Maloes or Dunkirk, and to sail, without loss of time, for either the one or the other place.†

It appears that Lord Berkeley arrived off Guernsey on the 2d of July, where, at a council of war, it was resolved to bombard St. Maloes on the 8th, and that Captain Benbow should make the attack ‡.

from

* Commissioners of the Admiralty's orders to Lord Berkeley, 18th June, 1695.

† Ibid, 27th June 1695.

‡ Minutes of council of war, 2d July 1695.

From the minutes, it appears, that the attack, conducted by Captain Benbow, was made on the Quince rock, on the 5th; that the town was set on fire, in different places; and that the frigates and well-boats were much disabled.

The service therefore was shifted from St. Maloes to Granville *; but the frigates were to remain off St. Maloes, till information should be received, that Benbow and the bomb-ketches were off Granville †.

After throwing a great many bombs into the place, and setting it on fire, the fleet made for Calais, where it burned the wooden fort, that defends the road, set on fire the town and the vessels in the harbour in different places ‡.

From Lord Berkeley's letter of 17th July, 1694, it appears, that he did not return to Portsmouth, but remained off Havre;—That on the 14th he laid Dieppe in ashes; that on the 15th he sent Captain Benbow to take the foundings of Havre, which he found difficult of approach, on account of the tides;

—That he, however, threw some bombs into the town, and set it on fire, in several quarters;—

—That he found St. Maloes so well fortified, that an attack upon it was impracticable; and—

* Ibid.—5th July, 1695.

† Lord Berkeley's Letter, 8th July.

‡ Substance of Lord Berkeley's Letter to the Admiralty in the form of a Memorandum.

—That

—That he again appeared off Havre-de Grace, which he set on fire, in different places.*

In his letter of 25th of July, from the Isle of Wight, he reports, that he had appeared off Cherbourg and La Hogue, and alarmed the enemy, who had kept up an ineffectual fire on him.

That he had sent some men of war and fire ships to La Hogue, to attempt burning the shipping; and, that the only reason why he had not bombarded the place was, the small calibre of the mortars, being only ten inch.†

In his letter of 6th August, he reports, that he had landed some troops; but being short of seamen (Admiral Ruffels having made large drafts from the frigates) he had been obliged to re-ship them; and in a letter of the 16th August from Portsmouth, that he had landed the regiment intended for Ostend, from its being unservicable.

1695.

Lord Berkeley sailed on the 23d of June with six English and four Dutch men of war, nine galliots, fourteen flat bottomed boats, and two brigantines, to bombard, and if possible, to burn St Maloes. On the 4th of July, the bomb vessels were ordered into the channel, to attack Quince Fort, to the westward, and point D'Ambour, on the eastward of the town; and the fleet, on the 5th, anchored about a mile and a half from them, to afford assistance.

* Appendix, No. XV. p. c.

† Appendix, No. XVI. p. cv.

The enemy sent, with the assistance of the tides, galleys and boats, to gall the line of bomb vessels, which, notwithstanding this resistance, set fire to the east part of the town, and destroyed the wooden fort of Quince.

After this service, the fleet returned to England; leaving a small squadron, consisting of, five English and three Dutch frigates, and a like number of bomb ketches, under the command of Captain Benbow, to cruize on the French coast. On the 8th of July, Benbow appeared, before Granville, which he bombarded and set on fire; and on the 9th, he came before Havre de Grace, to alarm the enemy, and then returned to Portsmouth *

While Captain Benbow was thus alarming one part of the French coast, Lord Berkeley sailed on the 5th of August for Dunkirk, and took 400 soldiers on board the men of war, with the object of taking advantage of any temporary lodgement, which might be made.

The place, however, was so completely protected by chains, piles, pontoons and guns, that the measure was found to be impracticable.

From Dunkirk, Lord Berkeley proceeded to Calais. The first attempt was made upon the wooden fort, now repaired, upon the east, and mounting fourteen heavy guns, to protect the harbour. On the 17th he cannonaded and destroyed

* Molyneux, P. 91.

troyed this outwork.—The bomb vessels being, by this means, at liberty to act against the town, set it on fire in different points, and burned the large magazine.

By these expeditions, the enemy's principal maritime towns and their shipping were distressed; while the grand fleet of England and Holland kept the French fleet shut up in Brest.*

1696.

At no period in the history of Britain, have conjunct expeditions of this description, been of more use, than in the year 1696, when Louis XIV. projected the invasion of Britain, by embarking an army of 16,000 men, at Dunkirk, to be commanded by King James in person, and under him the Marquis de Harcourt. This force was to embark in fifty transports, escorted by two strong squadrons, under the Marquis de Nesmond, and the famous Jean du Bart.

To conceal the intentions of the French ministers, accounts were published of an immense armament, preparing at Toulon, for the purpose of some decisive operation in the Mediterranean; while, at the same time, troops were secretly, and in small bodies, drawn from all quarters towards Dunkirk, and fleets of victuallers sent along the

* Molyneux, P. 92.
Smollett, Vol. I. P. 302.
Burchett, P. 526, 531.

coasts of France, convoyed by men of war to the place of rendezvous.

The French court imagined, that the English fleets, at this crisis, were either stationed at a distance, in the Mediterranean, or laid up in port, and therefore the invading fleet was ordered to be ready, in the month of February, to proceed from Dunkirk.

The English minister having got information of the scheme, ordered the combined fleets of England and Holland, consisting of fifty ships of the line, under Admiral Ruffel and Lord Berkeley to put to sea.

On the 28th of February, Ruffel came to anchor off Gravelines, and Lord Berkeley's squadron was placed, between that port and Dunkirk.

In their passage, it had been observed, that a considerable number of lesser provision vessels had been stationed in the harbour of Calais; and Sir Cloudefley Shovel was directed, with a small squadron, to attempt the destruction of them.

In a council of war, this service was found to be impracticable; but the squadron, having been re-inforced in the end of March, by several Dutch ships and bomb vessels, received orders, on the 2d of April, to make the experiment. On the 3d the bomb firing commenced, many shells were thrown into the town and harbour, and a considerable number of the ships burned.

1696.

Lord Berkeley was detached with a fleet, on the 3d of June, to cruize along the French coast. His first operation was, the landing some men on the islands called the Cardinals, and taking possession of the castle. He next landed on the island of Groy, which he also laid waste ;—

From Groy, he proceeded to the island of Rhé, and bombarded St. Martins, destroying the goods and warehouses in the town. He next bombarded Ollone, then cruized off Bellisle, for the purpose of creating alarm, and from this station returned to Spithead.

Sir George Rooke had arrived, at this juncture, in the Downs, with the Mediterranean squadron, and took the command*.

These expeditions answered the purposes of frustrating the attempts of the enemy to invade Britain, and of destroying the ships, with which it was intended, to support this measure.

QUEEN ANNE.

1703.

An equipment of this description, was this year sent to destroy a french fleet, with stores and provisions, protected by three men of war, ready to sail from Granville Bay. The command of this squadron was entrusted to Rear Admiral Dilkes, who stood over to Jersey on the 22d of July, and having taken in proper pilots, made in the

* Molyneux, page 95 and 6. Burchet, page 547 and 8.

the night the west rocks of the Minques, and attacked the enemy's fleet, on the 26th, by day light, consisting of forty-three merchant men and three men of war, all of which he took or destroyed, except four merchant ships, which sheltered themselves under Granville Fort*.

O S T E N D

1706.

A small armament was prepared, under the command of Sir Stafford Fairborne, to look into the river Charente, and with orders to destroy such ships, as the enemy might have at Rochfort. He sailed in the end of April, and after taking some prizes, returned to Plymouth. He was directed, next, to assist in taking Ostend. To cover the real design, Fairborne blockaded Nieuport, then returning suddenly upon Ostend, landed the marines. On the 19th of June, trenches were opened before the place. The frigates were run in, so near the shore, that by firing broadsides into the town, they compelled the garrison to surrender on the 25th; the French troops agreeing not to serve again for six months†.

1708.

Sir George Byng, with the object of favoring the expeditions in the Mediterranean, which reduced Minorca, was sent with Lord Dursley, to attempt the destruction of the naval armament on

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the

* Molyneux, P. 116.

† Ibid. P. 135.

Burchet, P. 737, &c.

the coasts of France, accompanied with a small military force, under general Erle.

The object was to create alarm. The first attempt was made, on the 1st of August, in the Bay of Boulogne. The appearance of landing troops, on the third, had the effect intended, of creating movements in the French army in the neighbourhood. On the 4th the fleet weighed, and stood into the Bay of Estaples, where a few troops were landed, and then re-embarked. Being joined by some transports off Dover, on the 11th, it made for the Bay of la Hogue, without attempting a landing; and on the 14th lay too, before Cherbourg, to produce alarm; and then, on the 28th, returned to Spithead*.

GEORGE II.

DARIEN.

1740.

At the commencement of the Spanish war, and while that court was preparing an armament, to support the pretender, Admiral Vernon was sent, with a small fleet, of six ships of war, to scour the coasts of South America.

On his arrival, he bombarded and took Porto-Bello, on the isthmus of Darien, and demolished all

* Molyneux, P. 153.
Gazettes, 4458—9 & 61.

all the fortifications of the place.—He next bombarded Carthagena, and took the fort of San Lorenzo on the river Chagre, and then returned.*

COMMODORE ANSON.

1740.

This success of Admiral Vernon, at Darien, led to the expedition to Carthagena, detailed under the first class, which appears to have been connected with that of Commodore Anson to the South Sea—

Commodore Anson's instructions, dated 31st January, 1739-40, bear;—

— That five sail of ships were to form his squadron, having on board 500 troops, under the orders of Lieut. Colonel Cracherode;—

— That he was first to proceed to the Cape de Verd Islands, and after taking in refreshments, he was to make for the coast of Brazil, taking care to maintain good intercourse with the Portuguese governors;—That his object was, to distress the Spanish settlements, seize on, and destroy their shipping, &c.—

— That he was afterwards to make for the coast of Chili, then to cruize along that of Peru, to

* Molyneux, p. 172.

Smollett, vol. iv. p. 172.

to Lima, attempting, if possible, to second the disposition of the natives to revolt against the Spanish government ;—

That from Lima he was to direct his course to Panama, and thence to send letters (for which he was to receive a cypher) to the commanders in chief of the fleets and armies, serving on the north coast of America, always being in readiness to afford assistance to the armament, to be sent to that quarter.—In the event of success attending this expedition, he was to continue, according to information, in the South Seas ;—

— That, on his return, he was to cruize to the northward, for the Acapulco ship ; and in case of success in his attacks on the Spanish coast, he was to leave one or more of the vessels, for the protection of the trade in these seas ;—

— That, on his return, he was to touch at the river Plata, and to endeavour to intercept the ships coming from the Buenos Ayres, and then to return, by the coast of China, to Europe.

The events in this memorable voyage are sufficiently known. It must, however, at this distant period, occur in the review of them ; that had the expedition sent to Carthagena, been directed to the isthmus of Darien, with even half the force it carried to the West Indies, it might have taken possession of, and fortified a station, which not only would have given to Britain a decided controul over North and South America, but, in the sequel, and particularly after the memorable war of 1763, have enabled Britain to command
the

the trade of the Pacific Ocean, connected, as it might have been, with our trade to India and China ;—

—That this isthmus, on which Britain had claims, from the time of the Darien Company, 1703, might have been easily fortified, and protected by the fleets Britain always must have in the East and West Indies; and, upon the breaking out of the American war, that the possession of the connecting link of the two Americas must have given a controul, not only over the Spanish settlements, but been a material check on the progress of the revolters in our own American colonies.*

1760.

The only expedition of this description, which occurred in the war, that terminated in the peace 1763, was that under Rear Admiral Rodney, for the bombardment of Havre-de-Grace. This squadron consisted of four ships of the line, two frigates, two sloops, and six bomb vessels, and sailed from St. Helens, 2d of July 1760.

In his letter, dated off Havre, 12th July, the Admiral reports, That the French had three frigates at Havre; that they were employed in loading ninety-four flat-bottom boats, having one gun in the prow, and another in the stern, with military stores, to be sent to Brest; that seven of these were loaded with shot, and each of them to be

* Appendix, No. XVII. and XVIII. page cvii.—cxvii.

be navigated by twelve men, for whom three months provisions had been put on board; that they had been directed to make for Honfleur, in the night, where, and at Dive, twelve more were ready to join them; that they were to take the first easterly wind and dark night (keeping in close shore) to pass Cape Barfleur, and endeavour to get into Brest; that the only chance of intercepting them was, after they had got out of the river Seine, so that he was obliged to keep cutters cruizing, between Caen River, and the Isle of Marçeau.

From his letter of the 17th of July, it appears, that he had driven on shore, at Port Bassin, five French vessels, of 250 tons, laden with military stores, and by agreement with the Marquis de Brisfac, had abstained from bombarding that town, on condition that the store ships should be burned.*

The place chosen for the attack on Havre Harbour, was the channel of the river leading to Harfleur; the bombardment lasted fifty-two hours; the town was on fire in several places, and the magazine for the flat-bottom boats, totally destroyed.

So great was the consternation from this attack, that troops were marched from all quarters, under the apprehension of an intention, on the part of the English to land.

The

* Appendix, No. XIX. page cxviii.

† Smollett, vol vii. p. 198.

Entick's History of the late war, vol. iv. p. 249.

The expedition thus fully answered its purpose, viz.—destroying the magazines of that post, from which the enemy had proposed to fit out a conjunct expedition against our coasts*.

Having thus brought under your notice, partly from official documents, and partly, (where these have failed me) from authors who have written on the subject, my report on the question:—

“What arrangements have been adopted, in former periods, when France, or its allies, threatened invasions of Britain or Ireland, to frustrate the designs of the enemy, by attacks on his foreign possessions, or European ports, by annoying his trade, and destroying his equipments?”

permit me to state the results from the research; because they may point out the causes, which have prevented the full, or even partial success of the conjunct expeditions of Britain.

1st.—The giving equal powers to the commanders of the fleet and army*, from the ignorance of the one, of the duty of the other, has produced that jealousy of character and of fame, which has been ruinous to the service.

2d.—The want of boats or rafts, properly constructed for the debarkation, or re-embarkation of troops, has occasioned the confusions and losses, with which invasions of the enemy's foreign or European coasts and ports have been marked.

* Success has almost always attended, the vesting the power in the commander of the fleet.

3d.—The want, in both classes of expeditions, particularly the second, of gun-boats, carrying heavy ordnance, and yet requiring a small depth of water, to enable them to run in under the enemy's batteries, or near their shipping, has prevented attacks being made with effect; and connected with this, has been the want of a proper number of bomb-vessels, cutters, and sloops, to support the boats, or to range along shore, for the purpose of creating alarm, and concealing from the enemy, the real points of the intended attack.

4th.—The want of a large marine corps, trained and habituated to consider this kind of service, as their peculiar duty, and qualified to act either on ship-board, or with promptitude and effect, on shore, has, on many occasions, exposed the most brave and well disciplined troops, to danger and defeats*.

5th. The want of correct information in the commanders, respecting the strength of the places to be attacked, and trusting too often to scientific, instead of practical engineers, who had local

* Regular infantry, artillery, and cavalry, have almost, upon every occasion, from sea sickness, and the novelty of the duty, been unable to act with effect, except where they have been landed, without opposition, and been several days on shore, to recover the fatigues of the voyage. Hence, in reembarking, they have, on many occasions, exhibited confusion, if not timidity.

knowledge;

knowledge; has, also, been productive of the worst consequences.

6th.—An improvident dependence for provisions, in the invaded country, without taking measures to induce the inhabitants to bring in supplies, has, in a variety of instances, exposed the invaders to distress, and the army to losses and defeat.

*I have the honor to be
Sir*

*Your most Obedient
and faithful Servant,*

John Bruce

Right Honble

Henry Dundas

Ac; Sc; &c;

knowledge; has, also, been productive of the
worse consequences.
In the neighbourhood of the
village, in the wooded country, without being
incited to induce the inhabitants to bring in
supplies, has, in a variety of instances, exposed
the invaders to distress and the same to loss and
distress.

I have the honor to be
Sir,

Your most obedient
and faithful servant
J. J. J.

Respectfully,
J. J. J.
J. J. J.

APPENDIX

TO

REPORT,

ON THE

ARRANGEMENTS which have been adopted, in former Periods, when FRANCE threatened Invasions of BRITAIN or IRELAND, to frustrate the Designs of the Enemy, by attacks on his Foreign Possessions, or European Ports, by annoying his Coasts and by destroying his Equipments, &c.

APPENDIX

ARRANGEMENTS which have been adopted,
in former Periods, when France threatened
invasions of Britain or Ireland,
to frustrate the Designs of the Enemy,
by attacks on his Foreign Possessions, or
European Ports, by annoying his Coasts
and by destroying his Expeditions, &c.

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APPENDIX, No. I.

COMMISSIONS and Instructions for SIR JOHN
NORRIS and the EARL OF ESSEX.

Commission for SIR JOHN NORRIS to go into
Brittayne.—1591.

[*Note*, The Orthography in the Original has been followed, though it is, in many instances, inaccurate.]

Elizabetha, Dei gratia, Angliæ, Franciæ,
et Hiberniæ regina, fidei defensor, &c. omnibus
et singulis, ad quos hæc literæ nostræ prevenerint,
salutem. Cum serenissimus princeps, Henricus
Quartus, Francorum et Navarre rex, charissimus
frater noster, et consanguineus, a subditis quibus-
dam suis rebellibus, in ipsius interitum conspi-
rantibus, armis et bello; atque ad id perpetrandum
et continuandum subsidium habentibus a rege
Hispaniæ, non solum pecuniæ, sed hominum ar-
matorum plenos exercitus conficient, nostram
opem imploravit, contra tam impiam et injustam
communitatem, et suorem subditorum rebellium,
et vicinos hostium: nosque ob eam, que nobis
cum christianissimis regibus semper intercessit
amicitiam, propterq. vota et desideria nostra,
quibus et cupivimus et cupimus Galliæ regnum,
cum regni nostri salute, quam maxime florens,
vigenſque perdurare, iniquum, denique ducentes
et ab honore principis alienum, principi vicino,
a opem:

A P P E N. No. I.

fratri et amico, in difficilibus rebus suis, non fere opem: volentes in hac parte, tam pietatis officio, quam optimi principis necessitatibus, ac honeste petitioni satisfacere, copias quasdam auxiliares, et subsidia bellica, ad defensionem et tuitionem regni sui, et presentim ducatus et provinciæ suæ Britanniae in Franciam, transmittimus; sciatis, quod nos de fide probitate, et in re militari experientia predilecti et fidelis fervientis nostri, Johannis Norrice, equitis aurati, ac presidentis consilij nostri, in provincia Mononiae, in regno nostro Hyberniae, plurimum confidentis, eundem Johannem Norrice dictarum nostrarum copiarum auxiliarum et subditorum bellicorum, capitaneum generalem, et ductorem fecimus et constituimus, facimus et constituimus, per presentes; dantes et concedentes eidem Johanni Norrice, capitaneo et ductori generali, plenam potestatem et auctoritatem milites, a nobis conscriptos, ac illi a nobis commissos, in eas partes et loca dicti regni Franciae, ceu ducatus Britanniae, sub signis et vexillis nostris conducendi, ad quas, velque, eos sic conducere, ex parte dicti charissimi patris nostri et consanguini, fuerit requisitus; necnon bellum aut praelium, cum hoste vel hostibus dicti fratris nostri quocunque, vel quibuscunque commitendi, et alia quaecunque manu militari faciendi, et exequendi que ad dicti regis, regni et ducatus sui conservationem et tuitionem, ac hostis vel hostium, infestationem, debellationem, expulsionem, et profligationem videbuntur, pro tempore expedire.

Damus preterea, dicti Johanni Norrice, capitaneo nostro generali dictarum copiarum, plenam

nam potestatem et auctoritatem, quascumque ordinationes, leges et proclamationes, de tempore in tempus constituendi, et faciendi pro conductione bono regimine et gubernatione copiarum hominum nostrorum predictorum, nec non, constituendi omnes et singulos capitaneos, officiarum et officarios quoscumque copiarum, hominum predictorum. Ac insuper damus, eidem Johanni, plenam potestatem, et auctoritatem, per presentes, ad audiendum, examinandum et determinandum per se, vel per sufficientem deputatum, sive deputatos suos sufficientes, in ea parte omnes causas criminales, murmurationes, disobedientias, defectiones et defectiones, a capitaneis et gubernatoribus copiarum, hominum nostrorum predictorum, et omnia alia malefacta cujuscunque naturæ, nominis, et speciei sunt, per aliquam personam, sive personas, in copiis hominum predictorum, ac delinquentes in premissis castigandi, pœnasque mortis et membrorum, vel alias pœnas corporales, juxta eorum demerita, infligenda, juxta leges et consuetudines martiales et bellicas. Et ad audiendum et terminandum omnes hujus modi causas, contractus et querelas omnium et singulorum, de copis hominum predictorum, in partibus illis contingentibus, cæteraque omnia et singula faciendi, exegendi et perimplendi, que ad officium capitanei generalis pertinent. Damus etiam eidem Johanni Norrice, plenam potestatem et auctoritatem, quod ipseidem Johannes, quamdiu officium capitanei nostri generalis in partibus ultramarinis exercuerit; de tempore in tempus, per literas suas, billam manu sua signatam faciet, non solum solvi et expendi tot denariorum summas,

mas, de thesauro nostro pro solutione, et sustentatione copiarum hominum prædictorum, juxta ratam contentam, in schedula per consiliarios nostros signatam, et dicto capitaneo tradendam, pro vadijs et stipendijs, omnium et singulorum personarum, nobis sub dicto capitaneo generali fervientium, prout eidem capitaneo nostro generali, juxta suam discretionem, summam melius videbatur expedire, sed etiam ex subsidiis, et apparatibus bellicis, tantam vim et copiam conferri, expendi et consumi, in tuitionem et defensionem dicti charissimi fratris, et consanguinei nostri, ac regni sui, quantum usus ejus postulabit, ipsique capitaneo nostro generali videbitur opportunum. Quodque hujusmodi literæ manusuæ signatæ, que dirigentur, thesaurario vel agentis vices thesaurarii, copiarum hominum prædictorum, per nos deputatos et aliis officiariis nostris, erunt sufficiens warrantum, eisdem thesaurario, vices agentis thesaurarii, et officiariis nostris pro executione earundem, secundum mandatum et assignationem, in ea parte, per prædictum capitaneum nostrum generalem, datam et dandam, ac secundum quod ad officium capitanei generalis pertinet & fieri consuevit. Ac, insuper, damus universis & singulis capitaneis, collonellis, vicecapitanis, locumtenantibus, militibus, hominibus ad arma, equitibus, peditibus officiariis, ministris, & subditis nostris quibuscunque in copiis hominum prædictorum retentis, et retinendis tenore præsentium, sub fide et ligeancia, quibus nobis debentur, firmiter in mandatis quod eidem Johi Norrice militi, capitaneo nostro generali, in præmissis, faciendis, exequendis, et agendis intendant, obediant, assistant et auxilientur, prout decet,

et. Ac insuper volumus et concedimus, per presentes quod hæ literæ nostræ patentes erunt tam eidem Johanni capitaneo nostro generali quam omnibus aliis militibus, capitaneis et aliis subditis nostris quibuscunque, in copiis hominum nostrorum predictorum retentis & retinendis, pro executione premissorum, sufficiens warrantum in ea parte.

In cujus rei, &c. &c. &c.

Admiralty. Navy. Cinque Ports. Commissions, Vol. I.
Mr. Secretary Williamson's Papers.

Dec. 21st 1797.
Exd I. B.

INSTRUCTIONS to SIR JOHN NORRIS Knight,
being sent into Fraunce, and authorized
by Her Majesty's Commission, to conduct
and governe certain Forces in Fraunce,
to the Ayde of the French King.

1591.

Where [whereas] we have appointed you to be the generale captaine of our forces, to the number of 3000, which are prepared for the ayde of the French King, specially to serve the said king, in Britaigne; our pleasure is, that you shall make all good expedition that you can, to be at Portesmouth, before the 11th of April, to receive the numbers of 900 there, and at Southampton, and to embarke and transport the same, first
to

to Jersey, from thence to Granville, in Normandy, or to a port called Cancalla neere to Port Orson, a towne fortified, and held by the King; as you shall find either of these two places meetest for your landing of the said numbers.

Item, That where 600 of the 3000, are at this present sent to Diepe, under the charge of Sir Roger Williams, for a present defence of that towne, as soone as those numbers may be dismissed from Diepe, and shall be sent to the pts [ports] where you shall be, you shall also take the charge of them, as parcell of the 3000.

You shall likewise consider, at your being at Portsmouth, how knowledg may be given to them, which shall bring the 1500 of the owld bands, that are ordered to come from Flushing, may have knowledg to follow you to Jersey, or Granville, or Cancalla, and so direct them, for their landing, that when they shall be come, where you shall be, you may also take the charge of them.

We doubt not, but by the French ambassador's certificat to the French King, his master and by means of the deputies of Bretaine, which are now in London, you shall have some persons of credit to meet you at your landing, to impart to you the King's mind, how to use your service; and also to give you knowledge of the state of Britaigne, for which purpose you shall endeavor yourself, to understand certainly what are the forces of the King's enemies in Bretaine, how many of them are leaguers, being the King's rebels, and how many are Spaniards, and other strangers,

strangers, sent by the King of Spaine, and in what places they doe, for the most remayne. On the other side, also, you shall understand what forces are there, for the French King, of what condition and strength they are, by whom they are commanded, and in like manner, to understand all other things appertaining to the state of that country, and what portes and townes doe hold for the French King, and how many are held by the rebells, and how many by the enemies. You shall also understand, what port townes were meete for you to demand, to which you may have safe recourse, for yourself and your company, upon any need; and also to have commodity there, by shipping, to send into England, for such things as you shall neede, and to receave also, out of England all things needful. And upon knowledge hereof, you shall wisely consider, what service may be done by you and your troupes to joyne with the King's forces now in Bretaine.—And as you shall find it probable, that joyning with the French King's forces, you may, with yours, do some exploits, either to expel, or damnesfy the forraine ennemys, or to suppress and vanguish the King's rebells, or to uphold the King's party, untill he shall send greater forces, then you shall employ yourself with your forces, to do some such good service to the said King; but if you perchance find, that the King's forces already sent, or shortly to be sent into Brittain, are so weake, as though you shall joyne them, you shall not be able to performe any good service, without manifest danger to yourself, and our subjects, serving under you; in such case, you shall make the same danger apparent to the Prince d'Ombes,

d'Ombes, or Monfr. de la Noue, or to such other, as shall have the charge of the King's warre, in Britaigne, and thereupon, as well for their owne safety, as for yours from manifest danger, induce them to allow of your opinion, not to hazard either of themselves, or our people; but yet to offer all our service, with our people, jointly with the French King's forces, to attempt any thing probable to be atchieved with your strength; and at least, to joine with the French, to your mutual defence, against the offence, and invading by the ennemy, untill there may be sent more ayde from the French King, sufficiently to strengthen you, and invade the ennemy. And after your landing and conference had, with any appointed by the King, or by the Prince d'Ombes, you shall advertize us, or our counsell.

Dec. 21st 1797.
Exd J. B.

The EARLE OF ESSEX's Commission.

Elizabetha, Dei gratia, Angliæ, Frannciæ et Hiberniæ Regina, fidei defensor, &c. cum ad petitionem serenissimi principis, fratris et consanguinei nostri, charissimi, Henrici quarti Francorum et Navarræ regis, jamprimum post adventum suum ad regnum suum Franciæ, suppetias varias ac multimodas, tam per mare quam per terram, contulerimus multisq. summis pecuniarum illi, mutuo prestitis propter tormentorum, et bellicarum munitionem, magnam quantitatem magnisq. etiam copijs militum, e regno nostro Angliæ trans mare sæpe

sæpe missis, in defensionem dicti regis ac regni sui, contra subditos quosdam suos perfidos ac rebelles, in ipsius interitum consperantes. Atque eo modo, dictus frater noster, sæpe per literas et nuncios fatetur ac recognoscit, se, suumq. statum fuisse hactenus, a magnis periculis liberatum et conservatum. Et tamen propter magnam vim hostium extraneorum, indies adhuc crescentem, partesque quasdam regni Franciæ ac nominatim Ducatus Britannia occupantem. Et ut hujus modi, externa vis propelleret opem nostram ulterius, jam hac presente estate imploravit; ideo, propter veram et sinceram amicitiam, que nobis cum dicte rege fratre nostro charissimo semper intercessit, propterq. vota et desideria nostra commovemur, dictum Gallia regni cum regni nostri, salute florens et vicens perdurare. Atque ab hoste externo, precipuè Hispano, et papistico liberari, copias quasdam auxiliares, bene armatas et subsidia bellica de novo (præterea, que ante paucos menses, transierunt in Britanniam et Normanniam) decrevimus transmittendas in Normanniam: sciatis, propterea, quod nos de fide, probitate, arenuitate, et, in re militari, experientia, charissimi consanguinei nostri Roberti, Comitis Effexiæ et Ewe, Vice comitis Herefordie, Bouchier, Domini de Ferrarijs de Chartley, et Lovayn, Magistri omnium Equorum nostrorum, et præclari Ordinis nostri Garterij, Militis, plurimum confidentes eundem Robertum Comitem Effexiæ omnium copiarum auxilliarium, hominumq. armatorum, tam equitum, quam pedum, aliorumque subsidiorum bellicorum jam transmittendorum earumque copiarum militum que jam sunt in Normannia, vel alibi in Gallia, in servicio

b

nostro,

nostro, sub gubernatione at conductione Rogeri Williams, militis, five aliarum quarumcunque copiarum militum Anglicorum, qui posthæc adjungendi sunt copiarum nostrorum predictorum, et omnia alia malefacta, perpetrata, cunuscunque naturæ, nominis, vel speciei sunt, per aliquam personam, five personas, in copijs hominum predictorum, ac delinquentes, in permissis castigandi, pœnasq. mortis et membrorum, vel alias pœnas corporales juxta eorum demerita, infligendi, juxta leges et consueutdines martiales et bellicas. Et ad audiendum, et terminandum omnes hujus modi causas, contractus, et querelas omnium et singulorum, de copijs hominum predictorum, in partibus illis contingentium, cæteraque omnia, et singula faciendi exigendi, et perimplendi, quæ ad officium capitanei generalis pertinent. Damus etiam eidem consanguineo nostro, Roberto comiti Effexiæ plenam potestatem et auctoritatem, quod ipse idem comes, quamdiu officium capitanei nostri generalis, in partibus ultramarinis, exercuerit, de tempore in tempus, per literas suas, five billam manu signatum faciet, non solum solvi, et expendi tot denariorum summas de thesauro nostro, pro solutione et sustentatione copiarum hominum predictorum, juxta ratam expressè contentam, in scheda, vel schedulis per consiliarios nostros signatam, et dicto capitaneo nostro generali, tradendam pro vadijs et stipendijs omnium et singulorum personarum, nobis sub dicto capitaneo nostro generali fervientium, prout eidem capitaneo nostro generali, juxta sanam discretionem suam melius videbitur expedire. Sed etiam, ex subsidijs et apparatibus bellicis, tantam vim et copiam conferri,

rri, expendi et consumi, in tuitionem et defensionem dicti charissimi fratris, et consanguinei nostri, ac regni sui, quantum usus ejus postulabit, ipsique capitaneo nostro generali videbitur opportunum. Quodque hujusmodi literæ manu sua, sic ut premittatur signatæ, quæ dirigentur thesaurario, vel agenti vices thesaurarij, copiarum hominum predictorum p. nos deputato, ac secundam formulam dicti schedule, in ea parte, per predictum capitaneum nostrum generalem, datam et dandam, et secundum quod, ad officium capitanei generalis pertinet, et fieri consuevit: Ac insuper, damus universis et singulis capitaneis, colonellis, vicecapitaneis locumtenantibus, militibus, hominibus ad arma, peditibus officarijs, ministris et subditis nostris quibuscunque, in copijs hominum predictorum retentis sunt, ad servendum sub dicto comite, in quacunque parte Gallia, capitaneum generalem, et ductorem fecimus et constituimus, ac per presentes, facimus et constituimus; dantes et concedentes eidem comiti capitaneo et conductori generali plenam potestatem et auctoritatem, milites a nobis, in hunc finem conscriptos, jam equites quam pedites, ac illi a nobis jam commissos, in partes Normannia, five alicujus alterius partis regni Gallia traducendi. Necnon, bellum aut prælium cum hoste, vel hostibus, ac cum rebellibus dicti fratris nostri quocunque, vel quibuscunque committendi, et alia quocunque manu militari faciendi, que ad dicti regis conservationem et tuitionem, ac hostis vel hostium infestationem, debellationem, expulsionem, et profligationem videbuntur, pro tempore expedire. Damus, præterea, dicto consanguineo nostro Roberto

berto comiti Effexiæ, capitaneo nostro generali dictarum copiarum, plenam potestatem et authoritatem, quascunque ordinationes, leges, et proclamationes, de tempore in tempus constituendi, et faciendi pro conductione, bono regimine, et gubernatione copiarum hominum nostrorum predictorum. Necnon constituendi omnes et singulos capitaneos officiarium, et officarios, quoscunque copiarum hominum nostrorum predictorum, tam equitum quam peditum. Ac insuper damus eidem comiti plenam potestatem et authoritatem, per presentes, quemcunque et quoscunque subditorum nostrorum, in exercitu jam sibi commisso, nobis fervientum, juxta sanam in ea parte discretionem suam, exigentibus eorum meritis, pro ratione rerum, ab ipsis strenue gerendarum, ac pro rebus in bello, sive pugna, bene gestis honorandi, et propter virtute operaque in honorem regni nostri, prestita nobilitandi, eisdemque meritorum insignia, id est, arma danda et assignandi, ac eisdem insignibus ordine equestri, ac militari decorandi, et assignandi, prout ad officium capitanei exercitus generalis pertinet, aut fieri juxta more Angliæ consuevit. Necnon, ad audiendum, examinandum, et terminandum, per se, vel per sufficientem deputatum suum, sive deputatos suos sufficientes, in ea parte, omnes causas criminales murmuraciones, disobedientias, desertiones et defectiones a capitaneis et gubernatoribus copiarum retentis et retinendis, tenore presentium, sub fide et ligeancia, quibus nobis debentur firmiter, in mandatis, quod eidem comiti, capitaneo nostro generali, in premissis, faciendis, exequendis et agendis intendant, obediant, assistant, et auxilientur, prout decet.

decet. At denique volumus et concedimus per presentes, quod hæ litteræ nostræ patentes erunt, tam eidem comiti, capitaneo nostro generali, quam omnibus aliis militibus, capitaneis, et aliis subditis nostris, quibuscunque in copiis hominum nostrorum predictorum retentis et retinendis, pro executione premissorum, sufficiens warrantum, in ea parte. In cujus rei testimonium, has literas nostras fieri fecimus patentes, sigilli nostri magni Angliæ appensione. Datum, apud manerium nostrum de Greenwich, Julii, anno Domini, millesimo, quingentesimo nonagesimo primo. Regni nostri tricesimo tertio.

Dec. 21st, 1797.
Exd J. B.

INSTRUCTIONS for the **EARLE** of **ESSEX** and **EWE**, Master of our Horse, and Knight of our Noble Order of the Garter, sent by us into France, with certaine Forces of Horsemen and Footmen, as General Captaine of the same Numbers.

Whereas the French King, our good brother, had made very earnest request to us, both by his letters, and by a speciall person of his counsell, named Monsieur de Reaux, sent hither to joyne with his embassador, or resident, to yelde to him a further ayde of men, to the number of 4000 footmen, over and besides the other 3000 already being under the charge of Sir John Norrice in Brityane,

Brityane. Although we have great cause for the strengthning of our realme, and for the defence thereof, against the same ennemyes, which are ennemys both to the said King, and to ourselves, to forbear to send out at this time any more captains and experimented foldiers forth of our realme, considering the great diminution of a multitude of good valiant captains, and foldiers, with their furniture of armor and weapon, which happened partly by death, and partly by other disorders, being of the company, which we sent with the Lord Willoughby, in the former of the yeare 1589, now not fully two years past; yet such have been the importune requests of the said, with remonstrances and declarations of what importance this our ayde may be to him, for the increase of his estate and dominion, or rather for the suppression of his rebels, and expulsion of his forraine ennemyes, as for the love and regard that we have to the said King, to the increasing of his fortune, and to establish him, in the full possession of his crowne, we have yielded to give, and send into Dieppe, in Normandy, the number of 4000 men, accompting 600 foldiers, which are already in our pay with Sir Roger Williams, to be part thereof; of all which 4000 Footmen, with such number of Horsemen, as are appointed to accompany you thither, we have, by our letters patents, under our great seale of England, made you to be the general captain, and conductor, with all power, belonging to such a general captain, as by the same our condition more largely appeareth. And for the manner and forme of execution of the said commission, we have thought meete, by way of these our instructions,

ions, to direct you how you shall use your authority, in sundry things properly appertaining to this service, now committed unto you.

First. At your first accesse to the French King, and after our most harty commendations, made to the King, with such reverence, on your part, as shall be convenient, and other complements of honor to him done, you shall let him understand, that he hath good cause to accept this our present yelding to his request, in a most thankful part, considering what great causes we have for the defence of ourself, and our realme, to retayne at home in good readynes, all the forces, that God hath given us, and namely such captains and leaders of experience, in the warres, as we have bin contented, to accompany and serve under you, And therefore ye shall, in our name, require him, that such service, as he hath to employ you, with these our forces now sent, may be made probable to you, that the abode of you and them for the time, which we have assented to, which is onely for two months, may be profitable for him; and so also joyned with his great forces, as the enemyes may not, by the excesse of their numbers, and strength appears manifestly superiors, and without any profit or honor to the King, wast of our people, to the discomfort our realme, and encrease of the pride of the common enemy.

And this manner of speech ye shall use to the King, to the intents, that you may be speedily informed, of the purposes intended by him, in what sort you and your forces shall be employed, which being to you knowne, you shall impart the
same

same to such principall men, as for their worthinesse are appointed, under you, to be the generall officers for the field, and with good advice upon conference, you shall afterwards agree to accept so much, as shall seeme convenient, and shall in honorable and descreet manner, take exceptions to any part of the service propounded to you, as shall appear inconvenient, or over desperate, to the manifest overthrow of our people, or otherwise not honorable to yourself, and our nation.

The authority which you have by our commission, and the credit that you shall have thereby, is such, as we doubt not, but you will have so great regard in ordering the same, as we need not admonish you in any particular manner with the lengthe of speech, but onely to remitt you to these few heads following.

First, And above all things we advise you to have due regard to serve God dayly, both yourself for example, and to direct all our people under you to do the same at all times and places usuall, as by the order and rites of the Church of England, you and your company ought to do, if they were at home, within our realme, where places and times may be had thereunto convenient. For so it is meet that both you and all our subjects should shew themselves obedient rather to the forme of our owne lawes, than to any forme of strangers; and besides that thereby your captains and officers shall, by good observation, discover if there be anie unfaithful subject gotten into their hands, to serve as spies, or to do some mischief to you, or to your companies, as in truth we have cause to doubt,
that

that some lewd subjects may intrude themselves into the service of you, for some of your numbers.

Secondly, We doubt not but you will have regard in all your actions to preserve your owne estimation as a man of honorable calling by birth, and of speciall reputation with us, that you may returne rather with encrease of your estimation gotten there, in a strange land, by your grave and honorable actions, than with any diminution.

Lastly, We do recommend to your care the good ordering of all our people, using them all and every of them in their degrees, so as they may both love you and obey you, and that they may be furnished, as well as times and places may serve, by your direction, to be given to your inferior officers, and the captains of the bands, with convenient victuall and lodging, and not to be put to any desperate enterprife.

You are further to consider, by perusing of the state and proportion of your allowance, of the wages of all our forces now committed to your charge, with the entertainment of all officers, both for the field and for the conduct of the bands, which is to be delivered to you as the generall, and to the treasurer, or his deputy, written in certain schedules, signed by our counsell, which we will not to be altered, but every person to be paid according to the same rates. And though the private soldier is not to have his full pay weekly (as by the schedule appeareth) yet our meaning is, that the particular soldiers, at the end of every month, shall, upon muster, and appearance in

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persone, receive his full pay, according to his ordinary daily wages, so as all defalcations of former imprestes of money or victualls be excepted.

You shall understand that the numbers which we have yelded to this present service of the French, are to your charge in pay of 4000 footmen, whereof the 600 which are there, under the charge of Sir Roger Williams, are to be accompted part, and likewise a band of 150 that are directed to come from the Briel; all which are to be under your rule. And where you have the number of 100 horsemen, or more, they are to be accompted in our pay for 250 footmen, as a force more serviceable for many respects; and then to make up the full charge of 4000 footmen, besides all officers, there are to passe out of our realme the number of 3150 heads of private foldiers, besides in every band 8 officers, whereof we do make to you this particular declaration, by cause you may be able to satisfye the King, or any of his counsell, if any speech should be moved to you, how we are charged, and how the King is ayded, with 4000 men and above.

We would have you cause, such ordinances as were devised, by the late Earl of Leicester in the Low Countries, for the discipline of the army there, to be considered, and to cause an extract to be made out of the same, or out of the like, that have been published by the Duke of Parma, selecting so many articles, as shall be thought meete, for the time and place, where you shall serve, and for the companies, whom you shall governe.

You

You shall also be enformed of the accord made here, by the French ambaffador, in the behalf of the French King, with certaine of our counsell, wherein it is agreed, that we shall not continue our forces, in our pay, above two months, from the time of their landing, whereof you shall have good regard, so as if you should not have good affurance, in deeds, besides words, to have a full weekly pay, after the end of two moneths, of some such part of our forces, under your charge, as upon knowledg from you, we shall consent unto, you shall not continew them any longer, but towards the end of the two months, you shall procure safe passage to returne, both for yourself, and such of our troupes, as we shall not assent to leave there, notwithstanding any entreaty, without ready payment to be made, and that to be weekly performed, according to our pay, and for your passage, you shall demaund ayde of the King's shipping, according to the accords.

You shall consider also, that in the same accord, the embaffador hath covenanted, for the French King, that there shall be sent a confirmation, of the said accord, from the French King, afore our forces shall land, which we looke to be performed; but because the embarking and transportation cannot be stayed, by limitation of any daies certaine, our meaning is, that if the said confirmation shall not be brought from thence, before your landing, or that it shall not be ready there, at your landing, you shall plainly declare, that you may not march into the country, otherwise

wise than to lodg yourself, with your people, in safety, until the said confirmation shall be brought, either into England, or to yourselfe.

You are also to consider upon perusall of the said accord, that it is agreed, that if Roan or New-haven, or either of them, shall be won for the French King, we shall have all the profits of the customs and dewties, payable to the King, for all manner of merchandises, accustomed to be paid to the King, assured to us, untill we shall be payed, for all somes of money, dew by the said King, to us, for any imprest of money, victuall, powder, municion, or any other thing, since the King's coming to his crowne, the execution whereof you shall, when time shall serve thereto, further to your best.

We require you to remember to give charge, from time to time, to all the captaines, to see the preservation of all the armor and weapon, wherewith the countries have furnished them; that the same (if they be not lost in apparant service) may be returned to the countries, which if you shall procure to be done, you shall gaine both praise, and love of your naturall country, which hitherto we have not seene any Generall sent out of our realme, to have so regarded, as was convenient.

As for the keeping of the numbers full, we hope you will look to, and correct such as shall for corruption, seeke to gain from us, and weaken your force, tending both to danger, and shame of the nation,

Where

Where we have added a clause in your commission, giving you authority, to give the honor of knighthood and armes, to such persons being our subjects, and serving in the army committed to you, as by their deserts, namely by their actions in battayll, or fight, shall in your discretion, be found worthy thereof; we having found by some former experience, that sondry times, in forraine parts such honor hath been given, rather of favor or mediation by friendship, then by desert, to persons that neither in battayle, or fight have shewed any special warlike action. And sometymes the same honor hath been given to persons, both unable by living to maintayne the countenance thereof, and to some not being descended in blood of either noble or gentlemen; for these and such respects, and to avoyde the like defaulte in distributions of such honor, we will and charge you, notwithstanding the generality of your power in your commission, that you do not bestow the degrees of the honor of knighthood, or of armes, upon any persons, not deserving the same, or be of such meane condition, as above by us is remembered. And yet at your returne, if any singular persons not qualified with livelyhood, or blood, shall for any notable worthy act deserve such honor, though there be other lacks abovementioned, we will ourselves at your request, upon your returne, reward such persons with the dignity, which their deserts shall deserve.

Our pleasure is, that when you shall be absent from the King, and shall have occasion to understand his mind, in any thing whereof you shall desire
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fire answere, you shall direct the same cause, by writing or message, to our embassador there resident, as a person most meete to negotiate any matter that may *concerne our service.*

Dec. 21st 1797.

Exd J. B.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX, No. II.

EXTRACT. Instructions for SIR EDWARD CECIL, Knight, Lieutenant General, and Lord Marshall of his Majesty's Fleete and Land Forces, now reddey to goe to Sea, for the Coast of Spain.

August 26, 1625.

The chief intention of this voyage beinge, the weakeninge and disableinge of the enymie in his sea, forces, and trade, by takinge and destroyinge his shipps, gallies, frigotes, and possible of all forts, by spoyleinge his provisions in his magazines and port townes, by depriving him of seamen, marriners, and gunners, by not sufferinge him to gather headd from any parte, by interrcepting his fleete, either goinge out or returninge, and by taking in, and possessing some such place or places, in the inline of his dominions, as may supporte and counterline our successive fleetes; you shall therefore directe and governe your proceedings and services, to yourselfe only, and shall not divide your fleete or companies for anie other adventure or purchase, excepte when you finde foe litle strength and defence upon his coasts, that you may safely assaile him in divers places at once. And therefore you shall circumspectly viewe all his coasts,

coasts, and look into everie porte, and where you finde shippes, gallies, or other vessels or provisions, you shall, with good advice and courage, and with God's assistance, doe your best to destroy them, and to take and overthrowe all such as shall attempte to joine or consort with them.

And because all particulars for sea and land service cannot be limited, with speciall instructions, without leaveinge many things, to the wisdom, prudence, and good menaging of the commanders, in all such occurrents, and generally in all things which are not, or shall not be expressly directed, you are to use your owne best judgement and discretion, following such advice of such a councill, as is assigned unto you. That havinge your owne experience and resolution, fortified by the consent of at least of the greater parte of the said councillors, you may give the better accompte of your actions, soe the service may be the more hopefull, for the repressinge of the ambicion of that overgrowinge power, which hath long threatened and disturbed all christendom, and for the obtaininge and followinge such a happie peace, as both His Majestie and his late Father, of renowned memorie, have longe and carefully sought after, and as may tend to the honor of God, the preservation of true religion, the honour of His Majestie, and the safety of his kingdomes.

You shall cause a journal to be kepte, and shall advertise me, from time to time, of all your proceedings, and of all things you thinke fitt, in your wisdom for me to knowe, or make knowne
unto

unto His Majestie. And soe to God's blessing I
commend your safety and good successe.

From the Councell at Holbern, 26th
August 1625.

(Signed) G. BUCKINGHAM.

State Papers. Instructions T. page 9.

Dec. 21st, 1797.
Ex^d J. B.

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APPENDIX. No. III.

INSTRUCTIONS for our right, trusty, and most entirely beloved Cousen and Councillor, GEORGE DUKE OF BUCKINGHAM, our High Admirall of England, and General of the Fleet and Army.

19th June, 1627.

Wee well understand, how by our ingagement into warr against Spaine, as our ennimyes have endeavored to advance their designes, foe our neereft allies, even those who have counselled us to the same warr, have taken advantage to encroach upon our rights, to ruine our freinds, and to roote out that religion, whereof by just title, wee are the denfendour. Our resolution therefore is, under the shield of God's favour, to prosecute our just defence. And to that end wee have made choice of you, before others, to command in chiefe all our forces now prepared, or which wee shall hereafter prepare, and imploy, for the seconding of our present undertaking; partly out of our confidence in your faith and entire affecon to our person, and the prosperity of our affaires; and partly because this charge is most propper to that place you houlde in our service;

service;—The cheife designe both of our ennemies, and ill-affected freinds, being to dispossesse us of that soveraignty in those seas, to which our kingdomes of Great Brittain have given denominacon, and which all our ancestors have enjoyed, tyme out of minde.

And because this our just dominion is incroached upon, first by such freebooters and pyrats as make spoyle of our subjects, and interrupt their trade.

Secondly, by that admirantaggo lately rayfed betwixt Spaine and Flanders, to maintain their entercourse by force. And lastly, by a like association, supported by the ships of our deare brother the French King, with a purpose to extend his monarchie into the ocean, to the prejudice of free trade, and especially of our merchants; wee to resist and frustrate their attempts, have committed to your charge a convenient fleete, both of our owne shippes and the shippes of our subjects, with all fitting provisions. And this you are to accompte the chiefe busines of your imployment. And therefore before and after you sett to sea, you must use all diligence, by pinnaces and messengers sent to divers parts, to gett true informacon, what shippes are sent abroad, and what preparacons are made, and where and when they may be met with, and accordingly you must dispose of your fleete to encounter them at sea, or in the havens or rivers, eyther to destroy them, or to bring them away with the goods you finde a board, that this great charge they putt us to, may thereby be repaid.

Besides these wrongs offered at sea, it is most notorious that our brotherly affection expressed in lending a considerable number of shippes, and in reducing the subjects of our dear brother the French King, unto a submission, upon our engagement of our honors, with his consent, for the performance of hard conditions offered on his part, hath beene unworthily abused, and turned to the ruine of those, who flye to our protection, which by our deare cousin the Duke of Saubize they challenge at our hands, soe that in honour and justice wee cannot deny them.

Wee have therefore caused certaine regiments of foote and some horse to bee putt a board your shippes, with a sufficient proportion of artillery and munition, all which you must transport towards Rochell.

But before your coming thither, you shall dispatch away some fitt person, in some convenient vessel, and shall give him instructions to acquaint the chiefe heads of our religion in that place, with our royall and just intention, which is not to invade the dominions or territories of our dear brother the French King, nor to raise his subjects, or to make a warr against him, upon any pretence, or interest of our owne; but that wee have sente you only in discharge of our promise and honour, to protect those who profess the same religion with us; and particularly that cittie, in their lawfull rights and priviledges, established by publick edicts, and ratified by the late promise of the King and State.

And

And because for performance of this promise, our honor was the gage, which by the desire of that King was interposed and accepted, and most relyed upon; and now understanding, by divers advertisements from thence, and by the sollicitacon of our deare cousin the Duke of Soubize, that they expect a present seige, and that all acts of hostilitie are commenced against them, wee have therefore, in discharge of our interest, sent unto them, those auxiliary forces for their succour, in tyme of neede.

Upon this significacon, a prestant and direct answer must be required; whether their case bee still such as they neede our assistance, what imployment shall bee fittest, and whether, in case of our ingagement, they will reciprocally oblige themselves to enter into action, and to give us, upon all accations, reliefe and retraite, and not make their peace or capitulate, but with our knowledge and consent.

If their answer be negative, or doubtfull, then you shall make a solemn protestacon, in our name, that wee have performed, on our part, that condicion of assistance and protection, which they could require or expect. And that our honor and engagement unto them is fully discharged. And this done, you shall forthwith send back into England such of your landmen and municion as you shall not have occacion to imploy for other service. If their answer bee affirmative, and that they ingage themselves on equall termes, soe as in justice and honour wee cannot abandon them, wee are then contented that you deliver over to our said deare cousin the
Duke

Duke of Soubize, as to the generall of them of the religion in those parts, such of our said troopers, with the artillery and municon, to be employed as auxiliary forces, in their just protection and defence, as in your discretion you shall thinke fitt.

Yet are these forces to be delivered to our said cosin, with this caution and restriction, that hee shall governe both them, and all his actions, by the advice and assistance of our counsell, and such as you shall nominate to bee of his counsell.

And as you are, in this manner, to provide for the reliefe and defence of them of our religion, so must you take as much care for the recovery of the shippes of our subjects, lately arrested with their goods and psons in the river of Bourdeaux.

For this purpose, you may imploy a sufficient number of your shippes of least water and best saile, which are to bee sent away well manned and provided, and with all possible caution, to prevent their discovery, 'till they come as high as our merchants' shippes are thought to bee.

That you may have meanes to bring away as many of the shippes, goods, and men, as can bee gotten, you must cause spare sayles to be sent aboard the shippes you send thither, that they may bee putt to the yards, in lieu of those which the French have carried on shore. Such as you cannot bring away, you shall sinke, burne, or otherwise destroy and make unserviceable, that
noe

noe use bee made of them against us or our friends.

This service being performed, the land forces disposed, and the free passage to Rochell layed open and secured, and the seas freed, by your resolute and prosperous endeavours, from forraine usurpacion, then if you finde your shippes, men, victualls, and municon sufficient for further imployment, you shall, with all or such part of your forces as you finde fitt, sett your course for the coast of Spaine or Portugall, or else for the islands there, to looke into their havens, to destroy their shipping and provisions, and to hinder their gathering to an head; and you shall encounter such forces as shall be found at sea, to breake the entercourse betwixt those parts and the Indies or Flanders, to take such Brasilemen, or merchantmen, as may be found, and such Hamburgers, Loubeckers, or others, as supply the enemye with prohibited provisions; and doe any other service, whereby our honour may be advanced, and our enemys endamaged, or frustrated of their preparations or designs against us.

In all these instructions, though wee expect from you a due regard of our royall intentions and designs, yet our meaning is not to limitt you to the exact observance of circumstances, nor to any such restriction; but that wee leave to your owne wisdom, and to the mature advise of the counsell of warre, appointed to attende you, to direct the order of your actions, what shall follow or precede, and the choyce of your undertakings for place, tyme, and persons, and the whole manner

ner of your proceedings, both in sea and land service, knowing well that the success of war dependeth most upon occasions, which how to take or pursue, cannot particularly bee directed, but must bee governed by the wisdom and valour of the commander, and to receive the event from God, in whom wee wholly put our trust.

For farther particular applicacon of our meaning, and of the latitude, wee leave unto you. Wee hereby give you full power to nominate for our counsell of this warr, to bee employed with you, such commanders, officers, or other persons as you shall chuse, and to advise, from tyme to tyme, with soe many, or soe few of them, as the importance of the affaires, and opportunities of tymes and places, shall require or permitt; and as you shall thinke fitt. And if for the advancement of our service, you finde it necessary or convenient to divide your forces by sea or land, wee give you alsoe power (according to your judgment and discretion) to send such commander or commanders, as you shall appoint with soe many shippes, men and provisions as you shall thinke fitt, either to Newfoundland, the Westerne Islands, the Levant Seas, within the straights of Gibraltar, or to any other part or place, where service may bee done upon the enemy for our honour and profitt; and our pleasure is, that noe words or clauses either in our commission or in our instruccons bee understood or interpreted to lymitt and prescribe you in the prosecution of any action which tendeth to this end.

And whereas by the last treaty betweene us and the States, the States have bound themselves
to

to furnish a 4th part of any such fleete, as wee shall sett forth against the King of Spaine, upon a deliberation, (advised of and regulated betweene us,) when you shall have taken councell, to imploy our fleete towards the coast of Spaine. Wee doe give you power and authority to call upon the States for their proporcon and assistance, to assigne them a tyme and place for their randizvous to joyne with you, to create and regulate the order to be held in it, and to command over that squadron, or part of the fleete, according to the 9th article of the said treatye, which wee have commanded our Secretary of Estate to deliver unto you, or a copy of the whole treatye, if you shall require it. And this pointe wee alsoe referre to your discretion. Given at our Court at Southwicke, the 19th day of June, 1627, and in the third yeare of our raigne.

State Paper's Instructions, T. p. 155.

Dec. 21, 1797.

Ex^d J. B.

APPENDIX, No. IV.

June 9th, 1694, Camarett Bay.

SIR,

I am forry I am forced to give you so ill an account of our success here. I send you copys of Admiral Ruffel's order to me, and of the councils of war that has been held since wee parted. On the 6th instant wee made the Island of Ushant, and as soon as they see us, they alarmed the country, by firing many guns, and making great fires all night. On the 7th wee had fine wether, and got into Camarett Bay : but as wee were coming in, and after wee were at an anchor, the enemy bombed us from five several batteries round the bay, most of which fell short, but some among the ships, but did no harm. If they had not discovered their bombs before we anchored, wee should have gone nearer in, and they might then have extreamly incommoded us. Yesterday morning wee had a very thick fogg; when it cleared, the enemy began to play their bombs again, but did no damage. About 7, according to the resolution of the council of warr, I made the signal for the souldiers to embark into the boats, and small vessels. Between 11 and 12, the Lord Carmarthen, whom I had ordered into the bottom of Camarett Bay, with the Monke, Charles Galley, Shoram, and four Dutch frigates (to cover the
landing

landing of the souldiers) got in, and presently after 12, Lieut. General Talmash went towards the shoar with the souldiers, and between one and two landed with 3 or 4 hundred men, but was beat off again, before the rest could land to his relief, and himself shot through the thigh, but I hope will do well. The enemy are retrenched in every little bay hereabouts, and have batteries, wherever they can be placed; and by what I can find, in no want of men, neither horse or foot, of the former of which wee see several squadrons; I counted ten, they were cloathed with white. I shall now make the best of my way to Portsmouth, where I shall desire to receive your commands. I send this by the Dreadnought, on board of which ship Mr. Talmash is. The Lord Carmarthen behaved himself very well and gallantly, and so did all the rest of the officers that were in with him. Our three English frigatts, as well as the Dutch, lay 3 hours against the enemy's batteries. Of English seamen, wee have lost 3 hundred killed and wounded; a frigatt of 30 guns of the Dutch, called the Wesel, was sunk, and her captain and most of her men killed. Sir, the fleet with me was extream thinly manned before, and now in a worse condition; so that if there is not care taken to provide us some seamen, before wee go out again, it will be impossible for us, Admiral Ruffel having made such large draughts from us, and yet wants many men to complete his number. Wee were last year, as you know, supplied with souldiers, and 3 or four battallions are the fewest can be now left, and they will hardly do neither (if any service is designed for the fleet) for several ships really
e 2 want

want seamen to trim their sayls, as you will see by the weekly account I'll send you. Sir, people at London perhaps will blame us, for not still attempting to go into Brest, but if they were here, and see how farr the enemy throw their bombs, I am confident they would be of another opinion, especially when they consider what little effect five mortars, ill fitted and attended, would have upon Brest, when in all probability (by what we have seen without) they would have at least six times that number to bomb us, and wee could not anchor without reach, having possession of no part of the shore. As for passing by the castles, 'tis certainly to be done without much difficulty. I intend to sayl this morning, but shall leave two men of warr, and two fire ships, off Ushant, as long as the wind continues easterly, and two days longer to give notice to any ship that might be coming to joyn us, whither wee are gone. I remain, Sir, with great respect,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

BERKELEY.

Wee have lost 5 or 6 well boats, and a Dutch long boat; one was sunk with a cannon ball, the rest grounded, and wee could not get them off, the tide having left them. The French burnt them yesterday in the evening, for fear wee should get them off in the night. The enemy are now throwing some bombs towards us, but without any effect.

Admiralty. Miscellaneous, 1690 to 1697, No. IV.

Dec. 21st 1797,
Ex^d J. B.

APPENDIX, No. V.

13th May, 1693.

INSTRUCTIONS for our right trusty, and entirely beloved Cousin and Councillor, THOMAS, MARQUIS OF CARMARTHEN, President of our Council ; Our right, trusty, and right welbeloved Cousins and Councillors, THOMAS EARLE OF PEMBROKE, Keeper of our Privy Seale ; WILLIAM EARLE OF DEVONSHIRE, Steward of our Household ; CHARLES EARLE OF DORSETT, Chamberlain of our Household ; LAURENCE, EARLE OF ROCHESTER ; and our right trusty, and welbeloved Councillor, SIR JOHN TRENCHARD, knt. one of our Principall Secretarys of State. Given at Whitehall, the 13th Day of May 1693, in the fifth Year of our Reign.

MARIE R.

Whereas wee think it requisite for our service, that you do forthwith repair on board our fleet ; you are, upon your arrivall there, to
give

give our admirals of the main fleet, and of the Mediterranean squadron, orders from us (which you will herewith receive) whereby they are required to follow and observe such orders and instructions, as you, or any four of you, shall give them in writing.

You are to call a council of flagg-officers, and consult with them, of the best ways and means of annoying the enemy, and advancing the present service.

Wee do hereby authorize you, to give the necessary orders, to the admirals of the main fleet to saile to the coast of France, and particularly to the coast off Brest, as soon as may bee, wind and weather permitting, in order to make an attempt upon the enemy's ships in Brest water, in case it shall be thought practicable.

We, do also authorize you, to give orders to the admiral and commander in chief of the Mediterranean squadron, for the proceeding of the merchant ships now under his convoy, with such number of men of warr, as you shall judge most expedient.

And wee do hereby further authorize and empower you, to give such further directions and instructions, as well to our admiralls of the main fleet, as to our admiral of the Mediterranean squadron, as you shall think necessary or expedient for our service.

You are to returne back to us as soon as you
have

have dispatched the necessary orders, and to give us an account of your proceedings therein.

By Her Majesty's command,

(Signed)

NOTTINGHAM.

Admiralty. Miscellaneous, 1690 to 1697, No. IV.

Dec. 21st 1797.

Ex^d J. B.

APPEN-

APPENDIX, No. VI.

ORDER to SIR G. ROOKE, May 31, 1693.

MARIE R.

Our will and pleasure is, and wee do hereby authorize and require you, that in case you shall have certain intelligence, before you part from our main fleet, that the French Toulon squadron has joined the rest of their fleet, you do then leave the Monk, the Lyon, the Woolwich, the Lumley Castle, the Princess Anne, the Loyal Merchant, the Larke, the Salamander bomb-vessel, the Oosterstellingwerf, the Beschermmer, the Medemblick, the Nimegen, and one fire-ship; as also the Turkish Tyger, and the Smyrna Factor, to convoy the ships bound to the Mediterranean, under the command of such person, and with such instructions, as the Commissioners for executing the office of our High Admiral of England have ordered. And you are to remain with, and joine our main fleet, with the residue of the ships under your command, till further order. And in case that after you have left our main fleet, you shall, upon your arrivall at Cadiz, or during your stay there, have certaine intelligence that the said Toulon squadron is come into the ocean, you are
also

also then to leave the Mediterranean ships, to proceed with the above named men of warr, and to returne as soon as may bee, wind and weather permitting, to joine our main fleet, with the residue of the said squadron; and in order thereunto, to make for the port of Plymouth, where you will receive further orders. And for so doing, this shall bee your warrant. Given at our court att Whitehall, the 31st day of May, 1693.

By Her Majesty's command,

(Signed)

J. TRENCHARD.

To our trusty and welbeloved
Sir George Rooke, Kt. Ad-
mirall and Commander in
Chief of our ships in the
Mediterranean.

Admiralty. Miscellaneous, 1690 to 1697. No. IV.

Dec. 21st, 1797.
Exd J. B.

A P P E N D I X, No. VII.

INSTRUCTIONS for SIR GEORGE ROOKE,
Knight, Admiral and Commander in
Chief of His Majesty's Fleet. Given at
Whitehall, the 12th day of August
1701.

THO. CANTUAR.
N. WRIGHT, C. S.
PEMBROKE, P.
DEVONSHIRE.
SOMERSET.
PERCEY.
GODOLPHIN.

His Majesty, upon a serious consideration of
the late proceedings of the French King, in seiz-
ing all the strong places in the Spanish Nether-
lands, and sending his army into Italy, and his
fleets to Cadiz and the West Indies, and from
several concurrent advices, having just cause to
apprehend that the French King intends to seize
likewise upon all the effects of the Spanish flota,
expected home in a short time, the better to en-
able him to carry on a war. For preventing so
great a mischief to His Majesty's subjects, and to
all

all Christendom, we have thought fit, in pursuance of the directions we have received from His Majesty, to give you the following orders and instructions.

I. You are hereby required and directed, upon opening these instructions, to sail with the fleet under your command to the westward of Ushant, and to endeavour to get intelligence whether Mons. Chateaurenaud be sailed from Brest, with a squadron under his command, and if they be gone from thence, on what service they are designed.

II. You are to make a detachment of so many English and Dutch ships, as will make up Vice Admiral Benbow's squadron, bound to the West Indies, to the number of thirty-five ships of the line of battle, with which you are to send Rear Admiral Munden, and to put them under the Command of Vice Admiral Benbow; and you are to give him the following instructions, which you are to enjoin him to keep secret, and not to impart to any person whatever, till he comes to his station, viz.

That he make the best of his way, with the joint squadrons under his command, to the latitude of Cape St. Vincent, taking care not to fall nearer the land than a hundred leagues distance, and so to proceed to the Western Islands, one of which he is to make with one ship only, to avoid being discovered; and from thence he is to ply away to the westward, in the fair way and course of the Spanish flota, expected home from the West Indies,

Indies; and upon his meeting with them, he is to use his best endeavours, either by fair means or by force, to seize and bring the said flota, and such other ships, as shall appear for their protection, or be in company with them, to some port in England; in order to which he is to return with the whole squadron. And forasmuch as it is his Majesty's intention that the effects of the said flota be entirely and safely preserved, for the use of those that have a just title to the same; he is to take particular care, that there be no kind of embezzlement, and to endeavour to possess himself of the invoices of the cargo of every particular ship; which said invoices he is to have immediately sealed up, and the hatches of the ships spiked; and he is to keep the said invoices safely in his custody, till further orders.

And in case he shall meet with the flota, he is to send on board the commander in chief, and acquaint him, that he has orders to carry them to a port of safety, and that it is His Majesty's resolution, to restore to every body what belongs to them; but the management hereof is to be left to his discretion, so as that it may not hinder the execution of the service.

He is not to impart his orders, concerning the flota, to any of the Commanders of his squadron, or any other person, until such time as it is absolutely necessary, for the execution of the service, seeing it may be convenient, in case he does not meet with the flota, that it should not be known he had any such orders.

In

In case he shall meet with any vessel beyond or near the Western Islands, he shall detain the same, till the expedition be over, to prevent discovery.

The said Vice Admiral Benbow is to continue to cruize in the station before-mentioned, in the usual tract of the said flota, till the tenth day of October next, unless he shall have certain information, that the said flota is passed by to the eastward; in which case he is to proceed on his voyage to the West Indies; and Rear Admiral Munden, with the detached ships, is to return home. And in case, he has reason to believe, by any advice he receives, that they are not yet passed to the eastward, he is to continue on the said service, for so long time as he shall judge his beer will carry him on his intended voyage to the West Indies, and will serve the said detached squadron, in their return to England, whither he is to order Rear Admiral Munden to return, with the said squadron, and himself to proceed to the West Indies, according to his orders from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

In case Vice Admiral Benbow attempts the flota, whether he succeeds or not, he is to send one of the ships of Rear Admiral Munden's squadron, to Newfoundland, to give the men of war and merchant ships there, notice, that there are great apprehensions of a speedy breach with France and Spain, and to send orders to the men of war, to convoy the merchant ships home.

III. When you have seen the said squadron, under the command of Vice-Admiral Benbow,
clear

clear of the land, in case you have any intelligence that *Monf. Chateaurenaud* is still with his squadron at *Brest*, you are to dispose yourself with the remaining part of the fleet, in such manner as may seem most probable to hinder his coming out; but you are not to make use of force without further order. But if you are informed that *Chateaurenaud* is sailed with the said squadron from *Brest*, you are then to repair to such stations in the soundings, as you shall judge most proper, for the security and protection of the several trades expected home from foreign parts; and you are to continue on this, or the former service, for so long time, as you shall judge adviseable, with respect to the season of the year, after which you are to repair to *Torbay*, or *Spithead*, and there expect further orders, taking care to leave a squadron in a proper station, for the services before-mentioned, of securing the commerce.

By their Excellencies command.

Admiralty. Instructions to Admirals, and Letters, 1701, and 1702. No. V.

Dec. 21st, 1797.
Exd J. B.

IN-

INSTRUCTIONS for SIR GEORGE ROOKE, Knt.
Admiral and Commander in Chief of His
Majesty's Fleet. Given at Whitehall, the
10th Day of September, 1701.

We being informed by your letter, dated the first instant, on board his Majesty's ship the *Triumph*, being then 9 or 10 leagues N. N. E. from *Ushant*, that you had made a detachment of English and Dutch men of war, under the command of Rear Admiral *Munden*, to reinforce Vice Admiral *Benbow's* squadron, in pursuance of our instructions of the 12th of August last; and understanding by letters dated at *Madrid* the 14th-25th, August, that the Spanish *flota* by reason of the delays and accidents they have met with in the *West Indies*, is not expected at *Cadiz* till January or February next, at soonest, which advice is sent us by *Mr. Blathwayt*, by his Majesty's command, with such circumstances as give us reason to believe, his Majesty is of opinion it may be depended on; and having seriously considered the same, according to his Majesty's pleasure, signified to us, we have thought fit to send you the following directions, *viz.*

You are hereby required and directed, upon receipt hereof, to dispatch a frigate, with orders to Vice Admiral *Benbow* (sending him likewise a copy of the said advice concerning the *flota*, which is herewith transmitted to you) that in case he receives the same in the station where he was ordered
to

to cruize, he do, without any loss of time, proceed with his squadron, on their voyage to the West Indies, according to his instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and that he order Rear Admiral Munden to return to England, with the detached squadron under his command, with all convenient expedition, unless he have intelligence, such as he can rely upon, that the said flota is coming home, and that there is a likelihood of his meeting them, either in the station where he was appointed to cruize, or elsewhere in their passage, in which case he is to pursue his former orders. And if he shall receive these instructions before he come to his station appointed, he is, nevertheless, to proceed to the said station, that being looked upon as the most likely course, for his meeting the said flota. In case Vice Admiral Benbow shall, after his separation from the said detached squadron, either in his passage to the West Indies, or after his arrival there, have notice of the Spanish flota, he shall endeavour to seize them, and bring them to a place of safety, but he is not to make any attempt upon them, unless he finds himself strong enough to do it, with a good prospect of success; and in case he do attempt the said flota, and succeed therein, he is to make the same declaration of his Majesty's resolution to restore to every body what belongs to them, and take the same care to prevent all kind of embezzlements, as he was directed by his former instructions; and, in like manner, he is to keep these orders secret. And the better to support him in, or after any attempt of this kind, as well as to oppose any designs the French may have in

in those parts, we have sent to his Majesty, for his leave to dispatch away five ships more to the West Indies, that are sheathed for that service (the names whereof are in the margin) and which the Lords of the Admiralty assure us may be ready to sail in a fortnight.

Dunkirk,	guns 60.
Dreadnought,	64.
Norwich,	48.
Yarmouth,	70.
Canterbury,	60.

You are to order the frigate, you dispatch with these instructions to Vice Admiral Benbow, to follow him, according to the course he was ordered to take, to the Western Islands, or where it shall be most probable for the said frigate to find him.

By, &c.

Dec. 21st 1797.
Ex^d J. B.

EXTRACT of Mons. SCHONENBERG's Letter,
about the FLOTA and GALEONS, 25th
Aug. 1701. Sent to SIR G. ROOKE, with
the foregoing Instructions.

Madrid, 25th August, 1701.

The advices which came last week from Cadiz, have disappointed all the hopes that this Court, and the partizans of France, had founded, on the sudden arrival of the flota from Mexico; for an advice boat, sent from Vera Cruz, under the command of Captain Don Bartolome Garoze,

g

which

which was arrived in the said port of Cadiz, brought letters of the 17th of May last, giving an account, that there was no vent for the goods from Europe, because those which had been brought thither from China, had been sold at so low a rate, that they had almost ruined the market for the European commodities, that is to say, those which the said flota had laden at Cadiz, in order to traffick with them in Mexico; and that this misfortune, together with the scarcity of plate (there not being enough even for a third part of the lading) was the cause, why the flota could not begin its voyage till September, at which time, the north winds blow, which are absolutely necessary for the bringing the flota, on its return towards Spain, where consequently it is not to be expected before January or February next.—The same letters add, that a report being spread at Vera Cruz, that a squadron of English and Dutch men of war, had appeared near the Island of Cuba, they had immediately, with great precipitation, taken away, and carried to Galapa, a town of the Terra Firma, under the jurisdiction of Vera Cruz, all the plate which had been brought down to that port for the flota: and that although the Governor of the Havannah had given notice to those of Vera Cruz, by three expresses, one after another, that they should not give any credit to those reports; yet that advice had not proved sufficient to remove their fears, or to induce them to bring back their plate, which might produce new difficulties, and occasion the further delay of the departure of the flota beyond September, and consequently its arrival at Cadiz, beyond January or February.

'Tis

'Tis scarcely to be expressed, how much the government is concerned at this news; more especially the French party, since all their hopes, and their whole support, were grounded on the expectation of the sudden arrival of the said flota, which they firmly imagined would every hour appear upon the coasts; but what augments their despair, is not only the impossibility of dispatching the galeons before June next, but chiefly the entire disability wherein they are plunged, by the delay of the flota; having thereby lost all means of supplies, in the pressing necessities, that increase and load them more and more every day.

Dec. 21st 1797.
Ex^d J. B.

APPENDIX, No. VIII.

DRAUGHT of INSTRUCTIONS for SIR GEORGE
ROOKE.

March 1703-4.

After you shall have concerted matters with the King of Spain and Portugal, you shall saile towards Cadiz, and, as you shall see cause, into the Mediterranean, and in your course, as well without, as within the Straits, allarme the coast of Spaine, in such manner as may be most usefull to the interest of the King of Spain, and of the common cause, making a plain distinction between those who shall be willing to acknowledge the King of Spain, and those who shall adhere to the Duke of Anjou and the French interest, in favouring and assisting the first, as friends, and pursuing and destroying the other, as enemys.

In case you proceed further up the Mediterranean, which you are to do, if you see cause for it, upon advice, at a councill of warr, you are to demand satisfaction and reparation for the injurys and losses sustained by Plowman, and other our subjects, concerned in that affaire, the state whereof you will understand from our envoye at Florence; unless by the accounts you receive from him, and which we have directed him to send,
you

you shall understand that that matter is accommodated, and finally concluded.

You shall particularly endeavour to destroy the French in the Adriatick, and even those who may be, in any Port of Venice, in case you proceed so farr, or shall send any ships thither, which we leave to your determination, as aforesaid; and you shall view, or order to be viewed, the Port of Buccari, and the fortifications, which have been lately built there by the Emperor, and if you find it needfull and proper, you shall leave behind you some ships in that port, with such instructions to the commodore, as the case shall require; and particularly for causing forward such instructions, &c. as shall be sent to the army in Italy.

You shall take a proper time, during your stay there, to demand satisfaction of the Venetians, for the losses and injuries sustained there, by our subjects, not already repaired, whereof our consul will give you an account; and particularly for the ship burned by the French at Malomocco, and that taken by the French, at Rargno; and you are likewise to demand, that all seamen, our subjects, in their service, or on board any of their ships or galleys be set at liberty, and embarke freely on board our ships, or the ships of any of our subjects or allys, and that, for the future, none be entertained in their service; and herein you are to governe yourselfe, according to the nature of the severall affaires, with more tenderness, if that state is really entring into the common alliance, and it appeare that the pursuit of this demand will frustrate or obstruct the treaty.

You

You shall endeavour, as you have opportunity, by all such meanes as you shall think most proper, to persuade the governments of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoly, to declare warr against France, and upon such declaration, and some hostility actually committed against France, you shall give such presents as you shall judge proper, whereof you shall give them such hopes, before hand, as may be expedient to induce them to it; and you may assure the Dey of Tunis, that he shall be permitted to expect 20 guns, of 18lb ball, which he has desired to buy.

And you are to demand, pursuant to our treaty, the release of our two subjects, William Penton and James Hawes, who were taken on board of a Danish ship, and sold, on 23d of June 1703, for slaves, but if you finde that they be seamen, part of the ship's company, and thereby guilty to be made slaves, yet you are to ask their release, as a respect that will be taken by Her Majesty.

You shall take all Italians, although subjects of a neuter prince, whom you shall find serving on board any prize ship belonging to our enemys, and treat them as prisoners of warr, and you shall thereupon require of such neuter prince, whose subject shall be taken in our enemy's service, that he issue such severe prohibitions, and give such order for the observance of them, as may prevent the like practice; and the same demand you shall likewise make, in case you are certainly and particularly informed of such Italians, engaging in the enemy's service, although none of them be taken by you.

You

You must endeavour, the best you can, to prevent the French from joyning their fleet, whether the same be attempted by their ships from West France, into the Mediterranean, or from Toulon for West France; and in order thereunto, you are to use all proper means, to gain intelligence of their preparations in those ports, and of their designs. And in case the stations and services on which you shall be employed, pursuant to these or any other instructions which you shall receive from us, should prevent the using such endeavours as might be requisite, to prevent the Toulon ships, from getting out of the Straits, and you are then to follow them, without respect to any of the services, mentioned in these or any former of our instructions, and endeavour to destroy them, leaving the execution of the rest until a more proper season.

You are to maintain a correspondence with our ministers, at the courts of the Duke of Savoy and the Great Duke, and with our consuls in Italy, and on the coast of Barbary, as you shall find it necessary for our service, and concert the most proper method of the like correspondence with our ambassador at Lisbon, before you leave that court.

Dec. 21st 1797.

Ex^d J. B.

A P P E N.

APPENDIX, No. IX.

DRAUGHT of additional Instructions for **SIR**
GEORGE ROOKE.

March, 1703-4.

Whereas there are some services of the greatest importance, which we have thought fit to commit to your care and conduct, and wherein we cannot hope, for any succeſſe, without all poſſible ſecrecy, we doe therefore ſignify to you our intentions therein, by theſe private inſtructions, and would have you, notwithstanding what is contained in our other inſtructions, dated ———, apply yourſelf, in the firſt place, to the execution of theſe ſervices.

You are already acquainted by the Earle of Nottingham, purſuant to our command, with the reſolution we have taken to attempt Thoulon, with the Duke of Savoy's readineſs to concur therein, and with the orders we have ſent to our envoy extraordinary in that Court, to concert the proper methods of executing this deſigne. We need therefore only adde, that you will receive, upon your arrival in the Mediterranean, an account from our ſaid envoye of what ſhall have been concerted and reſolved by him with the ſaid Duke; or otherwiſe you may ſend to Nizza, or Villafrancha, ſome light frigat for advice from him; and upon notice from him of the reſolutions taken, you are to co-operate

operate with the fleet under your command in the execution of them.

In order hereunto you will receive from our Secretary of State, a plan and description of that port: and if you should have an opportunity to get any farther or later description of it, you must be sure to do it, in such manner as may not give the least ombrage or jealousy of this designe, whereof you must not take the least notice to the ministers of Portugall, or to any other person whatsoever, till you shall think it altogether safe and necessary to consult about the execution of it, at a council of war.

You must, therefore spend no more time in allarming the coast of Spain, pursuant to our other instructions, than what may be necessary to cover this designe, without loosing the opportunity of effecting it, or meeting the Duke of Savoy's forces, at the time and place appointed, if they proceed marching by land.

This being the first and principal thing, we leave it to you to execute what follows in these instructions, in such manner, and at such time, as you shall judge consistent with it, giving still this attempt on Thoulon the preference; excepting the relief of Nizza, if that should be attempted by the French, as you were directed by our instructions, dated March 14; and excepting the following of the Thoulon squadron, in case they passe the streights, which in respect of our owne safety, and the safety of our dominions, must be your principall care, pursuant to the last article of our other instructions.

APPENDIX, No. IX, *continued.*

May, 1703.

INSTRUCTIONS for our trusty and well beloved SIR CLOUDESLEY SHOVELL, Knt. Admiral of the White Squadron of our Fleet, and Admiral and Commander in Chief of our Ships employed, and to be employed in the Mediterranean Sea. Given at our Court at St. James's, the 4th Day of May 1703, in the second Year of our Reigne.

ANNE R.

You are to enquire particularly, whether there be any possibility of destroying the salt and salt works at Pequars ; and if you find that it is practicable, you are to land such, and so many of our marines, as may be sufficient for this service, taking with them such of the French as will join in it, and may conduct our troops to the performance of this service ; but you are not to attempt this, till the service at Nizza and Thoulon be over, or that there be no occasion for the one, or hopes of attempting the other.

Having

Having performed these services, or as much thereof as is practicable, you are to proceed to Palermo in Sicily, and there make and observe the signals; and if you find it feasible, you are to concur with them in the attempt, assisting them by our ships and bomb-vessels, and with such of our marines as are necessary, and by all such other ways, as you shall judge proper.

If you succeed in this attempt, and you find it practicable to take Messina, you are in that, and all other things, to do your utmost to assist them in freeing themselves from the slavery of France, and the present Spanish government, and to reduce that island to the dominion of the House of Austria.

You are then to proceed to Naples, and to the coast of that kingdom, and upon the signals given you, you are, in like manner, to assist the people, to shake off the French and Spanish power, in favor of the House of Austria.

And if any part of the Emperor's army shall be in that kingdom, you are, as farr as is practicable, to co-operate with the officer commanding those troopes, in reducing Naples, or any other port of that kingdom; and in order to it, to land our marines, supply them with mortars and cannon, out of our ships, which you are to put on the land carriages, which you have with you; and in all respects do your utmost to support and assist the Emperor's army, or any others that declare for the House of Austria.

Dec. 21st, 1797.
Exd. J. B.

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APPENDIX, No. X.

SIR JOHN NORRIS's Letter to the Right
Honorable the EARL OF SUNDERLAND.

Ranelagh, in Vaia Bay, 27th July, 1710.

My Lord,

Since my last to your Lordship of the 7th July, the duplicates of which are herewith, I am to acquaint your Lordship, that all things being ready for the enterprize against Cette, on the coast of Languedoc, I sailed the 9th with the fleet from Barcellona, and sent my dispatches for the Duke of Savoy, communicating our intentions to his R. H. as was agreed upon, in the councill of warr of the 6th instant. The 13th we arrived on the coast of Cette, and that night debarked the troops, with Major General Seiffan, about a league from the town of Cette. The 14th, at the break of day, they marched to the said town, and I appointed ships for battering the fort, in the mould head. As soon as the troops came to the town, the inhabitants took to the church; and after a small fire passing between them, in which five English were wounded, and some of the inhabitants, they surrendered the town, after which, the fort upon the mould, which had in it 18 pieces of
cannon

cannon, followed their example, and surrendered without making any further resistance. Then a detachment of 300 men, with Major Wills, were left to guard Cette, and the General, with the regiment of Stanhope, and upwards of 300 marines, which I landed to strengthen them, marched to the town of Adge, where they took a post before the said town, that makes the island of Cette, and prevents the enemy from coming upon the same, and that night the town of Adge capitulated with them, without making any resistance. The 15th our troops lay upon the post before the town of Adge, and that night General Seiffan, having intelligence that the Duke de Roquillauze, who commands in the province of Languedoc, had formed a design to make a descent, by boats, over the lake, to the Island of Cette, sent to acquaint me, he designed to march the 16th at day, with his troops, to oppose the same, and desired the assistance of the fleet, with our boats, upon the lake of Cette. Upon receipt of which intelligence, the 16th in the morning, I went with the Vice and Rear Admiral, and all the boats of the fleet armed, upon the lake of Cette, and by our being there, prevented the enemys making any descent. Towards noon, we joined Major General Seiffan and our troops, who left behind him a detachment of Stanhope's, and another of marines, to guard the post at Adge, under the command of two Captaines. But, at the same time we joined the troops, we understood, that the said detachments had quitted those posts, and were coming after our troops, in some sayettees the enemy assisted them to; upon which the General proposed marching
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ing back all the troops, to retake the said post; but our officers affirming they had been so fatigued, it was impossible for them to march, and that they did not think their number sufficient to defend the said post, I desired a council of war of our land officers, as the troops were under arms, to consider what possibly they could undertake, and it was agreed to march into Cette, and to make the best defence they could, in that place, which they did accordingly. The 17th, in the morning, Major General Seiffan and Colonel Stanhope coming to me, were of opinion, if they could be further helped, they would again march to attack the post of Adge. I held a council of war, both with them and the flags, and the Dutch Rear Admiral, agreeing to assist with 300 men. It was accordingly resolved in a council of war, to march to attack the post of Adge (the council is herewith) upon which we embarked the troops on the fayettees, and all things were ready for to transport them, near that place. But towards noon, Major Generall Seiffan having received intelligence that the Duke de Noailles was arrived at Meye, and that 2000 horse and dragoons would arrive to-morrow at Adge, and that all his troops were marching from Rouffillon against us, and the Duke of Berwick was also sending a detachment, whereby the number of his troops that daily arrive would increase to 30,000 men; and the small number we have, not being now secured of the post, for keeping the enemy from deserting on the Island of Cette, 'twas resolved, in a council of war, which is herewith, that we debark our troops again at Cette, to do what we could, in
defence

defence of the same ; which was accordingly done. The 18th in the morning, the Duke de Roquelauze and Noailles, being marched in sight of Cette, with a great body of horse and foot, and seven pieces of cannon, whereby our small number was unable to keep the town of Cette, we were obliged to re-imbark our troops, leaving a company in the fort upon the mould of Cette, to cover our retreat, which place we were in hopes to have defended for some days. The enemy pushing of us, took our advanced guard, being a captain and 50 men ; and after we had re-imbarked all our troops, but what was in the fort, we made a retreat with them ; after which the officer of the fort, from some accident I am not yet acquainted of, surrendered it to the enemy ; and there being no further hopes of attempting any thing on this coast, that is so intirely alarmed, I held a councill of warr, which is herewith, whereby I shall do all I can to amuse the enemy, by the appearance of our ships on the coast of Provence.

I pray leave to acquaint your Lordships, for Her Majesty's information, that no person could be more zealous for the good of her service than Major General Seissan. We found the country entirely as he represented ; and the inhabitants joy'd at our coming, and would have assisted all they were able, for which reason I did not destroy their villages, or admit as little disturbing them or plundering, as was possible for me to hinder. The Major General had very good intelligence from all parts about us, and it seemed to me, if we could have kept

kept ourselves on the island, the country would have joined us. But when I saw we should be obliged to retreat, I advised the Major General to send to the Sevennes, and places of his correspondence, not to have them show themselves. If the affair of Catalonia could have permitted General Stanhope, and the 3000 men we brought from Italy to have gone with us, I believe we should have kept the island for this summer, and given great diversion to the enemy's troops. The mould of Cette is such, that when the fleet should, by the weather, be obliged to retreat, we could have put in it small frigates and transports sufficient to attend the troops.

As soon as the enemy knew the Major General was with us, they imprisoned all his family, who are gentry of estates in these parts; and by his services, he loses a considerable summe in the bank of Paris, that I think myself obliged to acquaint your Lordship of, for Her Majesty's information. He still is of opinion, that a further undertaking may have success, of which he will have the honour to acquaint my Lord Marlborough, to whom he is going post, and yourself, of his scheme, we being the first fleet that has yet been in the Gulf of Lyons, which navigation has so ill a character, from the tempestuous weather, and violent currents that change with the winds, and the anchoring being only on the coast, without proper harbours or roads; yet I think, if Her Majesty shall have any further intention of using her fleet in it, that, from the month of June to the middle of August, fleets may attempt the same.

I pray

I pray your Lordship to answer for me to Her Majesty, that in all her commands, I shall, with the greatest zeal and duty, endeavour to obey the same, and shall be very happy, if my proceedings meet Her Majesty's royal approbation.

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient,

Most faithful humble servant,

(Signed) JOHN NORRIS.

The 19th I sailed from Cette, and have appeared off Marseilles and Toulon. The 24th, I went into the road of Hieres; and under the three forts, upon the island of Porto Crofa, within a rock that lies off the same, lay a French fly-boat, of 50 guns, that was built in imitation of the King's Fisher. I ordered some English and Dutch ships to attack the said ship and forts, under the command of Captain Stepney; and after a considerable fire, they beat them out of their ship and the lowermost fort; and as our boats boarded the ship, she took fire, by a traine the enemy had laid, and burned till she blew up. There was killed and wounded in the action about five and thirty men, twenty-five of which were of the Bedford's ship's company. I understand the fly-boat came loaden from Scanderoon, and that the French convoy, some days ago, got into Toulon. I sailed that night again from Hieres, and not meeting any of our ships on our stations, with the opinion of the rest of the flags, I am come to Vado, to inform myself of them; and shall sail, as soon as we are watered, for the
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coast of Catalonia, taking with us the 300 recruits that are at Finall.

I am,

Your Lordship's most obedient,

Most faithful servant,

(Signed)

JOHN NORRIS.

I pray your Lordship to permit my desiring you have confidence in Mons. Seiffan, whom I have found a person very knowing where we have been, very gallant, and desiring to do every thing, that was for Her Majesty's service.

At a COUNCIL OF WAR, held on board His Majesty's Ship RANELAGH, in Barcelona Road, the 6th of July, 1710.

PRESENT,

Sir John Norris, Knt. Admiral and Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's Fleet, in and about the Mediterranean.

John Baker, Esq. Vice Admiral of the Blue Squadron of Her Majesty's Fleet.

The Heer Van Aerssen Van Sommelsdyk, Rear Admiral of the Dutch.

Whereas a project, concerted by Mons. Sefans, for an enterprize (the town of Cette) on the coast of
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of Languedoc, to be performed by him and Colonel Stanhope's regiment, and 300 troops from Port Mahon (to which His Catholick Majesty has consented and desired) has been laid before this council; and the last of these troops, with the remainder of the utensils of war, for that enterprize, being this evening arrived, and all other things for that service being in a readiness; it is therefore resolved, that the fleet do sayle from hence on the said enterprize, succoured as much as possible. It is our opinions, that the Admiral send an exprefs to the Duke of Savoy of our said intentions, by our two clean ships, the Suffolk and Nassau; that as soon as they shall have delivered the same, they immediately endeavour to join the squadron, that is cruizing off Toulon, for intercepting their homeward-bound convoy. And if in case they should joine our said squadron in their passage to the coast of Oneglia, or Genoa, they are then to deliver the said exprefs to the commander in chief, to be forwarded as they shall think most proper in a council. And whereas his Catholick Majesty has desired, that a convoy be appointed to convoy the transports to Calari in Sardinia, for the bringing 300 horse from thence, which he said will be ready in a short time, it is therefore our opinions, that Admiral Sommelsdyck do appoint his ships of the States General, for that service; and whereas Mons. Sefans has declared his sentiments to us, that the bomb vessels and their tenders will be of no use in this expedition, and it being our opinion, they will occasion a delay in the proceeding of our fleet, it is therefore our opinions, that we leave them at Barcelona,

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and that our rendezvous be appointed off the town of Cette, on the coast of Languedoc; and, not finding the fleet there, they are to cruize forty-eight hours on that station, and if afterwards they find they have reason to believe the fleet has been off that place, and is gone, they are then to proceed to joyne us, or the squadron that is cruizing tenn leagues E. and b. S. off the islands of Hieres; and not finding us or the squadron there, after having been tenn days on the station, they are then to return to Barcelona, where they are to remain till further orders. And whereas Admiral Sommelsdyck has received orders to return to the north with all the ships of the States Generall, it is therefore our opinions, that all the fleet do rendezvous at Barcelona, by the 10th of September, in order to the breaking up of the confederate fleet, for this summer's service.

At a COUNCILL OF WAR, held on board His Majesty's ship the RANELAGH, this 14th-25th of August, 1710, off Port Mahon.

PRESENT,

Sir John Norris, Knt. Admiral and Commander in Chief of Her Majesty's Fleet, in and about the Mediterranean.

John Baker, Esq. Vice Admiral.

F. van Aerssen van Sommelsdyck, Rear Admiral of the Dutch.

The

The Admiral having communicated his intentions to this council, that directs his sending a convoy with the transports, store ships, and all such trade of Her Majesty's subjects and ally's, as shall be bound for the Channell of Great Britaine, and desiring the favour of Adml. Sommelsdyck, commanding the States Generall ships, that as the English Admiral is unable to appoint more than one seventy gun ship and three frigates, and as Rear Admiral Sommelsdyck, is to send two men of war, in sight of St. Hubes, the English Admiral desires, the two said ships may sayle, in conjunction with the English, for protecting the trade of both nations, and as the English are obliged to go into the river of Lisbon, that the two said ships may accompany them there, and that their orders be strictly, not on any pretence whatsoever, to stay longer than eight days, upon the river of Lisbon, and then to make the best of their way to the Channell of Great Britaine, to see the trade of both nations to their severall ports, and that so soon as possible, the said convoy rendezvous at Majorca, from whence they should proceed, as resolved and agreed in this council.

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APPENDIX, No. XI.

EXTRACTS of a Letter from the DUKE OF
NEWCASTLE to ADMIRAL LESTOCKE and
LIEUTENANT GENERAL ST. CLAIR;
dated Whitehall, 22d August, 1746.

His Majesty has been considering, whether the Squadron and land forces might not be, in the mean time, usefully and immediately employed, to make a descent, on some part, of the western coast of France. And I am to signify to you His Majesty's pleasure, that you should forthwith transmit to me your opinion, whether it may not be practicable, with the force that you have, and the ordnance stores of all kinds, to possess yourselves of some of the French ports there (many of which are said not to be strong) and to make a descent on some part of the western coast, which might greatly annoy the French; give assistance and protection to any of the French protestants in Brittany, who have risen or may be disposed to rise; and cause an immediate diversion in Flanders; and whether for that end, it may be most practicable and adviseable to go up the river of Bourdeaux, in order to make an attempt there; or to go to port L'Orient, Rochelle, or Rochefort; or any other port or place in the west of France; and as you, Lieutenant General St. Clair, had, some time ago,

ago, a project of this kind, it is probable you may be the better prepared to give your thoughts upon it; which you are both to do, with the utmost secrecy and expedition; and in order thereto, it is His Majesty's pleasure, that if the wind should prove fair, before you receive His Majesty's orders, in consequence of the opinion, which you are now directed to lay before the King, you should, in that case, sail to Plymouth Sound, but remain there till you shall receive His Majesty's further orders; which shall be sent you with the utmost expedition.

P. S. You will take care to provide yourselves immediately with pilots, for the place, you shall think proper to go to; but it is His Majesty's pleasure, that you should do it, in such a private manner, that the secret may not transpire.

Admiralty.—Admiral Lestock, Lieut. Gen. St. Clair, Maj. Gen. Fuller, 1746—1747. No. LVIII.

Dec. 21, 1797.
Exd J. B.

EXTRACT of a Letter from the DUKE OF
NEWCASTLE to ADMIRAL LESTOCKE and
LIEUT.-GEN. ST. CLAIR, dated White-
hall, 26th August, 1746.

The king has commanded me, to acquaint
you, with his pleasure, that you should forthwith
fail,

fail, with all the ships and transports, that were designed for North America, either to Port L'Orient, or to Rochefort, or Rochelle, and endeavour to make yourselves masters of such of them, as you shall think most adviseable to attempt. And if you shall succeed, in getting possession of any of those places, you will make such further motions, in the country, and undertake such operations, as you shall think most likely to alarm and annoy the French, and thereby procure a diversion in Flanders, which is one great end of this expedition. And if you shall have information, that any number of protestants, in those parts, are disposed to take up arms, and put themselves under your protection, you are to give them whatever assistance shall be in your power.

If upon your arrival at Port L'Orient, Rochefort, or Rochelle, you should find, that those places are too strong to be attempted with any probability of success; it is then His Majesty's pleasure, that you should proceed to any other port or place, on the western coast of France, where you may have information, or shall yourselves be of opinion, that it may be practicable to make an attempt, with any probability of success, and where the navigation may not be too hazardous for the ships and transports; and you are there to land the troops, lay the country under contribution, and annoy the enemy in the best manner you are able, in order, to procure the diversion above-mentioned.

If it should please God to grant you such success, that you should be able to establish yourselves

selves, on any part of the coast, His Majesty will then order you, a further re-inforcement of troops, to be forthwith sent from hence.

As the view and design of this expedition, is to procure, if possible, a diversion in Flanders, from the danger the French may apprehend for that part of their coast, when they see such a considerable number of ships and troops upon it, His Majesty leaves it to you, to act in such manner as you shall think the most proper for that purpose, provided those places mentioned in the former part of this letter, are found too strong to be attacked.

I mentioned to you, in my former letter, the going up the river of Bourdeaux, in order to make an attempt there. His Majesty is inclined to think, that such a force of ships and troops, with such ordnance stores, must create great alarm in France, and consequently oblige them to send a considerable force to oppose them.

If you should find it practicable to burn any of the French men of war, or merchant ships, in any of their ports, His Majesty doubts not, but you will endeavour to do it.

It is His Majesty's pleasure, that you should sail, as soon as ever the wind is fair; the success of such an expedition depending entirely upon the secrecy, and surprize of it. And it is the King's positive command, that you should not impart it, to any one person, one moment sooner, than is absolutely necessary for the execution of it.

Dec. 21, 1797,
Ex^d J. B.

EXTRACTS of a Letter from the DUKE OF
NEWCASTLE to ADMIRAL LESTOCK and
LIEUT. GENERAL ST. CLAIR; dated
Whitehall, 3d Sept. 1746.

The King has been pleased to order, that two battalions of the foot guards, and Major General Huske's regiment of foot, should forthwith proceed on board of transports, with a proper convoy, to Plymouth, and sail after you, as soon as they have an account from you, where they may find you. It is therefore His Majesty's pleasure, that you should leave directions at Plymouth, for the commanding officer of His Majesty's ships, that are to convoy these troops, where he should immediately proceed, in order to join you.

His Majesty would have you immediately send to Jersey and Guernsey, to get pilots, and what intelligent persons you can from thence; and there will be the less inconvenience in it, as it is now very unfortunately known, publickly, that some descent, on the coast of France is intended, though I hope, it will remain a secret to what particular place, you may design to go.

I shall write to you again by the convoy, that goes with the troops, and possibly may be able to send you some account, relating to the coast of Normandy, where you may go, on your return, in case you shall not be able to make any descent on the coast of Bretany, or further up in the bay.

Dec. 21st, 1797.
Ex^d J. B.

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EXTRACT of Letter from ADMIRAL LESTOCK
and LIEUT. GEN. ST. CLAIR to His Grace
the DUKE OF NEWCASTLE; dated ———,
Princessa, in Plymouth Sound, 3d Sept.
1746.

In consequence of our opinions (that is, Admiral Lestock's and Lieut. General St. Clair's) being perfectly known, and communicated to one another, Admiral Lestock, with the concurrence of the General, in order to bring our attempt to an happy issue, will immediately send Mr. Coates, the next officer to himself in the squadron, with the Ruby, a 50 gun ship, the Hastings, a 40, with a sloop and a tender, to view and survey Port L'Orient, and all the places near it, as well in regard to the safe anchoring of the squadron and transports, upon which His Majesty's troops must depend for a safe retreat in the re-embarkation, as covering them in a landing, in the most proper situation, for their approaching to make an attack, provided it is found practicable, and can be done, with any probability of success.

Dec. 21st, 1797.
Exd J. B.

EXTRACT of a Letter from ADMIRAL LESTOCK and LIEUTENANT GENERAL ST. CLAIR to His Grace the DUKE of NEWCASTLE; dated Princeffa, Plymouth Sound, 6th Sept. 1746.

Admiral Lestock thinks, that no operation, in this advanced season of the year, or in the month of September, which is a remarkable blowing month, can be undertook in the Bay of Biscay, without exposing the fleet and transports to some hazard; but he will do his utmost to overcome them, to answer the great end and aim of this expedition.

Dec. 21st, 1797.
Exd J. B.

ADMIRAL LESTOCK's Instructions to CAPTAIN COTES, for surveying the Coast of L'Orient.

You are hereby required and directed, forthwith, to proceed to the isle of Groa, or Groix, at the entrance of the harbour of Port Louis, or Port L'Orient, on the western coast of France, with His Majesty's ships Ruby, Hastings, Tavistock
sloop,

sloop, and Royal George cutter, whose commanders have been directed to put themselves under your command, and follow your orders, for their further proceedings.

As you are provided, with such pilots, as you may want, as also some charts of the sea coast, copied from an original done at Paris, which, I am informed, may be depended on, as good ; when you arrive at the isle of Groix, you are, if you can, with safety to the ships under your command, go between the isle and the main, to reconnoitre, as near as possible, the strength of the several fortifications, that may be on the isle, and at the entrance of Port Louis harbour, or, more particularly, to the N.W. of it.

And as intelligence, and good pilots, together with a perfect knowledge of the situation and strength of the port and coast, proposed to be invaded, or attacked, is the soul of all military operations, you are required to do your utmost, to inform yourself of the situation and strength of Port L'Orient, either towards the sea or land, as also the places adjacent on that coast, and to use all means possible, in order to form a judgement, whether it is too strong to be attempted, by such force as is under my command and Lieutenant-General St. Clair's, with any probability of success ; and as I have received information, that that port is very strong, to the sea-ward, though not so, by land, you are to reconnoitre the coast, to the N.W. of it, as your own judgement and experience, together, with the chart and assistance of the pilots, may direct you, and more particularly, at the mouth
of

of the river Quinperlay, for the most proper place and situation to land the troops, in order for their approach, to make an attack by land on Port l'Orient, provided it can be done, with any probability of success, or where, on that coast you shall be of opinion, that it may be practicable, to land the troops, alarm and annoy the enemy, in the best manner, as shall be thought adviseable, and lay the country under contribution, and thereby procure a diversion in Flanders, which is one great end of this expedition.

It is a particular duty recommended to you, that with the assistance of the pilots, with the Tavistock sloop, and Royal George cutter, under your command, you take a careful survey, between the said isle of Groix and the main, of the several shoals bays, and passages, that may be there, to prevent any hazard or danger to His Majesty's ships, and the transports and storeships; and, as it seems to be of the greatest importance to the present undertaking, you will look out for the clearest ground and best anchorage, capable of receiving the squadron, and such a number of transports and storeships, and where they may be sheltered in the best manner possible, from the wind and sea, as also, where the boats may pass, without difficulty, to and from, that part of the coast; where, in your opinion, it may be practicable, and most convenient for landing the troops, to make an attempt, with any probability of success; as well, for the best situation of the squadron and transports giving relief to the troops, in the necessary and requisite assistance, in all things, relating to the operations
they

they undertake, as for their re-embarking with as much safety, ease and expedition, as possible.

You will likewise survey and view carefully, the said isle of Groix, on the south side, with regard to anchorage, and, in respect, to the commodious and safe reception of the squadron and transports, with an off-shore wind.

And as it is impossible for me, who am entirely unacquainted with the port and coast, proposed to be attacked and invaded, to give you any further instructions, you are enjoined to act, as you think best, for His Majesty's service, in order to bring the attempts we shall make, to an happy issue, and do whatever else, your judgement and experience shall dictate, upon this occasion, as becomes an officer of prudence and knowledge.

As the success of such an expedition may depend, entirely, upon the secrecy and surprize of it, I shall not lose the advantage of any wind or fair weather, by which there is the least probability of my gaining ground, or proceeding to join you off the said isle of Groix; and when I appear in sight, you are to hoist a broad blue pendant, and continue to wear it, as you shall be directed, in the several ships you may be ordered on board of, for the better and more effectual carrying on this undertaking.

As soon as you have read this order, you are to take my sealed rendezvous from the several captains, under your command, and give them
your's

your's off the isle of Groix, which is your station agreeable to these your orders.

Given under my hand, on board His Majesty's ship *Princeffa*, in Plymouth Sound, the 3d of September, 1746.

(Signed)

RICHARD LESTOCK.

To Thos. Cotes, Esq. Commander in the second post of a squadron of His Majesty's ships and vessels, to be employed on a Secret Expedition.

By command of the Admiral,

EUSTACE PEACOCK.

Dec. 21st, 1797.
Exd J. B.

APPEN.

APPENDIX, No. XII.

5th August 1757.

SECRET INSTRUCTIONS for our trusty, and well-beloved SIR EDWARD HAWKE, Knt. of the Bath, Admiral of the Blue Squadron of our Fleet, and Commander in Chief of our Ships, to be employed in a Secret Expedition for our Service ; or for such other Officer, on whom the Command of our said Ships may devolve. Given at our Court at Kensington, the fifth Day of August 1757, in the 31st Year of our Reign.

GEORGE R.

Whereas, we have thought fit to employ a considerable body of our land forces, on a secret expedition, under the command of our trusty and well-beloved Sir John Mordaunt, Knight of the Bath, Lieutenant General of our Forces ; and, whereas, we have appointed you to be commander in chief of a squadron of our ships of war, to act in conjunction, and co-operate with the said Sir John Mordaunt, in the execution of the services prescribed to him, for your better discharge of the great and important trust, there-

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by reposed in you, we have judged it proper to give you the following instructions:

1st.—You shall, immediately upon the receipt of these our instructions, repair to Spithead, where we have ordered a squadron, consisting of at least sixteen ships of the line, and a proportionable number of frigates, to rendezvous, together with the transport vessels for our troops (who are to embark from the Isle of Wight) and also the vessels with the artillery and stores; which squadron and transports you are to take under your command, and so soon as the troops shall be embarked, you are to proceed, without loss of time, to the coasts of France.

2d.—Whereas we have determined, with the blessing of God, to prosecute the just war in which we are engaged against the French King, with the utmost vigor; and it being highly expedient, and of urgent necessity, to make some expedition that may cause a diversion, and engage the enemy to employ, in their own defence, a considerable part of their forces destined to invade and oppress the liberties of the Empire, and to subvert the independency of Europe, and if possible to make some effectual impression on the enemy, which, by disturbing and shaking the credit of their public loans, impairing the strength and resources of their navy, as well as disconcerting, and, in part, frustrating their dangerous and extensive operations of war, may reflect lustre on our arms, and add life and strength to the common cause. And we being persuaded that nothing, in the present situation of affairs,
can

can so speedily and essentially annoy and distress France, as a successful enterprise against Rochefort, our will and pleasure is, that you do co-operate in attempting, as far as shall be found practicable, a descent on the French coast, at, or near Rochefort, in order to attack, if practicable, and by a vigorous impression force, that place ; and to burn and destroy, to the utmost of your power, all docks, magazines, arsenals, and shipping, that shall be found there ; and exert such other efforts as shall be judged most proper, for annoying the enemy. After this attempt on Rochefort shall either have succeeded or failed, and in case the circumstances of our fleet and forces shall, with prospect of success, still admit of further operations, Port L'Orient and Bourdeaux are to be considered next, as the most important objects of our arms, on the coast of France. And our will and pleasure accordingly is, that you do proceed, successively, to an attempt on both, or either of the said places, as shall be judged practicable ; or any other place, that shall be thought most advisable, from Bourdeaux, homewards to Havre, in order to carry and spread, with as much rapidity as may be, a warm alarm along the maritime provinces of France ; and you are, as far as you shall be able, with the fleet under your command, to be aiding and assisting to Sir John Mordaunt, in the performance of the several services aforesaid.

3d.—In case, by the blessing of God upon our arms, our forces should become masters of any places on the coast of France, our will and pleasure is, that they do not keep possession thereof,

but that, after demolishing and destroying, as far as may be, all works, defences, magazines, arsenals, shipping, and naval stores, you do proceed, successively, on the ulterior operations of this expedition, according as any of them may be judged advisable, and may be performed, within such time, as shall be consistent with your return with the fleet, under your command, so as to be in England, at or about, as near as may be, the end of September, unless the circumstances of our ships and forces shall necessarily require their return sooner; and our troops are to be landed at Portsmouth, or such other of our ports, as the exigency of the case may suggest.

4th.—Whereas it is necessary, that upon certain occasions, councils of war should be held, we have thought fit to appoint, and do hereby appoint such a council, which shall consist of four of our principal sea commanders, and of an equal number of our land officers, including the commanders in chief of our sea and land forces (except in cases happening at land relating to the carrying on any military operations, to be performed by our land forces only; and in like manner, except in cases happening at sea, with regard to operations to be performed by the fleet only). And all such sea and land officers are hereby respectively directed, from time to time, to be aiding and assisting with their advice, as often as they shall be called together by you, or the officer commanding our land forces, for that purpose; and in all such councils of war, when assembled, the majority of voices shall determine the resolutions

lutions thereof; and in case the voices shall happen to be equal, the president shall have the casting vote.

5th.—Whereas the success of this expedition will very much depend upon an entire good understanding, between our sea and land officers, we do hereby strictly enjoin and require you, on your part, to maintain and cultivate such a good understanding and agreement, and to order the sailors and marines, and also the soldiers serving, as part of the complements of our ships, to assist our land forces, if judged expedient, by taking post on shore, manning batteries, covering the boats, securing the safe reembarkation of the troops, and such other services, at land, as may be consistent with the safety of our fleet. As we instructed our General and Commander in Chief of our forces, on his part, to entertain and cultivate the same good understanding and agreement, and to order, that the soldiers, under his command, shall man the ships, when there shall be occasion for them, and when they can be spared from the land service; and in order to establish the strictest union, that may be, between you and our said General and Commander in Chief of our land forces, you are hereby required to communicate these instructions to him, as he is directed to communicate those he has received from us, to you.

6th.—As our service may require, that you, or the Commander in Chief of our land forces, should, on particular occasions, dispatch a sloop or small frigate to England with intelligence, you shall

shall always take care, to have with you, one or more sloops or small frigates, for that purpose.

7th.—You are to transmit constant and particular accounts of your proceedings, to one of our principal Secretaries of State, and to our Commissioners for executing the office of our High Admiral of Great Britain; and you shall observe and follow such orders and instructions, as you shall receive from us, under our sign manual, or from one of our principal Secretaries of State, or from our Commissioners, for executing the office of our High Admiral of Great Britain, for the time being.

(Signed)

G. R.

Dec. 21st 1797.
Ex^d J. B.

SIR EDWARD HAWKE and (mutatis mutandis) to SIR JOHN MORDAUNT*.

Whitehall, October 5th, 1757.

Sir,

The King has directed me to transmit to you, without loss of time, the inclosed advices, received this morning by the Dutch mail, with regard to the expedition under your command, by which you will see the present weak state of the French forces in those parts, and that the guards, which

* The fleet returned to Portsmouth October 6th, and this letter was never delivered.

were

were ordered to march from Paris, cannot be at Rochefort, till about the 14th instant, by which time, it is hoped, you will have been able to compleat the execution of the great object of your instructions, in such a manner, as will be glorious to His Majesty's arms, and do lasting honor to those employed in so important a service.

The King having further taken under consideration, the very great importance of taking possession of the Isle of Rhé, for the annoying a considerable part of the commerce and navigation of France, I am commanded to signify to you His Majesty's pleasure, that, in case this letter should find you still on the French coast, in the neighbourhood of that island, you do endeavor, if you shall judge it practicable, to make yourselves masters of the said Isle of Rhé; and that you do remain there, and keep possession thereof, with the fleet and the troops under the command of yourself, and Sir John Mordaunt, in case you shall judge it practicable, to secure that Island, having first duly weighed and considered the present state of the fleet and forces, which cannot be known here, as well as the circumstances of the weather, and the season of the year. And in case you shall judge advisable to carry into execution the above services, you will immediately, and with the utmost diligence, dispatch one or more sloops, with a full and particular account of your proceedings, together with a state of the condition of the Isle of Rhé, and what reinforcement, provision, ammunition, stores, or assistance of any kind may be necessary to be sent from England, the better to enable

enable you to maintain possession thereof. But in case you shall judge an attempt on the Island of Rhé to be too hazardous an undertaking, or that you shall find the same, after you may have taken it, not to be tenable, consistently with the safety of the fleet and the troops, it is then His Majesty's pleasure, that you do return to England, as directed by your former instructions, without waiting for any further orders from the King to that purpose.

I am, &c.

(Signed) W. PITT.

P. S. For the greater caution, and to prevent all possibility of mistake, you are to understand the instruction now sent you, with regard to the Isle of Rhé, to be meant to take place only after the attempt on Rochefort shall have succeeded or failed.

Dec. 21st 1797,

Ex^d J. B.

5th August, 1757.

A P P E N D I X. No. XIII.

SECRET INSTRUCTIONS for our trusty and well - beloved SIR JOHN MORDAUNT, Knight of the Bath, Lieutenant General of our Forces, whom we have appointed General and Commander in Chief of all, and singular our Troops and Land Forces, appointed, or to be appointed for a Secret Expedition, for our Service ; or for such other Officer, on whom the Command in Chief of our said Troops and Land Forces may devolve. Given at our Court at Kensington, the 5th Day of August, 1757, in the 31st Year of our Reign.

GEORGE R.

Having by our commission, bearing date the 3d day of this instant, appointed you to be General and Commander in Chief of all and singular our forces appointed, or to be appointed, for a secret expedition ; for your better discharge of the great and important trust, thereby reposed in you, we have judged it proper to give you the following instructions:

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I.—You

I.—You shall, immediately, upon the receipt of these our instructions, repair to the Isle of Wight, where we have appointed ships to convey you, and the forces under your command, to the coasts of France; and so soon as the said forces shall be embarked, you shall accordingly proceed, without loss of time, under convoy of a squadron of our ships of war, commanded by our trusty and well-beloved Sir Edward Hawke, Knight of the Bath, Admiral of the Blue Squadron of our fleet, whom we have appointed Commander in Chief of our ships, to be employed in this expedition. The said Admiral, or the Commander in Chief of our said ships for the time being, being instructed to co-operate with you, and to be aiding and assisting, in all such enterprizes, as by these our instructions you shall be directed to undertake, for our service.

II.—Whereas we have determined, with the blessing of God, to prosecute the just war, in which we are engaged against the French King, with the utmost vigour; and it being highly expedient, and of urgent necessity, to make some expedition, that may cause a diversion, and engage the enemy to employ, in their own defence, a considerable part of their forces, destined to invade and oppress the liberties of the Empire, and to subvert the independency of Europe; and if possible, to make some effectual impression on the enemy, which, by disturbing and shaking the credit of their public loans, impairing the strength and resources of their navy, as well as disconcerting, and in part frustrating their dangerous and
extensive

extensive operations of war, may reflect lustre on our arms, and add life and strength to the common cause; and whereas we are persuaded, that nothing, in the present situation of affairs, can so speedily and essentially annoy and distress France, as a successful enterprize against Rochefort, our will and pleasure is, that you do attempt, as far as shall be found practicable, a descent, with the forces under your command, on the French coast, at or near Rochefort, in order to attack, if practicable, and by a vigorous impression, force that place, and to burn and destroy, to the utmost of your power, all docks, magazines, arsenals, and shipping, that shall be found there, and exert such other efforts, as you shall judge most proper for annoying the enemy.

III.—After the attempt on Rochefort shall either have succeeded or failed, and in case the circumstances of our forces and fleet shall, with the prospect of success, still admit of further operations, you are next to consider Port l'Orient and Bourdeaux, as the most important object of our arms, on the coast; and our will and pleasure accordingly is, that you do proceed successively to an attempt on both, or either of those places, as shall be judged practicable; or, on any other place, that shall be thought most advisable, from Bourdeaux homewards to Havre, in order to carry and spread, with as much rapidity as may be, a warm alarm along the maritime provinces of France.

IV.—In case, by the blessing of God upon our arms, you should make yourself master of any place, on the coast of France, our will and pleasure

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is,

is, that you do not keep possession thereof; but that after demolishing and destroying, as far as may be, all works, defences, magazines, arsenals, shipping, and naval stores, you do proceed, successively, on the ulterior operations of this expedition, according as any of them shall be judged advisable, and may be performed within such time, as shall be consistent with your return with the troops under your command, so as to be England, at, or about, as near as may be, the end of September, unless the circumstances of our forces and fleet shall necessarily require their return sooner.— And you are to land the troops at Portsmouth, or such other of our ports as the exigency of the case may suggest.

V.—Whereas it is necessary, that upon certain occasions, you should have the assistance of a council of war, we have thought fit to appoint such a council, which shall consist of four of our principal land officers, and of an equal number of our principal sea commanders, including the commanders in chief of our land and sea forces (except in cases happening at land, relating to the carrying on any military operations, to be performed by our land forces only, in which cases, you may call a council of war, consisting of such officers of our land forces as you shall think proper) and all such land and sea officers, in the several cases before-mentioned, are hereby respectively directed, from time to time, to be aiding and assisting with their advice, so often as they shall be called together by you, or by the commander in chief of our squadron, for that purpose.
And

And in all such councils of war, when assembled, the majority of voices shall determine the resolutions thereof; and in case the voices shall happen to be equal, the president shall have the casting vote.

And whereas the success of this expedition will very much depend upon an entire good understanding, between our land and sea officers, we do hereby strictly enjoin and require you, on your part, to maintain and cultivate such good understanding and agreement, and to order that the soldiers, under your command, should man the ships, where there shall be occasion for them, and when they can be spared from the land service; as the commander in chief of our squadron is instructed, on his part, to entertain and cultivate the same good understanding and agreement, and to order the sailors and marines, and also the soldiers serving, as part of the complements of our ships, to assist our land forces, if judged expedient, by taking post on shore, manning batteries, covering the boats, securing the safe re-embarkation of the troops, and such other services, at land, as may be consistent with the safety of our fleet; and in order to establish the strictest union that may be, between you and the Commander in Chief of our ships, you are hereby required to communicate these instructions to him; and he will be directed to communicate those, he shall receive, to you.

7th. You shall, from time to time, and as you shall have opportunity, send constant accounts of

of your proceedings, in the execution of these our instructions, to one of our principal secretaries of state, from whom you will receive such farther orders and directions, as we may think proper to give you.

(Signed)

G. R.

Expedition 1755-1757. No. 69.

Dec. 21st 1797.

Ex^d J. B.

APPEN-

APPENDIX. No. XIV*.

COPPY of the Commission for SIR JOHN
NORRIS and SIR FRANCIS DRAKE.

Elizabeth, by the grace of God, &c. To our trusty and well beloved servant, Sir John Norris, knight, president of our councill in the province of Munster, in our realme of Irelande; and to Sir Francis Drake, knight, greetinge: For as much as lookeing into, and deeply consideringe the late hostile attempte agaynste this our realme and our person (altogether without any just cause given by us) and doubtinge, that the like is meante to be renewed and continued agaynst us, and our crowne and cuntryes, wee are justly moved to enter into the consideration, what urgent and just cause wee have, and how necessary it is for us, to use all the best meanes wee can (where peace on our parte hath not prevailed) to prevente, impeach, and withstand such hostile attempts, and all preparations for the same, for the better defence and protection of our realme and dominions, of all our good and loving subjects, wee let you wit.

That having, to that ende, resolved with you two, by the advice of our councill, upon such special service, to be done for this good purpose, whereunto you have assented, and knoweing

* This, and the following numbers of the Appendix, are referred to, in the second Class of Expeditions.

your

your approved fidelity and wifdome, valour and circumspection, we have made especiall choice of you two, and have committed the charge thereof, afore all others, unto you ; and doe therefore by theis pnts, give you, jointly and severally, authority, to make choice and constitute such principall officers, as well by sea as by lande, as by you or eyther of you shall bee thought meete for this service. As allsoe to appointe meete captaines, and other persons, whom yee, or any of you shall depute thereunto, by writing under your hands, to levie, assemble, muster, and arme, within any parte of this our realme and dominions, beeing and coasting, meete and convenient for the purpose of this service, such and soe many of our loveing subjects, as are mete and apte for the warres, to serve by sea or by lande, not exceeding the number of four thousande. And the same soe levyed, registred, mustred, and by you two, or eyther of you, sufficiently furnished with armour and weapons, and other things requisite to conduct or cause, to bee conducted by meete captaines, leaders, and officers, to such places as you, or eyther of you, shall direct them, for the speediest and aptest use of there service. Wee do allsoe heereby give you full power and authoritye, by yourselves, or your deputyes, authorised by you jointly or severally, to take up and provide, at price reasonable for contentment of the owners, in mete place for this service, as well such, and soe many shippes, barks, boates, lighters, and other vessels whatsoever, with the advice and privy of the Lord Admirall, as allsoe cartes, wayns, and draughts, with horses and oxen,
with

with the privity of the justices or officers, where the same shall be provided, and horses, as shall be meete for the carrying, conveying, and transporting, from place to place, by seas and lande of any men, provisions of victuall, munition, armour, and weapons, and with the same men, provision and furniture, shipped and embarked, wee doe authorise you jointly and severally, both in your owne persons, and by such others allsoe whom yee, or eyther of you shall depute, by sea and by land, to invade and destroye the power, force, and preparations for all such force, made and to be made, by all manner of persons and there adherents, that have this last yeare, both by sea and by lande, with their hostile and warlike powers and armados, fought and attempted the invasion of our realme of England, and the dominions of the same (which it pleased Almighty God, with his most singular favour towards us, to frustrate and defeat) or of any such persons as shall hereafter, during the continuance of this our commission, goe about to make the like, or other new hostile preparations agaynst us, or any of our dominions or subjects. And the same persons, or there possessions and goods, to take and destroye, in hostile manner, to the frustrating of there force prepared agaynst us. And to the ende, that our loving subjects, servinge in this service under you, may bee the better ordered and governed, by a due obedience to bee by them yielded to you, and to either of you, in all materiall service, and in the observinge and executing of such good orders and constitutions, as yee two shall thinke conveniente to make, for the furtherance of this service, to our honour, and
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youre

youre owne credite, wee do hereby straightly charge and commande all persons, serving thus under you, and every of you, to give all obedience and respect unto you, authorising you to lay such punishment upon them, as yee, or any of you, shall thinke meete, according to the quality of the offence. And, in cases requisite and needfull, allsoe to use the law called marshall lawe. And, for as much as there may bee somme of our loving subjects, willing to beare some parte of the charge of this service, and put in their Adventures, in furtherance thereof, who are to have consideration and benefitt, accordinge to the pportion of there charge agreed on by you, wee give you full power and authority not only to deale with our sayde subjects, so offering to adventure, and to accepte and agree with them for the same, but allsoe to make distributions and shares of such gaynes, goods, and prises, whatsoever, that shall by you, or any of you, or by your company, to bee taken from any such forsyde manner of persons, and there adherents, as are above expressed; the same gaynes, goods and prises, after the due shares distributed, to be kept, holden, and enjoyed, by you, and our sayde subjects soe adventuring, without any accompt to be made for the same, to us, our heires, or successors; provided that such distribution bee made with the privity and allowance of such as shall bee appointed by our privy councell, or any six of them, to joyne with you in that behalfe. We doe also hereby straightly charge and command all and singular our officers, ministers, and subjects, whatsoever, to bee ayding, assisting, and furthering unto you, joyntly and severally,

verally, and to your deputyes, in any thing that may be for the better execution of this our commission, as well by sea as by land, for the furtherance of this our service, and hereof not to fayle, as they, and every of them, will answere for the contrary, at their utmost perills. And further our will and pleasure is, that whatsoever yee shall do, jointly, or severally, by virtue of this our commission, and according to the tenor and effect thereof, touching the execution of the premises, or any parte thereof, yee and every of you shall be discharged, in that behalfe, agaynst us, our heires, and successors. In witness whereof wee have caused these our letters to bee made patent, and to continue during our pleasure. Witness, &c.

Per ipsam Reginam.

Dec. 21st 1697.
Exd J. B.

APPENDIX. No. XV.

Havre de Grace Road, July the
17th, 1694.

SIR,

I design this should inclose to you the results of two councils of war, the first already held on the 14th instant, the other I intend to call as soon as the weather will permit, which at present is very bad. On the 14th, in the afternoon, wee sayled from Diep, having laid it in ashes, first as we sayled, we had the satisfaction to see the Jesuits steeple tumble, if we had been in the town, and nobody to oppose us, wee could not have burnt it better. On the 15th, in the afternoon, being off this place, and having no pylots, well acquainted, I sent Captain Benbow in, with the masters of the first and second rates, to sound all about the place, and by their report wee went in. Wee found it much more difficult to do our busyness here, then at Diep, for our great ships were forced to anchor a long way off, and our small vessels that went in, to hawl on and off, every half tide; howsoever, yesterday, about three of the clock, wee began to play our bombs, and set the town on fire, in several places; so that we judge there may be
now

now about a third of the town consumed, and the fire is still burning, tho' not so violently as in the night. It being bad weather this morning, I made the sign for all the bomb vessels and small frigates to come out. Yesterday, whilst I was in among the bomb vessels, giving orders, an unlucky bomb, from the enemy, fell into the Grenada bomb vessel, and blew her up; she being in shoal waters, and her fore part blowing up, some of her stern remained above water, by which means we saved many of her men, and the captain is taken up alive, and we have hopes of him. Captain Silver, a very good officer of the ordnance, his two nephews, and a lieutenant to Sir Cloudesley Shovel are lost. Except this unlucky accident, in burning these two towns (which are not inconsiderable) we have lost but one man, and three wounded, tho' thousands of their shot have gone over us. If the ill weather had not happened this day we could not have fired many more bombs, for our vessels are extremely shattered; and most of the mortars ran so, that they will be of little use, till they are new cast. Having so many soldiers on board, our water also grows very short, and many men being sick, every thing contributes to our returning home. However, I will keep the fleet out as long as possibly I can, with convenience, and at least give them the alarm at La Hogue and Cherbourg, and throw some bombs at the latter; and if we find a fair opportunity, land some men. As for St. Malos, there is no thinking of attempting it, without new mortars, and then there are abundance of things to be considered of, beforehand, and settled, to give success to a business of that

that weight. I sent the Elizabeth on the 13th, with a brigantine and some well-boats, Collonell Venner and two hundred souldiers, with orders, if they see a fair opportunity, to make an attempt upon Treport; but I have no news of them, nor of the Shoram, I sent with my last letters to England, till one of them comes, I have no ship to spare to send to England with this.

Sir, in the busyness of burning these towns, I have found all the officers very forward in their severall employments, and also the men that were sent in to sustain, and help them, in all appearance, thinking of nothing less then fear; particularly Captain Benbow has been of extraordinary use to me, in placing the bomb vessels. 'Tis now near twelve o'clock, and the wether being a little cleared up, we see the town in a flame.

I remain with great respect,

SIR,

Your most humble servant,

(Signed)

BERKELEY.

I writt you a story about Captain Silver and his nephews, for they were all taken up alive last night, his leg broke and they both wounded. I this afternoon called a council of warr, where the Dutch, offering to spare us water, we came to no resolution in writing, but agreed to stay here, a day or two longer, and with three or four bomb vessels

sels, that wee shall get repaired, by to-morrow, ply the town, to hinder them from putting out the fire; though, in my opinion, there will be no need of it, for I think the fire is grown to a head, that it will be passed their skill to put it out. Least you should wonder how the Dutch came by more water than wee, I'll tell you the reason is, that they have but three battalions on board, and wee seven, and that 'tis not our men of warr that want water, but the fireships, tenders, horse ships, and empty victuallers, that have souldiers on board. The Shoreham came in last night, this being the 18th of July, and the Elizabeth is now coming in; they did nothing on the coast, about Treport, worth mentioning, but alarming the people. I received last night several orders from the Admiralty, some of the 6th and 9th instant, requiring me to dispatch busyness at Portsmouth, as if I was upon the place. I know not what I have done, but I find the Admiralty are angry with me, and I am sure I never omitted giving them an account of every thing I do, and paying them all the respect they can desire; but if they will carp at every little matter, a man that has the misfortune to command, had need be as much upon his guard, for fear of them, as of the enemy. I beg your pardon, Sir, for holding you so long.

And remain, with great respect,

SIR,

Your most humble servant,

(Signed) BERKELEY.

The fire still burns in town. Lieutenant Colonel Richards of the ordnance is a very pretty officer, and by his skill has done very good service. Mr. Wharton will carry this to you, who will be able to give you a better and more particular account of every thing, then I can in writing. The frigates ordered by the Admiralty to join me, at Portsmouth, stay there, according to their orders, they say; and will proceed no farther to joyne me.

To Mr. Secretary Trenchard.

Admiralty. Miscellaneous, 1690 to 1697. No. IV.

Dec. 21st 1797.
Exd J. B.

APPEN.

APPENDIX No. XVI.

Near the Isle of Wight, July the 25th, 1794.

SIR,

Since my last, we have had very blowing weather. I send you the result of our council of war of the 19th. In pursuance of it, I appeared on the French coast, about la Hogue and Sherbrook, and alarmed the enemy, who fired many guns, and made fires on the shore. Having notice that there was a French friggat, and four or five merchant ships at la Hogue, I sent some ships, with a fire-ship, to endeavour to destroy them. Had the wether been good, I intended to have sent to Sherbrook, and demanded contributions, having received yours of the 16th; but the wether being unfavourable, and, if they should have refused, wee not being able to have thrown above 150 shells, I would not opiniastre it any longer. I am just now sending Captain Benbow, with three or four ships, to the Quince Rock, by St. Malo, to see whether it be fortified, or in what manner; when he comes back I will give you an account. The Reserve brought me a machine vessel yesterday, and another vessel, with three mortars on board, but all of ten-inch, which are meer baubles, and will do no service. T'is my opinion, that whatever mony is laid out upon them is thrown away,

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for

for t'is shells of weight, and a number of them, that must do our business, else bombarding will be but an insult upon the enemy, which I suppose is not the only thing desired. I think to get into St. Helens, this afternoon, and shall immediately send the bomb vessels into the harbour to refit. I believe we shall put seven regiments on shore. I desire you would think of the order I writt about (for victualing the soldiers) before I sayled from St. Helens. I remain, with great respect,

SIR,

Your most humble servant

(Signed)

BERKELEY.

To Mr. Secretary Trenchard.

Admiralty. Miscellaneous, 1690 to 1697. No. IV.

Dec. 21st 1797.

Ex^d I. B.

APPEN-

APPENDIX, No. XVII.

INSTRUCTIONS for our trusty and well-beloved GEORGE ANSON, Esq Commander in Chief of our Ships, designed to be sent into the South Seas, in America. Given at our Court at St. James's, the 31st day of January 1739-40, in the thirteenth Year of our reign.

Whereas we have thought proper to declare war against the King of Spain, for the several injuries and indignities offered to our crown and people, which are more particularly set forth in our declaration of war; and whereas, in pursuance thereof, we are determined to distress and annoy the said King of Spain, and his subjects, in such manner, and such places, as can be done with the greatest prospect of success, and the most to the advantage of our own subjects; we have thought fit to direct, that you, taking under your command our ships hereafter-mentioned, *viz.* the Centurion, the Argyle, the Severn, the Pearl, the Wager, and the Tryal sloop, should proceed with them, according to the following instructions.

You are to receive on board our said ships, five hundred of our land forces, and to proceed forthwith to the Cape de Verde Islands, and to supply your ships with water, and such refreshments as are to be procured there; and you are, from thence, to make the best of your way to the Island of St. Catharine, on the Coast of Brazil or such other place, on that coast, as you may be advised is more proper, where you are again to supply your ships with water, and any other necessaries you may want, that can be had there. And when you have so done, you are to proceed with our ships, under your command, into the South Sea, either round Cape Horn, or through the Streights of Magellan, as you shall judge most proper, and according as the season of the year, and winds and weather, shall best permit.

When you shall arrive on the Spanish coast of the South Sea, you are to use your best endeavors, to annoy and distress the Spaniards, either at sea or land, to the utmost of your power, by taking, sinking, burning, or otherwise destroying all their ships and vessels that you shall meet with, and particularly their boats, and all embarcations whatsoever, that they may not be able to send any intelligence, by sea, along the coast, of your being in those parts.

In case you shall find it practicable to seize, surprize, or take any of the towns, or places belonging to the Spaniards, on the coast, that you may judge worthy of making such an enterprize upon, you are to attempt it; for which purpose we have not only ordered the land forces, above-mentioned,

mentioned, but have also thought proper to direct, that an additional number of small arms be put on board the ships under your command, to be used, as occasion may require, by the crews of the said ships, or otherwise, as you shall find most for our service. And you are, on such occasions, to take the opinion of the captains of our ships, under your command, at a council of war, of which council of war, in case of any attack or enterprize, by land, the commander of our land forces shall also be one, which said land forces shall, upon such occasions, be landed, according to the determination of the said council of war; and when on shoar, shall be under the direction and conduct of the commanding officer of our land forces, subject however to be recalled on board, by any future determination of a council of war. And as it will be absolutely necessary for you, to be supplied with provisions and water, when, and where they can be had, you will inform yourself of the places, where that can be most conveniently done; and as we have been informed, that the coast of Chili, and particularly the Island of Chiloe, do abound with provisions and necessaries of all sorts, you are to call there for that purpose.

As it has been represented unto us, that the number of native Indians, on the coast of Chili, greatly exceeds that of the Spaniards, and that there is reason to believe, that the said Indians may not be averse to join with you, against the Spaniards, in order to recover their freedom, you are to endeavor to cultivate a good understanding with such Indians, as shall be willing to join and
assist

assist you in any attempt, that you may think proper to make against the Spaniards that are established there.

You are to continue your voyage along the coast of Peru, and to get the best information you can, whether there be any place, before you come to Lima, that may be worthy your attention, so as to make it advisable to stop at it. But if there be no place, where any considerable advantage can be expected, you are then to go along the coast, till you come to Calao, which is the port of Lima, taking or destroying all embarcations whatsoever, that you shall meet with.

As soon as you shall arrive at Calao, you shall consider, whether it may be practicable to make an attempt upon that place, or not; and if it shall be judged practicable, by a council of war, to be held for that purpose, with the strength you have with you, to make an attack upon that port, you are accordingly to do it; and, if it shall please God to bless our arms with success, you are then to endeavor to turn it to the best advantage possible, for our service.

And whereas there is some reason to believe, from private intelligence, that the Spaniards in the kingdom of Peru, and especially, in that part of it which is near Lima, have long had an inclination to revolt from their obedience to the king of Spain, (on account of the great oppressions and tyrannies exercised by the Spanish viceroys and governors) in favour of some considerable person amongst themselves, you are, if you should
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find that there is any foundation for these reports, by all possible means, to encourage and assist such a design, in the best manner you shall be able. And in case of any revolution or revolt from the obedience of the king of Spain, either amongst the Spaniards or the Indians, in those parts, and of any new government being erected by them, you are to insist upon the most advantageous conditions for the commerce of our subjects, to be carried on with such government, so to be erected; for which purpose you shall make provisional agreements, subject to our future approbation and confirmation.

But in case you should not think proper to attack Calao, or should miscarry in any attempt you may make, against that place, you are then to proceed to the northward, as far as Panama. But as there are many places along the coast, which are considerable, and where the Spanish ships, in their passage between Panama and Lima, do usually stop, it will be proper for you to look into those places, and to annoy the Spaniards there, as much as it shall be in your power. And if you shall meet with the Spanish men of war, that carry the treasure from Lima to Panama, you are to endeavour to make yourself master of them.

When you are arrived at Panama, you will probably have an opportunity to take or destroy such embarcations, as you shall find there; and as the town itself is represented not to be very strong, you are, if you shall think you have sufficient force for that purpose, to make an attempt
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on that town, and endeavour to take it, or burn and destroy it, as you shall think most for our service.

And as you may possibly find an opportunity to send privately, over land, to Porto Bello or Dariea, you are, by that means, to endeavour to transmit to any of our ships or forces, that shall be on that coast, an account of what you have done, or intend to do. And lest any such intelligence should fall into the hands of the Spaniards, we have ordered you to be furnished with a cypher, in which manner only you are to correspond with our Admiral, or the Commander in Chief of any of our ships, that may be in the Northern Seas of America, or the Commander in Chief of our Land Forces.

As we have determined to send a large body of troops from hence, as early as possible in the spring, to make a descent on some part of the Spanish West Indies, and as we shall have a very considerable fleet in those seas, in case it should be thought proper that any part of those ships or troops should go to Porto Bello or Dariea, with a design to send the said troops, over land, to Panama or Santa Maria, you are then to make the best disposition to assist them, by all the means that you shall be able, in making a secure settlement at Panama, or any other place that shall be thought proper; and you are, in such case, to supply them with cannon from the ships under your command, (if necessary) or with any thing else that can be spared, without too much weakening the squadron. And if the land forces on
board

board our said ships, should be wanted to reinforce those that may come over land, to the coast of the South Sea, you may cause them to go on shore, for that purpose, with the approbation of the proper officers.

When you shall have proceeded thus far, it must, in a great measure, be left to your discretion, and that of a council of war (when upon any difficulty you shall think fit to call them together) to consider whether you shall go further to the northward, or remain longer at Panama, in case the place should have been taken by our forces, or you can any way hear, that any of our forces may be expected on that side, from the north side. But you will always take particular care, to consider of a proper place, for careening of the ships, and for supplying them with provisions, either for their voyage homeward, or for their continuing longer abroad.

In case you shall be so happy as to meet with success, you shall take the first opportunity, by sending a ship on purpose, or otherwise, to acquaint us with it, and with every particular that may be necessary for us to be informed of, that we may take the proper measures thereupon.

If you shall find no occasion, for your staying longer in those seas, and shall judge it best, to go to the northward, as far as Acapulco, or to look out for the Acapulco ship, which sails from that place for Manilla, at a certain time of the year, and generally returns at a certain time also,

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you

you may possibly, in that case, think it most adviseable to return home by the way of China, which you are hereby authorised to do, or to return home by Cape Horn, as you shall think best, for our service, and for the preservation of the ships, and the men on board them.

Whenever you shall judge it necessary for our service, to return with our squadron to England, you may, if you shall think it proper, leave one or two of our ships in the South Sea, for the security of any of the acquisitions you may have been able to make, or for the protection of the trade, which any of our subjects may be carrying on in those parts.

Whereas the season of the year is so far advanced, that it may not be possible for you to arrive at Cape Horn, or to pass the Streights of Magellan, before the navigation in those parts may be so dangerous, that it cannot be attempted without risk to our squadron, you are, in that case, by no means to venture it, but to proceed directly to the river Plata, and there to remain till the season of the year shall permit you to go with safety to those seas. And as there is no certain account, that the rich ships, that were to come from Buenos Ayres are yet sailed from thence, it is possible that you may arrive, time enough, to intercept and take them, which, in that case, you will use your utmost endeavours to do.

During your stay in the river Plata, you shall endeavour to annoy and distress the Spaniards, in
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the best manner you are able, as well by taking, burning, sinking, or otherwise destroying any ships, or other embarcations, that they may have there, as by taking or destroying any of the Spanish settlements and possessions, which you may think practicable, with the force you have, to attempt. And you are particularly, if you should find it practicable to endeavour to take Monte Bedeo, and demolish it, or to put it into the possession of the Portuguese, in case the Portuguese governor of Nova Colonia should, by his behavior, encourage you so to do.

Whilst you are in the river Plata, you will keep a good correspondence with the Portuguese governor of Nova Colonia, who, it is not doubted, will be willing to supply you with whatever provisions you may want, for the service of our ships, under your command.

When you shall have annoyed and distressed the Spaniards, as much as you shall be able, in the river Plata, you are then to proceed to the South Seas, as soon as the season of the year will permit, either round Cape Horn, or through the Streights of Magellan, and act, according to the directions contained in the former part of these our instructions.

Admiralty. Commodore Anson, 1740 to 1744. No. XLVI.

Dec. 21st 1797.
Ex^d I. B.

APPENDIX, No. XVIII.

INSTRUCTIONS for our trusty and well-be-
loved MORDAUNT CRACHERODE, Esq.
Jan. 11, 1739-40.

Whereas we have thought proper, that five of our independent companies of invalids should be put on board a squadron of our ships, commanded by Captain George Anson, which we have appointed to go on a special service, you shall, on the receipt of these our instructions, take the said five companies under your command, and repair forthwith to Portsmouth, where our said squadron is, and embark on board the same, with our said companies of invalids, which are to be distributed in several ships, in such manner as shall be judged most convenient by the Commander in Chief of our said squadron. And as long as our said companies shall remain on board, they are to follow such directions, as shall be given by the Commander in Chief of our squadron, according to the constant practice in the like cases.

And whereas we have given full instructions to Captain Anson, with relation to the services to be performed by our ships, under his command, and have directed him, on certain occasions, to call a council of war, of which council of war, in
7 case

case of any attack or enterprize, proposed to be undertaken by land, you (or in your absence, the Commander in Chief of our Land Forces) are to be one. It is our pleasure, that in consequence of any determination that shall be taken by a council of war, for that purpose, our said forces, or any part of them, shall be landed, and during such time as they shall remain on shore, shall be under your direction and conduct, in the performance of any service at land, and in making any attempt or enterprize that shall have been previously agreed on by the said council of war.

And as it is our intention, that both the landing and reimbarking of our said troops should be entirely under the direction of a council of war, you are, with our forces under your command, to return on board our ships, whenever the same shall be judged proper by a council of war.

Admiralty. Com. Anson, 1740 to 1744. No. XLVI.

Dec. 21st, 1797.
Exd. I. B.

AP.

APPENDIX. No. XIX.

EXTRACT of Letter from Rear Admiral
 RODNEY to Mr. CLEVELAND, dated off
 Havre, 12th July, 1760.

Since my last, of yesterday's date, I have received certain intelligence from the masters of several neutral vessels, who came out of Havre, this day, and in particular from a Spaniard, who expressed an eager desire to speak with me, that the enemy were fitting out the Thames, Felicity, and another frigate, and that orders were come to Havre, to load ninety-four of their flatt bottomed boats, with military and naval stores, to be sent to Brest; that he saw seven loaded with cannon and shot, that eight thousand great shot were put on board one boat; that they were navigated with twelve men, each vessel having one gun in her prow, and another in the stern, with three months provisions; that they were sent, when loaded, to Honfleur, in the night, at which place, seven are now ready to sail, and five at Dive; that their orders are, to take the opportunity of an easterly wind, and dark night, to keep close in shore, and to be particularly careful to destroy the vessels,

fels, if in danger of the enemy; they are likewise directed to sail, five or seven in company, and never to pass Cape Barfleur, but in the night. The Spanish captain likewise informed me, that seven flat bottomed boats, loaded with timber, sailed from this place, about the middle of May; their getting safe to Brest, he imagines, has induced them to this further tryal; this intelligence, I believe, may be depended upon, it being corroborated by the master of a Portugues, brought on board me, in the night.

Please to acquaint their Lordships, I shall use my best endeavors to prevent the enemy's designs, and shall spread the small squadron, under my command, as much across the mouth of the river, as the depth of water will permit; but as the land between Honfleur and Dive is high, and the water shoal, a considerable distance off, there is little probability of their being intercepted, till they get fairly out of the river; but I shall continually keep cutters close in to the south shore, in the night; and have dispatched the Albany and Furnace, with the Anson cutter, and an armed fishing vessel, manned from the Deptford, with orders to disguise their vessels, as much as possible, and cruize close in shore, between the mouth of Caen river, and the Isles of Marçeau. I have likewise wrote to Admiral Durell to hasten the Rose to me, as soon as possible; and desire you will please to represent to their Lordships, the necessity of having more vessels under my command, at this present juncture, to enable me more effectually to perform this service. The Thames and the frigates, are intended for America,

CXX

A P P E N. No. XIX.

rica. I shall easily know their forwardness, their masts being perceptible, over the town; at present only their lower ones rigged.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

G. B. RODNEY.

Admiralty, 1760 to 1761. No. LXXII.

Dec. 21st 1797.

Exd J. B.

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Bruce, John, 1745-1826 / Bruce, John, / Melville, Henry Dundas,

Report on the Arrangements which have been adopted, in former Periods,
when France threatened Invasions of Britain or Ireland, to frustrate the
Designs of the Enemy, by attacks on his Foreign Possessions, or European
Ports, by annoying his Coasts, and by destroying his Equipments

[London] [1798]

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